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Abstract 
Current peacebuilding interventions aiming at addressing the causes of violent conflicts in 
the eastern DR Congo have been focusing on the ‘local community’ level as a scale of 
intervention. This study employed the multi-sited ethnographic methodological approach to 
understand why peacebuilding interventions have not so far succeeded in addressing the root 
causes of violence. Empirical findings drawn from this study demonstrate that, by focusing 
on land, power and identity issues as the driving forces of violence in Masisi (North Kivu), 
not only peacebuilding interventions have reduced the complexity of these issues to the 
‘local’ level at the expense of other levels (provincial, national and regional), but have also 
ignored the role of powerful individuals (string pullers) in conflict dynamics as well as 
networks of interests that continue to challenge the current peace initiatives. This study used 
the politics of scale approach to demonstrate how land, power, and identity are multi-scalar 
issues rather than only local ones, and to analyze how these issues continue to provide 
avenues to some powerful individuals in the process of the scales’ production. 
Acknowledging the relevance of the politics of scale in the approaches we currently know 
might be a way forward to peacebuilding paradigms shift.   
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Armed conflict and peacebuilding in eastern DR Congo 
                       […we have received fund from UN agencies and other 
peacebuilding organizations to work with local communities in Bashali… So 
far, the project has difficulties because the people we expected to be 
committed in activities block the project, following the order of some 
powerful individuals located in Goma and Kinshasa…], Conversation with 
NMM, July 2017 
This study departs from two dominant analyses about the crisis that has provoked a series of wars 
in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) over the past twenty years. The first 
analysis emphasizes the general governance crisis that has occurred in eastern DR Congo, which 
is seen as a crisis involving weak institutions and the failure to implement mainly security and 
administrative sector reforms (Trefon, 2011; Boshoff et al 2010). The second analysis (on which 
this study focuses) questions the role and approaches of the state- and peace-building interventions 
to support the Congolese government which have been going on for nearly two decades. This 
second analysis condemns the fact that the international community has privileged top-down 
approaches to resolve the Congolese crisis, arguing that, through these approaches, violent 
conflicts have actually persisted because the local dynamics of conflicts have been neglected and 
overlooked (Autesserre, 2007, 2008). Following this critique, scholars and policymakers have been 
extensively advocating for attention to the local level, where the issues of land, identity and power 
are seen as a starting point to effectively address the causes of violence (Huggins, 2010, 
Lemarchand, 2009). 
Over the past decade, the call for a ‘local turn’ has drawn the attention of many peace building 
organizations which have implemented several programs on the ‘local level’, under the label of 
‘local communities’, as a strategy to tackle the origins of violence and conflict. However, despite 
considerable efforts deployed in these interventions, very little has been achieved so far. This study 
argues that the design of the ‘local’ as a scale for interventions aiming at addressing the causes of 
violence has fallen into the ‘local trap’ due to ignorance regarding other levels of influence.  
Drawing on the assumption that the land, identity and power are the key drivers of the violent 
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conflicts in eastern DR Congo, this study uses multi-sited ethnographic methods to show how 
peace building interventions have not only reduced the complexity of the land, power and identity 
triangle to the ‘local’ level, but have also ignored the role of powerful individuals and networks 
across other levels, where other actors continue to challenge the current peace building approaches.  
This study uses the politics of scale approach to discuss land, power and identity as multi-scalar 
issues, and to analyze the role powerful individuals as well as networks play across different scales 
and times in Masisi, eastern DR Congo. It aims at examining the conditions under which land, 
identity and power, far from being only local issues, have been framed and shaped by Congolese 
legal and institutional frameworks through scales that are constructed and controlled by multiple 
actors and networks. To grasp how these processes have evolved over time I will introduce a 
historical perspective and frame of the violent conflicts that have occurred in the region.   
It is important to start with a historical outline and background. The decade of the 1990s was 
characterized by increasing political instability and violence in the Great Lakes region of East 
Africa, culminating in armed conflict in eastern DR Congo, massacres in Burundi, and the civil 
war and genocide in Rwanda, which had significant impacts on the situation we find today in 
eastern DR Congo. One of the areas in eastern DR Congo that was directly affected by the 
Rwandan crisis is Masisi and its surroundings areas. In 1993, inter-ethnic tensions among the 
population in Masisi resulted in widespread violence that caused over 10,000 deaths and the 
displacement of nearly 300,000 people (Mathieu & Tsongo, 2008:386). The protracted violence in 
Masisi from the early 1990s onward cannot be understood without putting it into its local and 
regional contexts. 
Before I proceed with the actors and the scales of these tensions, let me present the composition 
of social groups in the province of North Kivu as recognized by the Congolese government. 
According to the Monograph of North Kivu (2005:36), compiled in line with the requirement for 
each province to produce a study providing administrative, political, demographic, social and 
economic data, there are thirteen ethnic groups, also called ‘communities’. These groups are 
Nande, Pere, Mboba, Talinga, Kano, Nyanga, Kumu, Tembo, Kusu, Mbute, Hunde, Hutu and 
Tutsi. For the purpose of this study, I will focus mainly on three: the Hunde, Hutu and Tutsi. The 
majority of Hunde live in the Territoire of Masisi, where they consider themselves to be the 
original inhabitants (autochthons). Hutu and Tutsi also live in Masisi, but also in the Territoires of 
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Rutshuru and Lubero (in North Kivu) and Kalehe (in South Kivu). In South Kivu, there is another 
ethnic group called Banyamulenge (Tutsi) located in the Territoire of Fizi. In this thesis, I use the 
term Banyarwanda (referring to population of Rwandan origin) to designate Hutu and Tutsi (apart 
from the Banyamulenge), and also to distinguish Congolese Hutu and Tutsi from those in Rwanda. 
Chapter two describes the history of the Banyarwanda in the DR Congo in more detail. 
The Rwandan genocide of 1994 can be considered a decisive turning point for the political, social 
and military situation in eastern DR Congo, and particularly in the Kivu provinces, which hosted 
about two million Rwandan refugees in the period after the Rwandan genocide (Oyatambwe, 
1999:32). Among the refugees there were the defeated Rwandan forces (Forces Armées 
Rwandaises-FAR), ‘Interahamwe’ and ‘Hutu Power’, both Rwandan Hutu militias, which had 
been involved in the genocide. These militias fled to DR Congo (still Zaire at that time) with their 
military arsenal and were installed in a refugee camp a few kilometers from the Rwandan border. 
When the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) army led by Paul Kagame took power in Rwanda in July 
1994, the presence of Rwandan refugees and the general political instability in Congo at the time 
became a serious concern for the new Rwandan government. Profiting from the political chaos in 
Congo at the time, which was characterized by a general insecurity in the eastern part of the 
country, Ex-FAR and Interahamwe began recruiting young Rwandan refugees and organizing 
military training for an eventual attack on Rwanda to launch at any moment (Lanotte, 2003:34).  
Between 1995 and 1996, sporadic attacks on Rwanda from the Congolese side by ex-FAR and 
Interahamwe contributed to the Rwandan authorities’ concerns over the presence of Rwandan 
refugee camps in eastern DR Congo, leading them to consider a preventive military attack 
(Reyntjens, 2009:45). At the same time, the Rwandan regime of Kagame could not count on the 
Congolese government to deter the Ex-FAR and Interahamwe from their attempts to attack 
Rwanda. Mobutu, who was the president of the DR Congo at the time, had been an ally of the 
Hutu-dominated regime in Rwanda which Kagame had overthrown, and was therefore tolerant of 
the Hutu forces in DR Congo that were threatening to attack Rwanda. However, the political 
landscape was also rapidly changing in DR Congo, and Mobutu’s regime was showing imminent 
signs of collapse (Jewsiewicki, 2012:11).  
On the Congolese side, the crisis was triggered by a series of events. In 1990, Mobutu embarked 
on a process of democratic transition to a multiparty state, which culminated in a forum for national 
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dialogue between the Mobutu regime and the political opposition. This political opening offered 
to the Congolese opposition forces was largely due to the change in the geopolitical situation 
provoked by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the bipolar world order in 1989, meaning that 
Mobutu could no longer count on Western support. In August 1991, a national dialogue known as 
the National Sovereign Conference (Conférence Nationale Souveraine-CNS) took place in 
Kinshasa. The consensual transitional government (1991-1994) that resulted from the discussion 
during the CNS, decided that there should be a population census for the purpose of holding 
general elections. At the same time, the CNS decided to create the Vangu Commission, a 
parliamentary team that was sent to the Kivu provinces to evaluate the political and security 
situation. Upon the recommendations of the Vangu Commission, the Congolese Tutsi population 
in eastern DR Congo was accused of being accomplices of the Rwandan regime against the 
Congolese regime (Tegera, 2009:316).  
On October 7th 1996, following the Vangu Commission’s report on the situation in eastern DR 
Congo, the Governor of South Kivu delivered an ultimatum to the Tutsi of South Kivu, the so-
called Banyamulenge, to leave the country. This became an opportunity for Rwanda to justify a 
military attack on the DR Congo to prevent what the Rwandan regime called ‘another genocide’ 
against the Congolese Tutsi population (Turner, 2007:4), such as the one that had occurred in 
Rwanda in 1994. Until the ultimatum, there had not been enough of a reason to launch a war. More 
importantly, in order to avoid what could have been seen as a Rwandan invasion of the DR Congo, 
the Rwandan regime needed Congolese actors who could take the political lead in the war under 
preparation. Thus, in October 1996, an alliance of Congolese political forces was formed with 
Rwandan and Ugandan encouragement. This alliance was named Alliance de Forces 
Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL). The first meeting which instituted the 
AFDL was held in Kigali, Rwanda and gathered together a variety of Congolese political forces, 
including the Democratic Alliance of the People (Alliance Démocratique des Peuples-ADP), 
headed by Déogratias Bugera, a Tutsi from Masisi, who became the Secretary General of the 
AFDL, and the People’s Revolutionary Party (Parti Révolutionnaire pour le Peuple-PRP), 
represented by Laurent Désiré Kabila, who became the chairperson of the AFDL.  
In May 1997, with the military support of Rwanda and Uganda, the AFDL defeated Mobutu’s 
regime and took power, with Kabila as president. Although the AFDL military victory resulted in 
a total reconfiguration of the Great Lakes region in terms of security and political alliances, 
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pressing local questions such as the nationality of the Banyarwanda of Masisi and the repatriation 
of Congolese Tutsi refugees who fled to Rwanda in 1994 were not prioritized by the newly formed 
Kabila government. The Rwandan and Ugandan forces initially remained in the country; however, 
tensions developed, as Kabila accused Rwanda and Uganda of imperialism and of looting 
Congolese resources (Willame, 1999: 213). At the end of July 1998 Kabila expelled the Rwandan 
and Ugandan forces, causing alarm to the Banyarwanda. He in turn was accused of tribalism, 
nepotism and dictatorship by former AFDL members, mainly Tutsi and Hutu leaders. A rebellion 
erupted in Goma in early August. This new rebellion took the name Rassemblement Congolais 
pour la Démocratie (Congolese Rally for Democracy-RCD) and resulted in a new war against the 
government of Kabila, the so-called Second Congo War, which was launched simultaneously from 
North and South Kivu provinces.  
While the RCD was supported by Rwanda and Uganda, President Kabila benefited from support 
in troops and weapons from Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia. One year after the beginning of the 
fighting, a ceasefire was signed in Lusaka (Zambia) with the help of mediation by the African 
Union and the United Nations. On November 30th 1999, the United Nations created the Mission 
of the United Nations in DR Congo (MONUC, which became MONUSCO in July 2010) under 
Resolution 1291 of the Security Council. In April 2002, the Lusaka ceasefire agreement was 
followed by the ‘Global and Inclusive Agreement’ signed by all belligerents in Sun City, South 
Africa. The major outcome of this agreement was the creation of a transitional government in DR 
Congo in the beginning of 2003. The agreement had five main objectives: reunification and 
restoration of state authority, national reconciliation, formation of a structured and integrated 
national army, organization of elections, and the formation of structures that could lead to a new 
political order. These objectives were supported by the MONUC mandate which was summarized 
in five points: implementing the Lusaka ceasefire agreement, monitoring against violations of the 
agreement, facilitating the transition, assistance in organizing general elections, and facilitating 
the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reinstallation and Reinsertion (DDRRR) 
processes (see UN Security Council Resolution 1279 of 1999). To ensure the implementation of 
the Sun City agreement, the international community, represented by the five UN Security Council 
members, created an international committee for the support of the transition called the Comité 
International d’Accompagnement de la Transition (CIAT). Based in Kinshasa, CIAT accompanied 
the Congolese government in the organization of elections in 2006. However, even before the 
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elections, signs of a new war were seen in North Kivu. In 2004, one year after the transition had 
begun, the creation of a military group called Synérgie Nationale pour la Paix et la Concorde 
(SNPC), led by Laurent Nkunda, a Tutsi military man whose headquarters were located in Masisi, 
marked the start of a new rebellion against the transitional government in Kinshasa. The 
transformation of SNPC into the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP/ National 
Congress for the Defense of the People) in 2005 revealed Nkunda’s agenda: the protection of Tutsi 
community interests. On the other side, the Hutu community organized itself in PARECO 
(Coalition des Patriotes Résistants Congolais / Alliance of Resistant Congolese Patriots) and the 
Hunde community created APCLS (Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain 
/Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo). These armed groups will be further 
discussed in chapter six. 
The role of Rwanda became ambiguous within this configuration of local armed groups. The 
CNDP was largely interested in the return of Congolese Tutsi refugees living in Rwanda, in the 
recovery of their land in DR Congo once returned there, and in their security against the Force 
Démocratique pour la Liberation du Rwanda- FDLR (Democratic Force for the Liberation of 
Rwanda), a Hutu armed movement in eastern DR Congo, composed of former soldiers of the 
Rwandan national army and the ‘Interahamwe’ militia. This group was created in 2000 and 
established its bases in different locations in eastern DR Congo, with the aim of overthrowing 
Kagame’s regime in Rwanda (Pole Institute 2008:8). On the other hand, the other group that was 
active in the region, PARECO, did not have any official political agenda and did not officially 
declare war against the Congolese government, unlike the CNDP and FDLR. 
In December 2008, CNDP and PARECO, alongside other armed groups in North and South Kivu, 
accepted a ceasefire and signed a peace agreement with the Congolese government in March 2009. 
However, in January 2009, before the signing of this agreement on March 23rd 2009 in Goma, 
Nkunda was arrested by Rwandan authorities (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2009:482). In 2012, 
ex-CNDP leaders created another rebel group named M23, which was led by Tutsi officers and 
demanded the implementation of the Goma agreement. In 2013, M23 was defeated by the 
Congolese army with the support of UN peacekeeping troops. Hundreds of M23 troops fled to 
Rwanda and Uganda. Around this time, the Hutu in Masisi were organized in another militia group 
called Nyatura (composed of ex PARECO troops), which was, and continues to be, in permanent 
rivalry with APCLS, the Hunde militia in the region. 
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It is against this highly complex background that state- and peace-building intervention efforts 
intensified in DR Congo from the year 2000, with a particular focus on the eastern parts of the 
country. In the aftermath of the Congolese general election of 2006, the Congolese state had 
become, in the eyes of the international community and donors, a ‘legitimate’ government that 
needed consistent technical and financial support. The national security sector reform (SSR) and 
the construction of national public infrastructures became the priority of the international 
community, which implemented several projects such as the training of the army and the police, 
and capacity building in public administration (International Crisis Group, 2006; Boshoff et al., 
2010). One example is the European Union fund, which covered a period of ten years (2003-2013) 
and aimed at strengthening the state’s capacity to recover from the effects of the war. In order to 
implement these programs, the EU funds were disbursed to international organizations, mostly 
western non-governmental organizations (NGOs). However, despite efforts by diverse actors, the 
cycle of violence in eastern DR Congo still persists to the present day.  
Critiques by scholars have, since then, denounced this failure and associated it with a top-down 
approach applied by international peace and state-building organizations, and they have advocated 
for more focused attention to the local dimension of the conflict. This local turn, based on the 
assumption that conflict dynamics have to do mainly with the local level in which different groups 
are opposed to one another and continue to maintain the violence, has given rise to several 
interventions. In dealing with the ‘local’, the issues of land, power and identity have been framed 
and put at the center of conflict resolution efforts, and this has led to the design of different peace 
building programs by diverse organizations. Nonetheless, in almost three decades of peace efforts, 
many of these interventions still have not successfully addressed the root causes of violence.   
1.2 Statement of the problem: Peace building and the local trap  
Throughout the past two decades, international organizations have intensified interventions in 
eastern DR Congo in attempts to deal with the causes of violence. The first dominant view of 
intervention was based on the hypothesis that the DR Congo is an extreme example of a neo-
patrimonial state in which networks of businessmen and politicians have created and maintained a 
status quo of political chaos (Tull, 2003:431). The argument that has been put forward is that the 
origin of the violent conflict is situated at the state level, with the state having lost both the 
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monopoly on the use of violence and control over its international borders, since Congolese 
independence in 1960 (Maindo, 2007:25). This assumption has led international actors to intervene 
mainly at the national level as a strategy in both state-building and post-war reconstruction (1996 
and 1998), especially in the eastern part of the DR Congo.  
According to the survey conducted between 2006 and 2007 by the International Rescue Committee 
(Coghlan B. et al (2008):  
the DR Congo’s national crude mortality rate (CMR) of 2.2 deaths per 1,000 per 
month is 57 percent higher than the average rate for sub-Saharan Africa. This rate is 
unchanged since the previous IRC survey in 2004. DR Congo remains in the midst 
of a major humanitarian crisis… we now estimate that 5.4 million excess deaths 
have occurred between August 1998 and April 2007 (2008: ii).  
These figures have influenced the agendas of UN agencies, the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, the European Union and bilateral donors, in holding the view that the Congolese 
government should resolve the causes of violence. This view of the international community has 
put the DR Congo in the category of a post-war country and it has been assumed that the state 
should become effective through the strengthening and reforming of its institutions (Froitzheim et 
al, 2011:46). For example, during the Congolese political transition (2003-2006), the international 
community priorities were largely oriented towards state-building programs, in the form of 
security sector reforms and the organization of elections. As Sévérine Autesserre put it, 
Many of the international actors, especially high-ranking diplomats and UN staff 
members, do not believe that local causes played a decisive role in sustaining 
national and regional violence during the war and in the post-war period. During the 
transition, diplomats, UN staff, and many non-governmental organizations worked 
mostly on the national and regional cleavages, mediating among, and when 
necessary putting pressure on, the main Congolese, Rwandan, and Ugandan political 
and military leaders (2007: 424). 
This view of the state as key actor in resolving the causes of violence has been nourished by state-
building ideas which consist of re-building institutions of a post-conflict or fragile state (discussed 
in detail in chapter two). In the Congolese context, these ideas have been criticized as the ‘liberal 
peace’ approach which assumes that democracy and the market economy are intrinsically peaceful 
and mutually reinforce each other (de Goede 2015:1). In the same way, in other countries such as 
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Sierra Leone (Tom, 2011), Bosnia (Chandler, 2006), or countries in Central America (Kurtenbach, 
2011), state-building has been a central focus of multidimensional peace operations in war-torn 
societies. However, efforts to construct legitimate, effective state institutions are often rife with 
tensions and contradictions (Paris and Sisk, 2007:1).  
From 1999 onward, the DR Congo has hosted almost 20,000 UN troops to support peace efforts 
and the democratic process. The organization of general elections in 2006 and 2011 attracted the 
attention of the international community and of bilateral donors, under the assumption that an 
election would solve the problem of legitimacy and would therefore reinforce the state’s authority 
to deal with the causes of the conflict. However, despite the significant amounts of international 
funding and expertise in support of the Congolese national government in its efforts in conflict 
resolution, there is little tangible evidence of success (see Boshoff 2010, Justaert and Keukeleire 
2010, International Crisis Group, 2006). Oxfam’s report (2012: 5) points out that efforts toward 
stabilization in DR Congo have not been successful due to the lack of political will from the 
Congolese government and lack of inclusion of stakeholders in the different stabilization 
programs. As Trefon (2011: 1) pointed out, the overall picture of reform failure is the sum of a 
series of disconnected, uncoordinated, fragmented and contradictory initiatives due to lack of a 
common vision among Congo’s bilateral and multilateral donors. Froitzheim et al. (2011: 45) 
echoed Trefon in showing that the European Union’s state-centered approach has been unable to 
deal with the realities of governance in the DR Congo and the strong trans-border dimensions of 
the conflict. The authors condemn the lack of a coherent strategy for the DR Congo, despite the 
large budgets. Their analysis concludes that the EU’s approach in the DR Congo has been 
resolutely nation-based, more concerned with establishing a symbolic presence and a form of 
representation than with achieving specific goals.  
This lack of effectiveness is demonstrated in the concrete examples of several programs 
implemented in the areas affected by violence. Examples are the Stabilization and Reconstruction 
Plan for War-Affected Areas (STAREC) and the International Security and Stabilization Support 
Strategy (ISSSS). STAREC was created in 2009 as a post-conflict program aiming at stabilizing 
eastern DR Congo by improving the security environment, whereas the ISSSS was created by the 
UN mission in DR Congo (MONUSCO) to support and coordinate interventions in partnership 
with the Congolese government through STAREC. Despite the financial and technical 
contributions from donors, these failed to yield the expected results. 
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Thus far, current assessments of the programs implemented demonstrate a lack of consultation, 
particularly with the targeted populations, a prevalence of material reconstruction over governance 
reform, a lack of international coordination, and a lack of financial commitment from the 
Congolese government (International Crisis Group 2012: 8). International Alert (2012: 7) 
concludes that the various programs implemented by the government and by international partners 
to bring peace in eastern DR Congo have failed because they have based their interventions on 
mistaken assumptions and unreliable context assessments. Some of these assumptions are refracted 
versions of what Autesserre (2012:204) describes as ‘dominant narratives’ of discourse on the 
Congo conflict, which underlie the intervention strategies. These dominant narratives focus on a 
primary cause of violence (the illegal exploitation of natural resources); a main consequence 
(sexual abuse against women and girls); and a central solution (reconstructing state authority). As 
Autesserre argues, these narratives obscure the interveners’ understanding of the multi-layered 
problems of the Congo, orienting interventions toward a series of technical responses that in fact 
hinder the search for a comprehensive solution.  
Several critiques of international intervention efforts have concluded that they have failed to 
restore peace in eastern DR Congo due to their failure to take on board the underlying causes of 
the violence, that go beyond the national realm. This is the approach taken by Autesserre 
(2009:256), who argues that international efforts have been doomed by a ‘culture’ of peacekeeping 
that has made its protagonists neglect the importance of local conflicts. She stresses, in the same 
way as Lemarchand (2009:119), that the main reason for failed peace-building efforts in Congo is 
that the international community has paid too little attention to the root causes of the violence, 
including local disputes over land, power and ethnic identity. 
Putting these causes in historical context, Mamdani (2002:494) argues that it is the persistence of 
the ‘native authority’ – the colonial system of rule that welded ethnicity with power and land, 
splitting the political world between those who are indigenous and those who are not – that 
continues to fuel violence in the Kivu Provinces. Stearns (2013:165) agrees with Autesserre and 
Mamdani in stating that customary rule, local power disputes and land conflicts are at the center 
of violence in Kivu. All of these authors acknowledge that there are deep-seated resentments over 
thorny issues such as citizenship, land tenure, and local power structures in eastern DR Congo.  
These critiques have led to a second dominant view of intervention in which the ‘local level’ has 
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become a new feature for external interventions. In response to the critiques of the top-down 
approach and demands for an alternative, non-state actors (NGOs and UN agencies) have started 
implementing projects at the ‘local level’. The problem with this ‘local turn’, however, is that it 
has faced two unresolved issues. Firstly, considering land, power and identity as essentially ‘local’ 
issues has also misled interventions. Although the existing literature emphasizes that land, identity 
and power issues are at the core of violent conflict in Masisi, peace building organizations rarely 
implement projects that reflect this comprehensive diagnosis. Even though conflicts over land have 
played and continue to play an important role as a driving force of violence and are a primary 
source of tensions between the so-called ‘local communities’, the connected questions of identity 
and political power remain missing from the local interventions (this is further demonstrated in 
chapter four). Many projects on the grassroots level focus on resolving land disputes among 
individuals through mediation, reconciliation and conflict resolution skills. Some organizations 
are also involved in advocacy campaigns at provincial and national levels in attempts to affect land 
reform. However, despite this set of peace- and state-building interventions over almost two 
decades, the causes of violent conflicts are still not adequately addressed.  
Secondly, patron-client networks and the powerful individuals that control land and power 
structures are rarely part of peace building initiatives carried out by NGOs (Vlassenroot and 
Raeymaekers 2009, Fuamba et al 2013). This was also noted by Laudati (2013:46) when she 
argued that the failure to recognize these actors as influential figures in terms of potential violence 
around land, identity and power, was also simultaneously a failure to recognize those actors and 
networks as potential pathways to peace. In Masisi, those networks and powerful individuals do 
not only act on a clearly defined local level, but they also hold political positions in the capital, 
Kinshasa, run important businesses in Goma, and are connected to multiple informal networks at 
provincial and national levels.  
So far, none of the various peace building interventions has ever succeeded in coming up with a 
coherent approach that includes those actors in the peace processes.        
This study relies on the assumption, which both scholars and policymakers have recognized, that 
working at the local level should be the starting point to address the causes of violent conflicts, 
and on the evidence on the ground which shows how peace building organizations have ignored 
the complexity of what is only vaguely referred to as the ‘local’. Local intervention efforts have 
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not only failed to deal with various links between the ‘local’ and other levels beyond the local; 
organizations have also overestimated the capacity of the ‘local community’ to address the 
complex causes of violence. While it is agreed that the nature of conflict is essentially local, the 
case of Masisi in eastern DR Congo shows how the key driving forces of violence (such as power, 
land and identity) are not exclusively local issues; they are linked to other scales of influence and 
involve multiple actors and networks.  
For decades, peace building actors have failed to provide both a clear approach to address the 
underlying factors of violence and a constructive long-term process in which Congolese actors 
would eventually take ownership to prevent violent conflicts. Thus far, peace building 
organizations have not questioned their erroneous understanding of the local, which consists in 
hoping that local communities will gladly accommodate their peace building programs, and in 
expecting local communities to be capable of addressing the triangle-related violence, 
independently of other scales and dimensions of the conflict. It is the existing failure in scrutinizing 
and understanding ‘the local’ on both a theoretical and empirical level that has motivated this 
study.  
This study seeks to question the meaning of ‘local’, such as is taken for granted by peace building 
organizations, while showing how the local is linked to other levels, and the conditions under 
which powerful individuals navigate across different levels of influence, at the expense of conflict 
management initiatives.  
This study seeks to understand why peacebuilding interventions working at the local level for years 
continuously fail to address the causes of violent conflict in spite of huge resources allocated. Why 
and how is the ‘local community’ constructed and how is it used to implement peace building 
programs? What are the limitations of focusing on the local community and how does this 
constitute the local trap? Finally, what were the processes of scale production by diverse actors 
and how can peacebuilding interventions relate to the politics of scale? The general objective of 
this study is to analyze the processes of the emergence of local actors as well as the conditions 
under which these actors contributed to the production of multiple scales. The aim is to understand 
why current peacebuilding interventions continue to fail in addressing the causes of violent conflict 
and to what extent the politics of scale could provide a thorough understanding of this failure.  
Specifically, this study seeks to: (1) identify and analyze examples of peace building interventions 
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in eastern DR Congo in order to understand the process of the construction of the ‘local’ as a scale 
to legitimize intervention, and how this actually relates to other scales, which tend to be neglected 
by peace building interventions. This study asks why and how was the ‘local community’ 
constructed and how is it used to implement peace building programs? What are the limitations of 
focusing on the local community and how does this constitute the local trap? 
(2) discuss and analyze the role powerful individuals and networks play across different scales of 
influence in DR Congo. How and under which conditions land, power and identity have become 
multi-scalar issues, the connection between peace building interventions and powerful individuals, 
as well as the role of legal plurality and institutions that contributes to the maintaining of violent 
conflict. 
(3) contribute to current knowledge about the role of actors and scale-making processes in peace 
and conflict studies by analyzing the conditions of the emergence of Big Men in eastern DR Congo, 
and how their relations to land, power and identity provide an empirical outlook and adequate 
analytical framework in the field of political geography.  
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is organized in seven chapters. The first chapter gives a general introduction to the 
study. It begins with the background to the conflict, the actors involved and dynamics at different 
levels. It also states the research problem addressed in this study as well as the objectives and 
research questions of the study. 
The second chapter provides a literature review on peacebuilding, its relation to state building and 
other related approaches such as the ‘local turn’. It discusses the meaning of land, power and 
identity in the peace and conflict studies in sub Saharan African countries and in the eastern DR 
Congo in particular. The chapter scrutinizes the meaning of politics of scale in the contest of 
protracted conflict and it is used to build the theoretical approach used in the study. Chapter three 
discusses the methodological aspects, namely the multi-sited ethnography, research areas, 
categories of participants to the study, reflexivity and positionality as well as the conditions of 
fieldwork and challenges of the study.  
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Chapter four examines the process of the construction of the ‘local community’ level and explains 
how peacebuilding interventions design programs around land, power and identity issues, while it 
questions the meaning of the ‘local’ in comparisons to other scales. It explores the extent to which 
focusing on the local level has or has not been an effective approach to address the root causes of 
the violence. Chapter five analyzes land, power and identity as multi-scalar issues. It discusses the 
way peacebuilding interventions have dealt with land tenure issues mostly on the local scale, 
ignoring other scales, especially important jurisdictional and institutional frameworks at the 
provincial and national scale. Apart from land tenure, this chapter discusses relevant laws and 
institutions, with emphasis on how the Banyarwanda in Masisi struggled to access rights to land 
and nationality. Chapter six draws on chapter five to discuss the processes through which these 
struggles evolved in different periods of time and produced scales, navigating from the local, 
regional and national. The chapter discusses the emergence of armed groups and powerful 
individuals as well as strategies used by them both to gain power and to control land. I use an 
example of a conflict transformation implemented in Bashali chieftaincy (Masisi) by Life&Peace 
Institute (a Sweden-based peacebuilding organization) in partnership with Action Solidaire pour 
la Paix (ASP), a Congolese civil society organization. I closely analyze a participatory-action 
research both organizations conducted in Bashali, in order to identify to what extent powerful 
individuals (‘string pullers’) can be determinant in the success or failure of such a conflict 
transformation initiative.   
  
15 
 
Chapter 2 Conceptual framework                               
2.1 Conflict drivers, peacebuilding and the question of scale  
2.1.1 Definitions and discussion  
Questions of land, power and identity in the literature are discussed across different fields of study 
and their meanings vary accordingly. The definition and the understanding of each of the three 
concepts are sometimes analyzed separately, sometimes in the same analytical framework. In this 
sub-chapter, and for the purpose of this study, I will discuss each of the three concepts with 
particular attention to how different research fields relate them to conflict studies.  
Over the past decade, scholars have been engaging with the concept of land in relation to various 
other issues such as land access, property, authority, belonging, citizenship and how the analysis 
of conflict considers these concepts as contested issues and often at the center of groups’ claims 
(see Lund 2011, Sikor and Lund 2009, Boone 2014). Other authors discuss land as a governance 
issue by focusing on the function of legal systems and institutions (see Jentoft, 2011; Kurniawan, 
2014). In conflict studies, however, the notion of land, seen as a conflict factor, is rarely discussed 
as an isolated issue when it comes to what is usually called ‘land conflict’. This is because, often, 
access to land is seen as problematic in most African rural areas where land-related conflicts are 
recorded (Lund et al, 2006:4; Boone, 2014).  
Many of these conflicts are also described as due to failure in distribution or redistribution between 
different social groups, which generate competitive struggles over land and land-based resources 
(De Luca and Sekeris, 2012:121). This view of land through the prism of access and distribution 
is also linked to the critical roles of state agencies, members of elites and a national ‘dominant 
class’ – persons able to use state bureaucracies and procedures for their own benefit – as well as 
the increasing importance of transnational networks linking nationally based agents with 
international corporations and foreign governments (Peters, 2004:306). This quest for large tracts 
of land is also seen as a strategy to maintain power by the political elite, who manipulate the rules 
and practices of land tenure to acquire land mainly in rural areas where tensions around land are 
likely to produce violence (Boone 2012:77; Rose, 2002:189). 
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Another aspect discussed about land tenure issues is the idea of land as ‘property’, property that 
can be claimed by both individuals and social groups on the one hand, and by the state on the other 
(Fay and James 2010:3; Upton, 2009:1408). In this context where authority over land is claimed 
by both individuals and the state, land tenure may involve reform processes by the state as a tool 
to better control and regulate access to it (Peters, 2007:24, Sikor and Mueller, 2009:1309). This 
claim for authority over land control and the struggles it generates is also explained by human 
geographers when they associate land with both the site and stake of struggle in the sense that 
conflict is experienced over land possession which at the same time is conducted on its terrain 
(Elden, 2010:806). Alongside the academic debate about the function of land in conflict settings, 
this vision of land as a stake of conflict has also been embraced by non-academic actors.  
In the policymaking sector, for example, land tenure has been largely considered as a tool for 
promoting peacebuilding and durable peace and to address the causes of land-related violence. In 
many countries, several interventions in the land sector not only tried to promote land governance 
as a business opportunity, but also the promotion of land governance is seen as a way to mitigate 
tensions, as in the International Organization for Migration official message: 
it was generally agreed that neither durable peace nor sustainable development 
can be achieved without giving due attention to land, access to land and hence 
land rights. It was widely noted that land tenure and property rights are important 
tools for promoting peacebuilding and durable peace, and should therefore be 
included in the UN Post-2015 Development Agenda (IOM, 2014:1). 
Furthermore, seen as a conflict factor, land has been at the center of many peacebuilding 
interventions often following guidelines provided by both academic and policymaking institutions. 
The World Bank, for example, believes that scarcity of productive land and changes in land tenure 
systems in Africa are contributing factors to violent conflicts (see OECD, 2001 and World Bank, 
2003 reports). Likewise, Policy Brief 3 from the series Policy briefs on post-conflict peacebuilding 
and natural resources management states that:  
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Land access, use, and ownership are central concerns for post-conflict 
peacebuilding. Land and its governance are often root causes of conflict; land 
issues played a major role in all but three of the more than thirty intrastate 
conflicts that occurred between 1990 and 2009 (Jensen et al, 2013:1).  
The dominant assumption behind this linkage between land and conflict, as mentioned above, 
relies on the idea that post-conflict societies often suffer from a lack of clarity regarding which 
laws and institutions can better govern the access, use, and ownership of land as well as land-based 
resources. In this study, I will engage with the concept of land in the sense of land access and the 
ways it involves the dimensions of identity and power.  
Attempts by scholars and policy makers to deal with land questions often refer to the dimension 
of ‘power’, whether in the form of politics, authority, state institutions or political elite, while at 
the same time, there is no consensus about what it means exactly.  
Power is one of the key concepts in the great western tradition of thought about 
political phenomena. It is at the same time a concept on which, in spite of its long 
history, there is, on analytical levels, a notable lack of agreement both about its 
specific definition, and about many features of the conceptual context in which it 
should be placed (Parsons, 1963: 232) 
Following Parsons’s warning about the concept of ‘power’, and in respect to the well-known 
classic and contemporary theorists of ‘power’ such as Max Weber, Karl Marx, Thomas Hobbes, 
Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, etc., there is not a single and apt definition of what ‘power’ is. 
With this difficulty of defining ‘power’, there is at least a trend among political scientists, human 
geographers, anthropologists and sociologists to discuss the concept of power in a broad analytical 
framework, by relating it to other concepts and other phenomena that fit in the respective research 
area of each discipline. For example, within the constructivist analysis of power, there is a belief 
that power and politics may have a strong mutually defining link, so much so that they are often 
used together as a single concept (Guzzini, 2005:519).  
This difficulty of defining ‘power’ as a single concept has also been largely accepted by human 
geographers, who therefore suggest that politics, the state, scale and political geographies of the 
contemporary world can be discussed without necessarily being very precise about what power is 
(Low, 2005:87). Guzzini, for example suggests that one should detach the notion of power from 
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states and institutions by taking a close look at ‘politics’ as something that is done by actors, 
beyond states. This argument of taking into consideration the role of multiple actors seems to 
strongly emphasize the idea that power is not restricted to those in government but can be shared 
by other elected members, powerful lobby groups, the media and the bureaucracy (Moore, 
2010:125). This recognition of multiple actors to better contextualize the concept of power also 
brings out another aspect which considers power as a relational effect of social interactions (Allen, 
2003:2). Allen demonstrates that power may bridge the gap between here and there, but only 
through a succession of mediated relations. He sees power as something that emerges and is 
immanent in the context of particular social relations through the work of networks and 
associations.  
When Berger and Luckmann (1966:18) in The Social Construction of Reality provide a 
differentiation between ‘society as objective reality’ and ‘society as subjective reality’, the notion 
of power seems not to be explicitly discussed, although they used Durkheim’s and Weber’s 
sociological perspectives of power as socially constructed. However, there is a clear recognition 
that this differentiation provided by the authors offers a theoretical foundation to discuss power. 
This recognition starts with the idea that society is formed by individual actors who produce 
society based on a subjective reality which guides their actions while, at the same time, individuals 
are formed by society and its objectivations (Dreher, 2016:55). As far as power is concerned, 
argues Dreher, it is precisely objective reality which comes into focus, since power structures and 
power hierarchies are specifically seen as structural conditions through which institutions, also, 
are the product of human action representing historicity and social control. It is precisely through 
this human production of hierarchies in order to control institutions and scales that I bring out the 
dimension of identity, as both constructed and contested features by groups of people engaged in 
competition.  
Identity is one of those concepts where any analysis runs the risk of generalizing and simplifying 
what it would actually mean. Peace and conflict studies, for example, is one of the research areas 
where identity takes different meanings and shapes. Often, it is associated with ethnicity (see Le 
Meur et al., 2006; Ndegwa 1997), or citizenship (see Boye and Kaarhus, 2011; Perneş 2012), or 
sometimes with the claims of belonging (see Jacob and Le Meur, 2012; Boone, 2007). Even when 
these forms of identity can predominantly be claimed by individuals or groups distinguishing 
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themselves from others, they generally lack a clear meaning depending on the context and 
dynamics of the conflict being experienced.  
Identity is formed by social processes. Once crystallized, it is maintained, 
modified, or even reshaped by social relations through social structures. (Berger 
and Luckmann, 1966:173).  
In the same way as power is socially constructed by human action which represents the historicity 
and social control of actors, Berger and Luckmann discuss how societies have histories in the 
course of which specific identities emerge and that these histories are made by people with specific 
identities. Berger and Luckmann stress that identity is - generally speaking - a phenomenon that 
emerges from the dialectic between individuals and society, whereas identity types are social 
products tout court. I will tentatively discuss some identity types that provide a certain account of 
what identity would mean in this study.  
To begin, take the example of citizenship. Seen as one piece of the identity puzzle, which needs to 
be carefully contextualized, defined and its meaning and its implications located in time and space 
(Duyvendak and Scholten, 2012: 276; O’Brien, 2016:102). Sometimes, citizenship can also be 
seen generally, and seen as a combination of rights and obligations that link individuals to the 
state, including paying taxes, obeying laws, and exercising the full range of political, civil, and 
social rights (Clarke and Missingham, 2009:955). Bringing the notion of citizenship in the state-
society presented by Clarke and Missingham, suggests the idea of citizenship as agency (Lister, 
1997:9). In his attempt to conceptualize the notion of citizenship, Lister sees it as participation that 
represents an expression of human agency in the political arena. Broadly defined, Lister explains 
how citizenship constitutes the rights that enable people to act as agents, individually or in 
collaboration with others. Lister’s central argument in this regard is that citizenship rights are not 
fixed; they remain the object of political struggles to defend, reinterpret, and extend them. Who is 
involved in those struggles, where they are placed in the political hierarchy, and what political 
power and influence they can wield will help to determine the outcomes of such struggles.  
To capture the essence of what Lister means by ‘citizenship rights are not fixed; they remain the 
object of political struggles’, Jones and Gaventa (2002:19) bring into the debate the idea of ‘scales 
of citizenship’ to show how the nation-state relation is the spatial frame of reference for citizenship. 
They argue that in the contemporary context of globalization-localization there is increasing 
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recognition of different groups within and beyond states, at the many different scales in which 
people’s lives are played out. The de-linkage of citizenship from the national state, the authors 
claim, has been of particular concern to those engaged in advocacy for the citizenship rights of 
people who live in areas which are not those of their cultural origin (migrants, refugees, etc.) for 
whom the formal status of ‘national citizenship’ remains a critical question. Citizenship thus, they 
conclude, becomes a differentiated relationship of belonging, action and accountability between 
citizens and the many different institutions that have influence on their lives.  
Conceptualized as a politics of scale, citizenship is considered as an aspect of social formations as 
both the objects and the outcomes of contending political enterprise. For example, the ‘local’ as a 
scale often emerges in varying configurations and through different fields of relationships in which 
citizenship is entangled as articulations of people and place (Clark et al, 2014:141). Looking at 
citizenship across scales also suggests the dialectic local citizenship versus national citizenship 
that actors may claim or fight for. Nguya-Ndila (2001) for example distinguishes two types of 
citizenship: civic (which refers to political rights, such as the right to vote and the right to benefit 
from public services) and ethnic (which grants the right to enjoy local resources, including land). 
This distinction between local and national citizenship is not new; it is a pre-colonial phenomenon, 
as Mamdani (1998:2) shows. Mamdani points out that the political crisis of the colonial state lies 
in the bifurcated citizenship reproduced through the bifurcated state. Moreover, he discusses how 
the formation of identity has been the result of a distinction in law between those indigenous and 
those not: as a rule, the non-indigenous belonged to the civic sphere and the indigenous to the 
ethnic sphere, the equivalent of what Nguya-Ndila calls national and local citizenship. In the 
example of the Banyarwanda in eastern Congo, Mamdani explains that only those considered 
indigenous (Hunde, Nyanga, Nande…) were entitled to a native authority of their own, and thus 
to an ethnic citizenship. But because the Banyarwanda immigrants in Masisi were not entitled to 
have a native authority of their own, they were excluded from ethnic citizenship. The reason why 
this ethnic or local citizenship mattered for the Banyarwanda in Masisi settlement was that it refers 
to social and economic rights, usually referred to as customary rights (Mamdani, 2002:502). 
Linking local citizenship to ethnic groups, both indigenous and non-indigenous, to define which 
of these two categories has the rights to that local citizenship, seems to bring ethnicity into the 
process of negotiating local citizenship (Boone 2007:578). It is important to mention here that as 
far as the notion of identity is concerned, local citizenship - as both a form of identity and political 
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claim - remains tricky to define, especially when it is merged with ethnicity. As Mamdani noted, 
in some African countries,  
Ethnicity, in other words, was never just about identity. Its two contradictory 
moments involved both social control and social emancipation. This is why it 
makes sense neither just to embrace ethnicity uncritically nor simply to reject it 
one-sidedly. Everywhere the local apparatus of the colonial state was organized 
either ethnically or on a religious basis. (Mamdani, 1996:147) 
In this study, the concept of identity is handled with care because of its complexity and fluidity. 
The data collected in this study will shed light on the terms in which ‘identity’ has been expressed, 
used or claimed by different actors.  
2.1.2 The interconnection of land, power and identity in conflict studies 
The conceptualization of land, identity and power and their relationship to conflict also recognizes 
the difficulty of generalizing one single definition for any of the three concepts. For example, land 
is usually associated with land rights, land access, property rights; whereas power evokes politics, 
public institutions, authority; and identity generally refers to citizenship, ethnicity, belonging, or 
autochthony. Generally speaking, conflict around land consistently gives rise to explanations based 
on the identity and interests of actors involved. Lund (2011:73) for example recognizes that there 
is always more at stake in land conflicts, arguing that it is never merely a question of land per se 
but rather also a question of property, and of social and political relationships. For Lund, land is 
not only a matter of access to property rights; citizenship and property are also closely connected 
in the sense that citizenship and belonging can be avenues to access and secure property, and 
property may bolster claims of belonging and citizenship.  
 
Assuming that citizenship and belonging can secure property may become problematic in the sense 
that the notion of citizenship is also contested (James, 2013:3) and often suggests a distinction 
between ‘national’ and ‘local’ citizenship (Jacob and LeMeur, 2012:93). While people may share 
a national citizenship, the idea of autochthony is often invoked as a mechanism of inclusion and 
exclusion (Geschiere, 2011:331). In the same line of thought, even in the context where a certain 
group has a national citizenship that endows them with certain rights, it is neither the only 
significant form of belonging to a political community nor the only source of property rights (Sikor 
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and Lund, 2009:16). Unlike national citizenship, local citizenship and land rights can be strongly 
intertwined and can, in some cases, mutually secure each other (Boye and Kaarhus, 2011:101).  
The assumption that local citizenship (although a contested form of identity) can ‘easily’ secure 
land may not always apply everywhere and in every place. It can be argued that local citizenship 
does not in itself secure land rights but merely allows those who are recognized as citizens (whether 
local or national) to enter the political economy of land and land questions. Being an autochthon, 
therefore, does not necessarily guarantee the security of land rights either, because in some cases, 
non-autochthons can easily acquire and secure their land rights through legal procedures (such as 
land registers), which provide land certificates to each citizen (Bøås, 2009: 22). Although access 
to land in many sub-Saharan African countries is often obtained by the acquisition of property 
rights, the way property rights are negotiated and how land regimes interfere in competition for 
land between social groups in rural areas is not always clear. Partly, this is because land tenure 
systems in many societies in Africa are fragmented and subject to many competing normative 
orders, which makes them challenging to analyze through any one lens (Perneş, 2012:195).  
This analysis is also made harder by the ways in which land tenure institutions vary and create 
connections and disconnections between local and national political arenas (Boone, 2013:199). 
Boone brings together local institutions of land tenure with the local political arena to explain how 
land-related conflicts play out when authority over land and citizenship are at stake. This 
competition for access to land also involves questions of power in the sense that individuals 
attempt to consolidate their claims about land and other resources through various means, often in 
pursuit of transforming access to resources into legally recognized political institutions (Lund, 
2011:8). In doing so, political processes - such as legal or institutional reforms at the national level 
- can profoundly influence land tenure dynamics, as individuals who hold powerful positions in 
public institutions at national level (for example a Minister or a member of parliament) may use 
their position to control political and administrative institutions (such as land registration) at the 
local level and (sometimes) customary structures by using their influence to access and secure 
tenure rights (Goldstein and Udry, 2008: 4). This competition also occurs because land rights can 
be allocated and reallocated by regimes seeking electoral advantage by rewarding their 
constituencies at the expense of losers, rivals, or minorities (Boone, 2009:183; Baland and 
Robinson, 2008: 1748). Van Acker (2005:81) also argues along these lines when he states that the 
quest for land control often is a strategy to realize a system of dependent integration: land relations 
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and social hierarchy mirror each other. However, even though land can be subject to patron-client 
arrangements, contestations among different social groups struggling to access land are likely to 
take the form of customary claims over land as a local citizenship right in opposition to the state 
institutions of land management. In this regard, one can argue that citizenship (local or national) 
may become central to ‘belonging’ as a way to claim land rights, and thus become the main 
articulation of competition and conflict around land issues.  
Hence the link between local citizenship and land rights, as demonstrated above, involves social 
groups that are involved in competition over access to land and control of it. The issue of land is 
not, as such, unique, but one among a range of issues where political and legal struggles intertwine, 
and where political and cultural symbols of power and authority are brought into play. Citizenship 
and land rights, Lund (2011:11) argues, are closely connected in most African societies. In this 
situation, if local citizenship becomes the dominant criterion to access and secure land - as is the 
case in customary systems - identities of groups in competition are likely to take ethnic forms when 
tensions occur.  
This is because most of the populations in rural areas in many African societies are organized as 
ethnic communities, wherein the dichotomy natives/autochthons versus late-comers/immigrants is 
experienced within imagined or physical boundaries. As Le Meur et al. (2006:13) have noted, the 
ethnicization of land conflicts may be perceived as being, not a causal factor, but the expression 
of tensions over land resources flowing between the power and the social networks representing 
conflicting interests. The link between land rights, power and ethnicity becomes more or less clear 
when Boone (2014:94) states that access to land is often allocated or validated by government as 
an ethnic entitlement in which members of state-recognized ethnic groups are entitled to claim 
land in their ethnic home area, or homeland. Boone argues that this gives individuals and families 
very powerful incentives to embrace and maintain particular state-recognized ethnic identities that 
are linked to homelands.  
From the above discussion, two major conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, the relationship between 
land, power and identity seems to be the characteristic of many African societies, whereby specific 
variables such as ethnicity, citizenship, and belonging can determine the nature and the scope of 
groups’ claims and can lead to violence. Secondly, land, power and identity and the conflicts that 
emerge from the interplay between them are located in local settings. However, what this debate 
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does not consider, as this study seeks to address, is how conflict on the local level can involve 
multiple actors beyond only the local. To bridge this gap, one can argue that although land, power 
and identity are strongly manifested and experienced by groups at the local scale, all three are 
undeniably embedded in political and institutional structures that are beyond the local. To illustrate 
it, the next section discusses the historical background of the arrival of Banyarwanda in Masisi 
and works toward understanding the formation of the dynamics and conflicts (what is termed today 
the land-power-identity triangle) that exist in eastern DR Congo today. 
2.1.3 Banyarwanda in Masisi and the origins of the conflict  
When the former German colony Ruanda-Urundi came under Belgian mandate in 1922, the 
abundant workforce in these two countries attracted the attention of Belgian mining and 
agricultural enterprises in eastern Congo, which were at this time experiencing an economic boom 
and in need of additional labor (see Mararo, 1997; Mathieu and Tsongo 1998; Rukatsi, 2004; 
Tegera 2009). This labor migration to Masisi organized by the colonial administration was 
facilitated by demographic pressure and famine in Rwanda. However, the arrival of the Rwandan 
population which became the ‘Banyarwanda’ was not followed by integration into the social and 
political fabric of the local population of this area, consisting of Hunde, Nyanga and Nande. To 
facilitate the resettlement and responding to demands by Rwandan chiefs, the colonial 
administration decided to create territorial entities for immigrants that were outside the control of 
the traditional chiefs. Tegera (2009:187) noted that this provision of autonomous entities for the 
Banyarwanda in Masisi pleased the Rwandan traditional authorities, who considered these new 
political entities now to be Rwandan ‘colonies’ in Congo.  
In October 1936 two Banyarwanda chieftaincies were established in today’s North Kivu: Gishari 
in Masisi and Bwito in Rutshuru. But because in Rutshuru the Mwami (traditional chief) was a 
Hutu and Hutu were in the majority in Bwito, there were no autochthonous claims by Hunde or 
other groups, as there were in Masisi. Notably Hunde chiefs in Masisi considered the creation of 
Gishari as a repudiation of their authority. To respond to this objection, the colonial administration 
appointed André Kalinda, one of the most influential Hunde customary chiefs, not only to facilitate 
the settlement of Banyarwanda but also to convince other Hunde chiefs to cooperate too. This 
collaboration between Chief Kalinda and the colonial authorities led to a more concrete deal. 
Kalinda sold 47,810 hectares of land to the colonial administration which became the Gishari 
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region, today known as the Bashali chieftaincy. Many Hunde chiefs saw the deal as a dispossession 
of their customary rights (Mararo, 2002: 47).  
Since this dispossession went against the general representation of land by the Hunde, it was 
fiercely contested. For Hunde, land is linked to a collection of rights and ‘sacred’ orders, the 
Mwami possessing authority over land and claiming spiritual power over people through the 
distribution of the land. As Mugangu (2007:394) points out, the person accessing land through the 
chief inevitably becomes a subject of the chief under customary authority. In the process of 
granting land to the Banyarwanda, these customs and regulations were not acknowledged by the 
Hunde chiefs. Therefore, the majority of Hunde chiefs opposed the integration of Banyarwanda, 
because they believed that whenever the Banyarwanda may access and control land, allegiance to 
the Hunde chiefs may no longer exist. The problem for the Hunde chiefs was that it was impossible 
to impose their authority on the Banyarwanda without controlling land. With the same strategy, 
the Banyarwanda wanted to access land through other means to escape dependency on the Hunde.  
Apart from the lack of allegiance to Hunde chiefs, Banyarwanda and Hunde communities had and 
still have different perceptions and representation of land. For Hunde, land is first and foremost a 
collective property that belongs to the community, lineages and families, and whose chiefs 
represent values and beliefs of a common ancestor (van Acker, 2005: 82). Banyarwanda in 
contrast, see land as a commodity, without a ‘sacred’ character and which can be gained 
individually, independent of personalized authority and customary relations (Tegera, 2009: 62). 
This perception of land included the notion of Isambu (an individual plot where access and 
occupation were granted by the political authority in return for tithes and labor) for the 
Banyarwanda Tutsi and Ubukonde (a personally owned plot which had been cleared and usually 
occupied for many years by the same lineage) for the Banyarwanda Hutu, which existed in the 
Banyarwanda traditional land system, as well as the case where a chief of a family or lineage could 
grant an exclusive private property right to a family member. Both notions of Isambu and 
Ubukonde remained the basic conception of the Banyarwanda at the time they arrived in Masisi. 
These two different conceptions of land - collective versus private property - have played a 
significant role in the competition over land between the Banyarwanda and the Hunde 
communities, with ramifications for both the citizenship status and the political rights of 
Banyarwanda.  
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In the context of local elections in 1957, and the possible departure of Belgians from Congo 
precipitated by the wave of independence across the continent, Hunde chiefs increased their 
pressure on the colonial administration to recover Gishari, while at the same time the Banyarwanda 
were concerned at the possibility of losing the land and the political protection they enjoyed from 
the colonial authorities. In the event, the colonial administration abolished Gishari as an 
autonomous entity of Banyarwanda and it became the Bashali chieftaincy, where the Banyarwanda 
were put under the thumb of the local Hunde chiefs and lost their land obtained from the colonial 
authorities (chapter five develops further the Banyarwanda struggles for their citizenship rights 
and land). Ever since then, the Banyarwanda in Masisi have been struggling for their own political 
authority, independent from Hunde customary rule. Struggle for land was accompanied by the 
competition for political power as a strategy to secure land and justify a belonging to the Masisi 
territory: as a homeland on the one hand, and to contest any allegiance to Hunde chiefs on the 
other. Between 1970 and 1980, President Mobutu’s decision to appoint some Banyarwanda to 
different positions in the local administration and in the government was a first attempt to integrate 
the Banyarwanda into the political structures of Zaire.  
Under the influence of various prominent Banyarwanda from North Kivu - especially his chief of 
staff, Barthélemy Bisengimana - Mobutu passed a law in 1972 that granted citizenship to anyone 
who had immigrated before 1960.Thanks to this law, affluent Banyarwanda were able to acquire 
large tracts of land in Masisi and beyond, not from Hunde chiefs, but through a new land law that 
was promulgated in 1973. Not only did this law put land management under the state institutions, 
including the land under customary authority, it also followed the recognition of the nationality of 
Banyarwanda one year before, so that Banyarwanda who were already highly positioned in 
national institutions could easily and legally acquire land without any customary influence. With 
this political situation, the relations between the Banyarwanda and the Hunde population in Masisi 
had become problematic, which was exacerbated by the fall of Mobutu’s regime caused by the 
Congolese war of 1996-1997.  
Around this period of political and security tensions at the regional level, due both to the presence 
of Rwandan refugees in DR Congo and to the fall of Mobutu, non-Banyarwanda ‘local 
communities’ in the Kivus (especially Nande and Hunde in North Kivu and Shi in South Kivu) 
were hostile to Banyarwanda, suspecting them of collaborating with the new regime in Kigali. 
Autesserre (2008:105) points out that around the same time local militias continued to compete for 
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the control of land, natural resources and political or administrative positions. Autesserre argued 
that although these conflicts were often of a very local nature, they included links to national and 
regional conflicts. For example, the Congolese Tutsi supported the invasion of Rwanda by Tutsi 
RPF forces from Uganda in 1990, as a strategy of having a Tutsi regime in a neighboring country 
where they would feel safe, but also as a strategic ally whom they could count on for support of 
their political and economic rights in Congo. Maindo (2007:34) clearly demonstrates that the 
question of land and identity of the Banyarwanda population was one of the key factors triggering 
violence in Kivu, connecting the local to the regional dimension. Another example is the 
constitutive protocol of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL), 
which would go on to topple Mobutu. This was agreed upon in Lemera (South Kivu) on 28 October 
1996. While it is said that this protocol was signed in the presence of Rwandan authorities in 
Gisenyi (Rwanda), rumors persist that there was another secret document according to which the 
Tutsi of Kivu would have been guaranteed not only Congolese nationality but also a kind of 
autonomous territory of their own in Kivu.  
According to Braeckman (1998), Pascal Tshipaka Mukeba, a former Head of Intelligence Services, 
told Agence France Presse (AFP) that before the war was launched against Mobutu, it had been 
decided to entrust the military control of North and South Kivu to Banyamulenge. In this interview 
Mukeba stated that it was Kabila’s failure to honor the content of this secret document that gave 
birth to the 1998 rebellion in eastern Congo by the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), and 
later prompted the assassination of Kabila in January 2001. Although the relationship between 
Rwandan officials and Congolese Tutsi has remained ambiguous since the first and second 
Congolese war, Congolese Tutsi continue to consider Rwanda as their ‘potential homeland’ where 
they can take refuge at any time. Nevertheless, the unresolved local and regional problems of 
Congolese Tutsi remain liable to trigger another war, likely with Rwandan or Ugandan support.  
Today, Rwanda and Uganda are hosting hundreds of the former rebels in addition to thousands of 
refugees who are waiting to return to their land in North Kivu. Needless to say, the AFDL (1996), 
RCD (1998), CNDP (2005), M23 (2012) and today Nyatura, APCLS and many other armed groups 
in North Kivu have always had land, identity and power questions in their agendas. While the 
analysis of the conflict in the literature looks at different levels to explain the dynamics of violence, 
peacebuilding and state-building intervention in DR Congo since 1999 has struggled to find a 
global and effective approach that could allow intervention at all those levels. That is why, as 
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mentioned earlier, state-building has dealt more with state institutions than other levels, assuming 
that the latter depend on the former. It is when scholars criticized this ‘top-down’ approach that 
some peacebuilding organizations started to design actions on the local level. As previously said, 
there is an abundant literature on the conflict in the eastern DR Congo which suggests that the 
land, power and identity triangle is the main cause of tensions. In order to grasp the interconnection 
between these factors on the theoretical level, the next section examines and uses the politics of 
scale approach to analyze how the above triangle as well as the actors belong to multiple scales. 
2.2 Peacebuilding theory and the meaning of the ‘local’  
Over the past few decades, contemporary academic debate on conflict resolution has discussed 
several approaches applied by institutional actors in different contexts and countries. One of these 
approaches is peacebuilding. When Johan Galtung introduced the concept of peacebuilding into 
the academic debate in 1975, his vision of peace as a ‘structure’ opened up a significant debate 
within peace and conflict studies. The overall understanding of peacebuilding by Galtung assumes 
that the mechanisms that peace is based on should be built into a ‘structure’ and be present as a 
reservoir for the system itself to draw up. More particularly, structures such as political, social and 
economic institutions must be found to remove causes of wars and to offer alternatives to war in 
situations where wars might occur (1975:298). 
This idea that peace is a structure and peacebuilding should deal with structures that shape conflict 
situations has gained credit with both scholars and practitioners through a series of interventions 
in conflict-torn societies. The turning point of peacebuilding interventions was the end of the 
bipolar world at the end of the 1980s. Since then, the United Nations became the first international 
institution to pay particular attention to what peacebuilding could offer, better than existing 
approaches such as peacemaking and peacekeeping. The first UN attempt to operationalize 
peacebuilding and to clarify the interventional framework in which it is supposed to be 
implemented was the ‘Agenda for Peace’, a strategic document released by the UN Secretary 
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992, explaining the role of the UN in preventive diplomacy, 
peacemaking and peacekeeping.  
The ‘Agenda for Peace’ therefore defines the concept of peacebuilding as the construction of a 
new environment which seeks to avoid the breakdown of peaceful conditions (par.57). In this UN 
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document peacebuilding, however, is not proposed as an isolated approach from other approaches 
to peace the UN has already been implementing. The best known are peacemaking (which consists 
of trying to bring hostile parties to agreement by peaceful means) and peace-keeping (which 
involves third-party intervention to keep warring groups apart and maintain the absence of direct 
violence). These operations, in the UN understanding, are urged to include comprehensive efforts 
to identify and support structures which can consolidate peace. In 2000, the Brahimi report was 
adopted by the UN Security Council, in which peacebuilding was given specific attention. The 
report states that ‘peacebuilding defines activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to 
reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations 
something that is more than just the absence of war’ (A/55/305 S/2000/809, p3). In this report, the 
conception of peacebuilding refers to the meaning of ‘positive peace’ in Galtung’s sense. Galtung 
defines ‘positive peace’ as a situation without structural violence, where relationships among the 
parties are supportive and collaborative and conflicts are resolved constructively; the integration 
of human society. By contrast, ‘negative peace’ is just the absence of violence and war (1967:12). 
To further emphasize the relevance of peacebuilding within the UN intervention framework, the 
UN General Assembly of 20 December 2005 adopted a resolution (A/RES/60/180) to establish the 
Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA) as an intergovernmental advisory body. In 2006, the 
Peacebuilding Architecture body was strengthened by the creation of three sub-bodies, namely the 
Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and Peacebuilding Support Office 
(PBSO) The main purpose of the Commission (PBC) was to focus attention on the reconstruction 
and institution-building efforts necessary for the recovery of conflict-affected countries and to 
support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable 
peace.  
On the academic level, over the decade following the creation of Peacebuilding Architecture, 
scholars intensified the debate on the concept of peacebuilding and how to implement it. Many 
concerns raised in this debate relate to the most significant ideologies that shape contemporary 
peacebuilding. One of the key ideologies is liberal optimism, based on the belief that human 
societies can be peaceful and prosperous through institutional fixes (Mac Ginty, 2013:2). One 
assumption of the liberal perspective is that institutional reinforcement can promote peace and 
prevent conflict. This is strongly rooted in the institutional approach which is related to the 
Weberian conception of the state, emphasizing the importance of central state institutions (Lemay-
30 
 
Hébert, 2010:3; Fukuyama, 2004:20). Mac Ginty found that although, in many cases, liberal peace 
interventions are well intentioned and rely on the institutional approach, the vast majority of 
peacebuilding initiatives occur in the global south but are designed, directed and funded from the 
global north, which means that for many people in targeted countries, peacebuilding is something 
that comes from ‘outside’ of the context. This is criticized by the term ‘top-down peacebuilding’.  
Peacebuilding interventions are also shaped by the economic dimension that lies in liberal ideas in 
what Brauer and Caruso (2013:152) term ‘peace economics’. They examine the normative aspect 
of ‘peace economics’ through the economic study and design of political, economic and cultural 
institutions and their interactions to prevent, mitigate and resolve the causes of violence within and 
between societies. Although ‘peace economics’ is about the contribution of economic science to 
peacebuilding, it remains challenged as ineffective to provide better measures of peacebuilding 
program outcomes. The difficulty of measuring peacebuilding programs has become another major 
subject of critiques in scholarly debate about peacebuilding paradigms.  
The two broad categories of thinking that grasp the limitations of the above peacebuilding 
approaches are the problem-solving and critical paradigms (Pugh, 2013:11). The problem-solving 
approach, which adopts a functionalist approach to the problems of conflicts, accepts that conflict 
is part of the human experience and attempts to find ways to minimize its impact. It seeks to 
develop systems and institutions that are able to mitigate the impact of violent conflicts and help 
divided communities to cooperate. The second approach is the critical paradigm that seeks to go 
further than the problem-solving approach. It maintains that the problem-solving approach is 
merely engaged in superficial short-term fixes that fail to ask wider questions about power 
relations in society. Pugh claims that peacebuilding has come to mean revising the structures that 
led to conflict, inevitably diminishing sovereignty and replicating colonization processes through 
so-called ‘local empowerment’.  
The critical paradigm has also raised a range of controversies related to the prevailing liberal 
peacebuilding model that drives the problem-solving interventions. Critical challenges are 
increasingly voiced by scholars and stakeholders who argue that there is a need for a greater 
emphasis in peacebuilding upon human security, local solutions, social justice and the resolution 
of the underlying causes of conflicts (Newman et al, 2009:13). It is argued here that liberal 
institutions aimed at containing instability and building generic state institutions based upon 
31 
 
external models have neglected the welfare needs of local populations and have failed to engage 
with indigenous traditional institutions.  
Peacebuilding through liberal institutions continues to fail to provide the ‘promised peace’ in post-
conflict countries. In addition, peacebuilding and state-building have been merged into a 
technocratic set of projects within the same intervention framework without any clear demarcation 
(Menocal, 2011:1716). Neither approach is effective because in practice the organizations promote 
statebuilding programs at the local level instead of strengthening state–society relations, 
responsiveness and accountability, which is expected from peacebuilding theory (Chetail and 
Jütersonke, 2015:7). This concern is specifically shared by Curtis (2013: 80) when he demonstrates 
that, in the case of Africa, the peacebuilding as state-building template faces severe limitations as 
key questions and paradoxes of legitimacy, sovereignty, effectiveness and agency simply cannot 
be resolved through standard approaches.  
One of the critiques of standard approaches is that the outcome of most peacebuilding interventions 
is founded on international standardized systems, legitimacy and norms and not founded on a 
contextual, critical and emancipatory epistemology of peace. Richmond for example advocates a 
new approach to ‘peace formation’ through which international actors can gain a better 
understanding of the root causes of conflicts, local actors may be assisted, power struggles may be 
ended or managed and local forms of legitimacy would be able to emerge (Richmond, 2014:14). 
The question of local legitimacy draws the attention of Newman et al. (2009: 5), who criticize 
what they term ‘top-down models of peacebuilding-community-driven initiatives.’ The authors 
propose that the perceived absence of ‘local ownership’ and the lack of sufficient consultation with 
local stakeholders has led local populations to question the legitimacy of peacebuilding operations, 
throwing the sustainability of peacebuilding projects into question. 
Academic and policymakers’ critiques of the dominant paradigms of state-building and 
peacebuilding have culminated in a new paradigm for peacebuilding during the last two decades. 
This paradigm advocates an approach to conflict resolution that considers state-building and 
peacebuilding as dynamic and mutually-reinforcing processes, recognizing the network of both 
formal and informal institutions and fragmented social orders as requiring delicate management, 
even as historical grievances and concerns must be addressed (Nganje, 2013: 2). It is argued that 
at the local level, social cleavages erupt into violent conflict, and/or produce ‘everyday resistance’ 
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which ultimately weakens state authority. In the same line of thought, Oda (2007:5) criticizes 
international organizations for imposing external models of dealing with conflicts and suggests a 
‘peacebuilding from below’ approach. He finds that while ‘ordinary persons’ are increasingly 
gaining attention as significant actors in peacebuilding, traditional ‘negative’ models of peace 
continue to restrict how one can explain their involvement in the peace process. While sustainable 
peace is supposed to be rooted in and adapted to the context of the post-conflict state, and yet also 
produced by locals themselves, Donais (2009:755, cf. Donais 2009a, 2012) found that, in many 
cases, key individual actors had the power to challenge or veto many aspects of an unfolding peace 
process.  
This inability of peacebuilding to adapt in the local context is associated with the fact that 
peacebuilding is merged with state-building approaches that offer the possibility of achieving a 
liberal peace, but are primarily concerned with institutional and legal design and with market 
access, with markedly less concern for the normative architecture of peacebuilding (Richmond 
2014:4). Richmond stresses that these strategies lack a connection in context, on a grassroots level, 
amongst populations who have their own understandings of identity, sovereignty, institutions, 
rights and law and who have their own needs in terms of their own socio-historical and cultural 
traditions. These critiques of state-building in terms of what the authors describe as the ignorance 
of the ‘local’ is one of the key points discussed in this study. Alongside the critiques of these 
standard approaches and their ignorance of the local level, the ‘local turn’ reemerged in the debate 
among scholars and practitioners (see Paffenholz, 2016; Özerdem and Lee, 2015; Charbonneau 
and Parent, 2012).  
In their attempts to escape criticism along these lines, a large number of international organizations 
have intensified their work at what they term the ‘local community’ level over the past two 
decades. As a result, they chose ‘local communities’ as a target group for peacebuilding 
intervention. To understand this choice two major points should be considered. First, following 
severe criticism of the UN and other important donors (the European Union, aid agencies and 
bilateral country partners) for their inefficient engagement during the Congolese crisis, certain 
international organizations wished to distance themselves from the maligned ‘International 
Community’ and its prevailing top-down approach by focusing programs and projects on the ‘local 
community’ level. Secondly, these international organizations assumed that these programs would 
benefit specific vulnerable groups of the population affected by violent conflict. Here is the point 
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at which the triangle of land, power and identity to understand conflict becomes central in the 
discourse of peacebuilding intervention. In practice, however, this thesis argues that even the turn 
to the local, supposedly to address the root causes of violence, has failed to do so. In the next 
section, I refer to the geographical discussion of processes of scale making, rescaling and the 
politics of scale as a theoretical approach to guide this study’s lines of argument. 
2.3 Politics of scale, conflict and actors  
Over the past decade, the ‘local turn’ implemented by some peacebuilding actors has been 
intensively debated among scholars, not only to establish the relevance of considering the ‘local’ 
as a new approach, but also to define what it means. This approach of seeing the ‘local’ as a target 
for peacebuilding intervention continues to build on the idea that the ‘local’ is a geographical scale 
where factors and interactions of conflict actors are easily observable. However, the notion of 
‘geographical scale’ which refers to the hierarchy of bounded spaces of differing size, such as the 
local, regional, national and global, has long been a taken-for-granted concept for political 
geographers and political analysts (Cash et al., 2006; Swyngedouw, 2007).  
This notion of ‘geographic scale’ as an unproblematic, given and fixed hierarchy of bounded 
spaces has been challenged by geographers by showing that the geographical scale at which, for 
example, economic activities and political authority are constituted, is not fixed but periodically 
transformed (Delaney and Leitner, 1997:93). In this study, I rely on the conception of scale as a 
questionable notion in order to grasp the sense of the ‘local’ in peacebuilding intervention’s 
discourse.  
 To begin, the term ‘scale’ has received much attention, while a shared understanding of exactly 
what the term means and how it should be used is still debated. Sayre and Vittorio (2009:19) 
recognize that common definitions of scale do not exist within disciplines. Authors use the term 
‘scale’ differently and do not all agree whether scale is an epistemological tool or whether it is 
ontological by essence. Human geographers conceptualize the relationality of experiences and 
dynamics that originate at socially constructed scales such as the local, regional, national or global 
(Masuda and Crooks, 2007:258). Yet, there remains little agreement among them, whether scale 
should be elevated to the level of such core concepts as 'space' and 'place' in the geographical 
canon, or whether this should be dismissed in favor of uncovering the spatiality that underpins 
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social, economic and political systems (Paasi, 2004:542). Paasi sees scales as historically 
contingent in the sense that they are produced, exist and may be destroyed or transformed in social 
and political practices and struggles. 
The understanding of scale as socially constructed is one of the few points on which human 
geographers have found a consensus. Sayre and Vittorio (2009:25) for example point out that 
scholars invoke social construction on the whole to emphasize the political significance and real-
world ramifications of scale, otherwise known as the politics of scale. Nevertheless, it can be 
pointed out that the argument about scale as a social construct still divides scholars in terms of 
whether scales are constructed in the epistemological moment (as observational measurement) or 
whether scales are produced in the ontological moment, in a process that occurs independently of 
any act of observation. The latter option seems to be supported by Moore (2008:207) who attacks 
the conceptual confusion surrounding scale – and scale politics – as, to a significant extent, the 
consequence of failing to make a clear distinction between scale as a category of practice and 
category of analysis. He criticizes the adoption of scale as a substantial category of analysis in the 
epistemological moment, arguing that this practice does not make sense and leads to erroneous 
conclusions in the analyses of the politics of scale.  
To avoid this misunderstanding, Marston (2000:220) suggests emphasizing other social and 
political processes that may contribute to the theorization of the notion of scale in human 
geography. Marston is in agreement with Lebel et al. (2005:7) in positing that scalar distinctions 
between the ‘regional’ and the ‘national’ or the ‘local’ and the ‘global’ are seen not as being 
organic qualities of the spatial organization of societies, but as being contingent on the interaction 
of social actors and structural forces that produce spatial scales through the exercise of power: as 
the outcome of negotiation, struggle and compromise. In their attempts to understand the link 
between social actors (individuals) and the production of scales, political geographers seem to 
agree that different social actors constrain, create and shift scales to claim and serve their interests 
in many situations (Delaney and Leitner, 1997).  
It is in the context of this interaction between social actors and their competing interests that Cidell 
(2006:201) examines the role of individuals across scales to explain multi-scalar conflicts. She 
argues along the same lines as Swyngedouw (2007: 24) that actors can change power and authority 
relations by working at different spatial levels and that actors can also thereby affect access to 
35 
 
resources and the decision-making processes with respect to power and resource distribution. It is 
along these lines that Masuda and Crooks (2007:257) suggest an experiential approach examining 
the role of human agency in supra-local encounters.  
Aside from questions of the epistemological and ontological nature of scale in the abovementioned 
debate, the approach of considering social and political processes in terms of power relations and 
the ways in which individuals or groups navigate within different scales is shared by multiple 
schools of thought in human geography. Similarly, conflict studies focusing on the role of actors 
tend to refer to the politics of scale in order to analyze the relational dynamics of conflict and the 
role of actors, both individual or network actors. It is via this understanding of how actors and 
scales interact that the politics of scale may substantially contribute to conventional conflict 
analysis.  
Within conflict analysis, Laudati (2013: 46) has emphasized that, against a background of any 
protracted violence, insecurity and uncertainty, a broader set of actors are keen to navigate and 
negotiate means of making a living, at different levels. Perreault (2003:99) criticizes Castells 
(2007) for failing to recognize the ways in which local actors can bridge scales and seriously 
questions what Castells presents as a dichotomy of ‘powerful’ global versus ‘powerless’ local 
interests. Along the same lines, Marston et al. (2007: 418) emphasize the political actions of local 
actors in what they term ‘jumping scales’ as a process that allows subaltern groups to increase their 
capacity to make political claims against other actors, via scales. 
While different actors may ‘jump’ scales for different aims and purposes, this process has 
introduced differentiated geographical representations of scale as size, as level and as relation 
through what Howitt (1998) terms verticality and horizontality in the studies of scale. In contrast 
to Brenner’s (2001:606) conceptual model of scale as a ‘vertical’ differentiation in which social 
relations are embedded within a hierarchical scaffolding of nested territorial units, Marston et al 
(2007:107) argue in favor of using a model of ‘horizontality’ that does not consider scale as a 
concrete entity in the same way the vertical model does. They posit a model of ‘horizontality’ as 
a means of studying humans and objects in their interactions across a multiplicity of social sites 
without any reference to levels or scales. 
The problem with the model of ‘horizontality’ proposed by Marston et al. is that it seeks to evade 
all references to levels or scale while, at the same time, it attempts to study humans in their 
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interactions, overlooking the fact that human interactions are dynamic, fluid and can be located at 
levels or scales whether hierarchical or not. International aid agencies and NGOs themselves 
utilize a comparable representation of scales to frame intervention efforts. As already discussed in 
this study, statebuilding and peacebuilding interventions often reference the ‘levels’ of conflict or 
the ‘territorial location’ of stakeholders as a means of drawing concrete lines of demarcation 
between those levels. Even though the notion of scale or level is recognized both in the 
epistemological versus ontological view and the vertical versus horizontal view, the role of actors 
and the use of scales by those actors are still not emphasized in this debate. 
Kalyvas's (2003:467) analysis of ‘local’ versus ‘national’ dimensions of violence provides an 
insightful entry point into how actors operate across different layers of scale. Kalyvas posits that 
local and national dimensions interact through the two distinct mechanisms of cleavage and 
alliance. Actors at the center are assumed to be linked with actors on the ground via mechanisms 
of ‘cleavage’ and ‘alliance' whereby transactions between ‘supralocal’ (in this thesis, Masisi is the 
local, ‘suprelocal’ are other levels: see figure 2) and local actors take place. The former supply the 
latter with external muscle and thus allow them to win decisive local advantages. In exchange, the 
former rely on local conflicts to recruit and to motivate supporters and in order to obtain local 
control, resources and information, even when their ideological agenda is opposed to localism. 
Kalyvas’ explanatory model of how supralocal and local actors interact assumes the existence of 
distinct groups of actors that operate either through ‘cleavage’ or ‘alliance’ at different levels. 
Kalyvas argues that strategic ‘alliance’ (as a means, not as an end in itself) is instrumental in 
negotiating resources or other advantages, with each group maintaining a degree of autonomy. The 
problem with this model is that the kind of boundaries that Kalyvas posits between levels and 
actors do not exist in all societies in all the same ways. For example, in many African countries 
the political orders and institutions are often dominated by diverse political actors who control 
networks of interests between the micro, meso and macro levels without tangible distinctions 
between the local and supralocal, and without any hierarchical order of dependence between actors 
and levels.  
Kalyvas is not alone in positing a hierarchical structure of levels and actors in the analysis of 
conflict. Ekeh (1975:92) joins him in his model of ‘Two Publics’ in which he contrasts what he 
terms the primordial public with the civic public in order to explain trajectories of political struggle 
in the aftermath of independence for numerous states in sub-Saharan Africa. Ekeh posits that the 
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majority of educated Africans are citizens of ‘two publics’ in the same society. On one hand they 
belong to a civic public from which they gain materially, but to which they give only grudgingly. 
On the other hand they belong to a primordial public from which they derive little or zero material 
benefits, but to which they are expected to give materially and generously.  
Ekeh posits that for most educated Africans their relationship to the primordial public is moral, 
while their relationship to the civic public is amoral. Ekeh concludes that the dialectical tensions 
and conflicts between the two publics constitute the uniqueness of modern African politics. Even 
though Ekeh also presents the two publics in terms of levels, his model provides recognition (in 
contrast to Kalyvas’s model) that actors may move between the two publics, even in the absence 
of hierarchical relations between those actors. What Ekeh does not recognize in his model is that 
in many African countries there are more than two publics at play today. Not only does he see the 
primordial public versus civil public as fixed publics, these publics are shaped and modified by 
intermediary processes and actors through both vertical and horizontal ways. Furthermore, a core 
concept of his model in terms of state-society relations is a problematic requirement that there 
should be ‘trust’ from individuals toward the state. State fragility in many developing economies 
and the presence of multiple core actors and of private networks are challenges to the models 
presented by Kalyvas and Ekeh. Both of these models lack a clear analytical framework for 
understanding actors and their networks and how these operate across levels, while at the same 
time belonging to multiple levels. 
In order to better understand how those actors and networks function and how they control 
resources and people across levels, I can refer here to the concept of ‘Big Men.’ Utas (2012: 1) 
explains that ‘Bigmanity’ emerges in response to a lack of formal structures, demonstrating that 
Big Men typically wield a great deal of social power in situations where there is a structural void. 
Utas suggests that the power accruing to Big Men should be seen as an alternative form of 
governance, extending to where the national state does not reach or where local forms of formal 
governance do not have sufficient sovereign powers. Utas argues that Big Men networks may or 
may not involve the façades of the state. He argues further that Big Men ought not to be seen as a 
system opposed to the state, but, on the contrary, as supplementing the state. On the other side, 
Käihkö (2012: 188) prefers the terms ‘Big Man’ and ‘Network’ instead of the terms patron-client 
relations or neo-patrimonialism, which are often used to describe aspects of the African political 
culture.  
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While patron-client networks have commonly been described as hierarchical (vertical) relations, 
Käihkö argues that these networks must be understood as part of a wider framework that also 
includes the horizontal dimension of peers. While ‘Big Men’ are considered as the nodes in these 
networks, in this study I will rather use the term ‘string pullers’, used by participants in this study 
(interviewees) to describe how powerful individuals who informally have a strong influence by 
keeping hands-hold on armed groups, owning large tracts of land and at the same time (some of 
them) hold political positions in the parliament and the government. The analysis of ‘string pullers’ 
and their strategies to produce scales is relevant to grasp the meaning of power in this study. This 
is the point at which the land, power and identity triangle, understood in terms of multi-scalar 
issues, may provide a useful analytical tool for understanding how ‘string pullers’ instrumentalize 
this triangle as a departure point to ‘jump’ scales, while at the same time belonging to multiple 
publics (in the sense of Ekeh, 1975) both formally and informally. This is the background of this 
study to understand the limits of peacebuilding intervention in its process of constructing the 
‘local’. 
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Chapter 3 Research design and methods 
3.1 Engagement as practitioner and research rationale 
The year 2010 was the turning point in the international community’s paradigm to deal with the 
Congolese political crisis, which was termed the ‘local turn’. In that year, the UN peacekeeping 
mission in DR Congo (MONUC) was transformed into MONUSCO (UN Mission for Stabilization 
in Congo), emphasizing the ‘stabilization’ dimension and assuming that the DR Congo, as a post-
conflict country, should shift from the post-conflict phase to stabilization as a bridge towards 
development. This shift has not only brought a change in the relationship between UN agencies 
and the Congolese government on the diplomatic and military level, but also caused several 
peacebuilding NGOs to readjust their programs accordingly. This thesis is rooted in my own 
professional experience with international peacebuilding organizations in the DR Congo since 
2010, when I was recruited by Life & Peace Institute (LPI), a peacebuilding organization based in 
Sweden, as Technical Advisor in Conflict Transformation. 
LPI had chosen the Conflict Transformation (CT) process inspired by the work of Jean Paul 
Lederach (1995). Unlike conflict management and conflict resolution approaches, Lederach 
suggests that Conflict Transformation can reflect a better understanding of the nature of conflict. 
He posits that conflict transformation, as a process, goes beyond merely seeking to contain and 
manage conflict, instead seeking to transform the root causes themselves – or the perceptions of 
the root causes – of a particular conflict. To engage with this process, LPI opted for Participatory 
Action Research (PAR) as a methodological tool to identify and to involve diverse stakeholders in 
the process of Conflict transformation. In 2008, LPI decided to work with local Congolese 
organizations as partners to support the implementation of its program in several areas affected by 
violent conflict, both in North and South Kivu provinces. It was in this phase of the program that 
I was recruited to support Congolese partner organizations of LPI in the implementation activities 
both in North and South Kivu provinces.  
One of the LPI partner organizations in North Kivu was Action Solidaire pour la Paix (ASP). ASP 
has been working in Bashali (in Masisi Territory) on a Conflict Transformation process since 2008. 
My role was to provide ASP program staff with technical and methodological support in conflict 
transformation and to facilitate communication on the program’s progress between LPI and ASP.  
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Working with both LPI and ASP shaped my research in two ways. Firstly, this job was an 
opportunity to enrich my theoretical knowledge in peace and conflict studies with experience from 
the field, especially in such a challenging and volatile political and security context. During my 
fieldwork for LPI in rural areas, Bashali and Masisi were almost entirely controlled by armed 
groups. 
Map 3 Armed groups around the research areas in 2015  
 
In this risky working environment, I got to know diverse actors directly involved in or affected by 
violent conflict, including military, some armed groups and victims. I also interacted with other 
peacebuilding organizations working in Bashali, implementing different programs and using other 
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approaches to address the causes of violent conflict.  
On a personal level, getting to know different community groups and the relations between them, 
their culture and historical background and how different wars affected them was a valuable entry 
point for further studies. Although the above aspects were not part of my work at that time, they 
later strongly informed my empirical research in Bashali and other places in Masisi. 
Besides this experience in the villages, my interest in how the ‘local’ is connected to other levels 
started in late 2011 when I was hired by International Alert, a British peacebuilding organization 
working in the DR Congo since 2000. My experience with International Alert allowed me to get 
to know several organizations and actors in Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. For example, I 
represented International Alert at a workshop on ‘Regional dimensions of conflict in the Great 
Lakes Region’ organized in Nairobi. With that experience, I gained a comprehensive 
understanding of how both regional and other levels are connected and shape the conflict dynamics 
in Masisi and North Kivu.  
The second way in which my professional experience motivated and shaped this thesis was the 
dissatisfaction and even frustrations arising from my work for both LPI and International Alert 
organizations. Dissatisfaction because the program implemented and the approach used by LPI in 
Bashali, for example, has done very little, in my eyes, to address the complex nature of the conflict 
setting. Frustrations because the Participatory Action Research has failed to bring new knowledge 
about the conflict in Bashali, but has merely reproduced what already existed in academic work 
and policy papers. Even the outcome of the PAR process such as the committees for dialogue and 
conflict management hardly function and members of these committees have little trust in 
peacebuilding organizations. 
Another aspect of my frustration was that a number of key actors were left out of the PAR process 
and their role in conflict dynamics has been largely underestimated. One category of these actors 
is ‘string pullers’, powerful individuals who are linked to armed groups and have a strong control 
on local populations, they possess huge tracts of land, and more importantly they hold strategic 
positions in state institutions. Some of them are members of national or provincial parliaments, 
others are Ministers or senior officers in the national army.  
It is, however, important to note that this study does not aim to assess the impact of the programs 
or the approaches used by peacebuilding organizations. I rather use the experience with LPI and 
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ASP in chapter six as an illustration to support my argument. I also consider other peacebuilding 
programs implemented by other organizations beyond Bashali to better grasp a broader picture of 
peacebuilding approaches.  
I have chosen to extend the study beyond Bashali for two reasons. The first reason is that some of 
the objectives of the study would have not been achieved by staying only in Bashali. While Bashali 
is very important in many respects (such as peacebuilding interventions, power competition and 
struggle over access to land by different groups, the Banyarwanda immigration) the analysis of 
key actors in different research sites and their networks in this study would have lacked enough 
empirical evidence to support the central argument. Investigating political processes and power 
relations or the question of identity necessitated going beyond Bashali in order to fill this gap. 
Second, the methodological and theoretical approach and its usefulness for this study led me to 
consider other research sites to reach diverse actors who are not located in Bashali as well as 
organizations and institutions beyond Bashali.  
To maximize evidence and to get a comprehensive understanding of the dimensions of conflicts 
as well as actors and networks, this study includes four more sites: Kilolirwe in Bashali Mokoto, 
Rubaya and Sake in Bahunde chieftaincy; and Masisi Center as the political and administrative 
main city of Masisi Territory. The second reason is that certain powerful and influential individuals 
do not live in Bashali. Many of them are Ministers in both national and provincial governments, 
others are members of the national or provincial parliament and others are businessmen. For this 
reason, I also worked in Goma and Gisenyi (Rwanda) where some of these individuals live. 
3.2 The study setting  
One of the challenges during the research was to find reliable quantitative data such as 
demographic figures and economic and social statistics. Due to war, political instability, lack of 
money and the generalized governance crisis, public registers, archives or offices for statistics 
function only rudimentarily. At the same time, public officials and scholars sometimes question 
data produced by international organizations because they believe that these data are produced for 
fundraising purposes and are not reliable. Hence the figures and statistics used in this thesis are 
taken mainly from three sources. The first is public institutions, which include a few official reports 
from the central and provincial ministries and official websites; the second source is reports from 
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humanitarian organizations about the situation of displaced populations linked to conflict 
dynamics in the areas covered by this study, and lastly academic work comprising published and 
unpublished articles, policy papers, theses and books. This choice was made based on both the 
need for information related to this study and the fact that these documents were accessible online.   
Masisi is one of the five ‘Territoires’ that constitute the province of North Kivu. It is 4,734 km² in 
size and is subdivided in two collectivités-chefferies, Bahunde and Bashali, and two collectivités-
secteurs, Osso/Banyungu and Katoyi (Figure.3.2). The difference between the two types of 
collectivités is that collectivités-chefferies are ruled by customary chiefs called ‘Mwami’, whereas 
collectivités-secteurs are ruled by agents appointed by the government. 
 Figure 3.2 Administrative sub-division of Masisi  
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3.2.1 Population of Masisi and social composition  
Masisi territory is inhabited by six groups categorized as ethnic groups by the Congolese state (see 
for example the code foncier or the Monograph of North Kivu), with an estimated total population 
of 673,000 in 2003 (Monograph of North Kivu 2009:29) and 711,000 in 2016 (Cellule d’Analyse 
d’Indicateurs de Développement-CAID). 
In this study, I mainly focused on two groups: Hutu and Tutsi on the one hand and Hunde on the 
other (see Mararo, 1997, Willame 1997, Rukatsi 2004 and Tegera 2009). The first is categorized 
as immigrants from Rwanda (Banyarwanda), the second as indigenes of Masisi. According to 
census data North Kivu had a population of 2,307,665 in 1984, including 342,423 who were 
classified as non-Congolese (Rukatsi 2004:34). In Masisi, the Banyarwanda constituted 38.82% 
of the population in Bashali, 54.42% in Bahunde, 38.19% in Katoyi and 28.65% in Osso. The 
Banyarwanda, in total, were estimated at 70% of the Masisi population in 1970s and 80% at the 
end of 1990s (Mathieu and Tsongo 2008:392). Due to the context of war and genocide in Rwanda 
in 1994, and the Congolese war of 1996, people were displaced from Masisi to several other places, 
which has modified the above statistics. In 1994, for example, when a Tutsi regime took power in 
Rwanda, a large number of the Tutsi population from Masisi left Congo and moved to Rwanda 
and elsewhere as settlers (Rusamira 2003:153).  
With regard to terminology, Tutsi and Hutu are often referred to as ‘Rwandophones’ (Mararo 
2002, Huening 2013), which means the Kinyarwanda-speaking population. However, the 
‘Rwandophone’ term is contested since Kinyarwanda is not solely spoken by Hutu and Tutsi in 
Masisi; some Hunde and Nyanga groups also speak it. The term ‘Rwandophone’ is also contested 
in everyday use because of its political connotation during the RCD rebellion (1998-2003). During 
this period, the Banyarwanda leaders used the term ‘Banyarwanda’ to create a social and political 
movement against other ethnic groups of North Kivu at a time when a Hutu (Eugene Serufuli) 
became governor, succeeding a Tutsi governor (Leonard Kanyamuhanga). I prefer to use 
‘Banyarwanda’, which emphasizes the Rwandan origin instead of the Kinyarwanda language. 
Therefore, I use Banyarwanda instead of Rwandophones especially because during the field 
research I discovered that even some Hunde speak Kinyarwanda, and Hutu or Tutsi can also speak 
Kihunde and other local languages.  
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3.2.2 Economic profile of Masisi  
The main economic activities in Masisi are agriculture, livestock, artisanal mining and small-scale 
trade in agricultural and livestock products. Among the agricultural products are tea, cinchona, 
coffee, pyrethrum, beans, cassava, maize, sorghum, soybeans, sugar cane and bananas; some 
grown for family consumption, some sent to nearby markets in Goma, Bukavu and some even 
exported to Rwanda. For decades, Masisi was known for fertile volcanic soils, high agriculture 
production and very good conditions for livestock farming. For example, the livestock of North 
Kivu was reported to reach 144,000 cows in 1983 with 60% located in Masisi. Around 1990, there 
were more than 300,000 cows, mostly in the Masisi and Rutshuru Territories (Mathieu and Tsongo 
2008). Beyond this period and due to violent conflict since the beginning of 1990s, no more 
specific figures for Masisi or other parts of North Kivu province are available.  
Masisi also has mineral resources such as coltan, tourmaline, tentalite and cassiterite, exploited in 
an artisanal way, especially in Rubaya and Ngungu. In Rubaya, the mining company 
Mwangachuchu Hizi International (MHI) was created in 1999 by the North Kivu politician and 
senator Edward Mwangachuchu. The MHI concession currently produces tantalite but has 
potential for cassiterite and wolframite too. In the Congolese context, MHI is a medium-sized 
company. It obtained an exploration permit in 2001 and, in November 2007, a mining contract for 
a 15-year renewable exploitation permit under which exploitation continues till now.  
Alongside MHI and in the same mining area, there is COOPERAMMA (Coopérative d’Exploitants 
Artisanaux des Minerais de Masisi), a local mining cooperative managed by Robert Seninga, a 
member of parliament in the North Kivu Provincial Assembly. The provincial decree authorizing 
the functioning of COOPERAMMA was signed in 2008 and was approved in 2012 at the national 
level. Until 2013, COOPERAMMA had between 2,000 and 2,500 members (interview in Rubaya 
4 October 2014),  
In 2016, the website of the government body for monitoring development indicators (CAID) listed 
more than a thousand individuals legally registered as businessmen in Masisi. Half of them are 
active in the mining sector in Rubaya and in the surrounding villages. Other businesses are in 
small-scale trade in agricultural products. 
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3.3 Multi-sited ethnography  
Human geographers and anthropologists use a multi-sited ethnographical approach in order to 
study interactions between people at different sites. According to Falzon (2009:1), ethnography is 
an appropriate methodological choice which privileges an engaged, contextually rich and nuanced 
type of qualitative social research, in which fine-grained daily interactions constitute the lifeblood 
of the data produced. In a multi-sited research, the objective of the researcher is to follow people 
and to understand the connections, associations, relationships and networks of people across 
spaces and scales. Practically speaking, by moving in and out of multiple sites, the researcher can 
come to know the actors, customs, routines, practices, and idiosyncrasies associated with each of 
these locales (Hennessy et al. 2015:2). The researcher travels to multiple sites, following various 
pathways in order to assemble a narrative which expands a single case beyond its immediate 
location (Geiger and Ribes 2011:3). Marcus (1995: 95) posits along the same lines that 
ethnography in general tends to move from its conventional single-site location towards using 
multiple sites of observation and participation that cut across dichotomies such as ‘local’ and 
‘global’.  
In linking multi-sited ethnography to politico-economic systems other factors may be missed out, 
such as virtual connections among actors and groups who sometimes may interact outside of 
systems (Murchison and Coats 2015:995). This importance of focusing on actors and groups in 
multi-sited ethnography studies is relevant, especially when a researcher intends to understand the 
role of informal networks. Not only for predicting outcomes, but also for implementing policies to 
contain or put an end to violence, as suggested by König et al (2015:1). This suggestion of 
including the study of networks and actors poses problems, however, since analyses are often made 
using mathematical models which, in many cases, provide a complex picture of the system of the 
phenomenon being studied (Kapucu et al 2010, Rice and Yoshioka-Maxwell 2015).  
The issue is that there are some variables such as beliefs, behaviors and perceptions that are 
difficult to capture by mathematical models, for example when one analyses a system of conflict. 
A concrete example is the econometric model used by König et al (2015) when they applied a 
mathematical model in their study of the Second Congo War (1998-2003) and its aftermath. The 
aim of their study was to construct a theory of conflict focusing explicitly on informal networks 
of alliances and enmities between and among actors. Key findings from their study suggest that 
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the intensity of conflict can be reduced through (i) dismantling specific fighting groups involved 
in the conflict; (ii) weapon embargoes; (iii) interventions aimed at pacifying animosity among 
groups. However, looking at these findings, we know there have been several joint military 
operations by the Congolese army and UN troops against armed groups, but still with very few 
results. The control of weapons in circulation among the population was also recently mentioned 
in the second phase of stabilization by ISSSS/MONUSCO after the failure of the first phase to 
address the question. On top of the foregoing, pacifying diverse groups is exactly what 
peacebuilding interventions are still failing to do.  
The problem with such an analytical tool is that there are other factors that cannot be entirely 
included in this kind of analysis. Some of these factors are the informal connections among 
individuals, interpersonal relationships or some shared interests between actors which one cannot 
identify and consider in a mathematical model. While this Congolese war is an excellent example 
to use in examining the role of informal networks and alliances, the fluidity of connections and 
interdependence between powerful individuals, the ways in which they are linked to conflict 
dynamics and how they navigate across scales are missed out in König et al’s study.  
It is for this reason the theoretical framework of this study evokes the notion of ‘politics of scale’ 
(ch. 2) to explain how the construction of scales resulted from multiple struggles and political 
processes across time and space.  
Talking about the construction of space Massey (2005:9) states:  
our contemporary sensitivity to issues of space rests on three propositions: First, that we 
recognize space as the product of interrelations; as constituted through interactions, 
from the immensity of the global to the intimately tiny ... Second, that we understand 
space as the sphere of the possibility of the existence of multiplicity in the sense of 
contemporaneous plurality; as the sphere in which distinct trajectories coexist; as the 
sphere, therefore of coexisting heterogeneity ... Third, that we recognize space as always 
under construction. It is never finished; never closed. Perhaps we could imagine space 
as a simultaneity of stories-so-far. 
In this study, I call ‘places’ the different locations where data were collected from, as suggested 
by John Agnew (2001:23). Agnew demonstrates that although the notion of place is used in a 
variety of ways, its meaning can be specified more clearly in terms of what he identified as the 
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three dimensions that tend to recur across the various theoretical positions adopted by geographers. 
The first dimension is place as location or a site in space where an activity or object is located and 
which relates to other sites or locations because of interaction, movement and diffusion between 
them. The second dimension is the view of place as a series of locales or settings where everyday-
life activities take place and the third dimension looks at place as sense of place or identification 
with a place as a unique community, landscape, and moral order. Agnew explains that, in this 
construction, every place is particular and thus, singular. A strong sense of ‘belonging’ to a place, 
either consciously or through everyday behavior such as participating in place-related affairs, 
would be indicative of ‘sense of place’. I therefore use place based on the first and second 
dimension provided by Agnew in the sense that these dimensions emphasize the idea of a location 
in which actors interact while relating to other locations through the activities of everyday life.  
As described above, the selection of the places was based on both knowledge of the research areas 
from 2010 and the results of the pilot research conducted at the beginning of 2014. I also use 
different levels of analysis, which include the local, provincial, regional, the national, and 
international level, to analyze how scales are constructed by several actors I deal with in this study.  
Figure 3.3 shows that the different scales provide four levels of analysis. The local includes 
Kitchanga, Kilolirwe, Sake, Rubaya, Masisi-center and Goma. The national level concerns 
Kinshasa, the regional involves Gisenyi/Rwanda, and the international level relates to international 
organizations and their interventions. Analysis of the triangle land, power and identity has been 
done by taking into account the different scales.  
The specificity of the methodological approach used in this study lies in the way the analysis of 
ethnographic data allows to discuss and to formulate arguments with the connection to the 
conceptual and theoretical framework. This link is significantly highlighted by the emphasis both 
methodological and theoretical approaches put on the different scales for collecting and analyzing 
data. The figure below illustrates different levels of analysis as suggested by the multi-sited 
approach.  
  
49 
 
Figure 3.3 Levels of the study analysis and research scales analyzed  
 
 
3.4 Selection of research sites and choice of participants in the study  
The choice of research sites reflects my own working experience and my study of the literature on 
conflict dynamics. The rationale behind the choice of these places is first, to maximize the chances 
of meeting relevant informants and a variety of actors and networks that are linked to the issues 
raised in the study. Second, I chose these places based on where peacebuilding programs have 
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been implemented, and lastly based on their accessibility considering the security factor prevailing 
in the region where the study was conducted.  
Additionally, the choice of Bashali in Masisi was made on basis of two major reasons. The first 
reason is the geopolitical position. With an area of 1,582km², Bashali shares borders with both 
Rutshuru and Walikale territories. These two territories as well as Masisi are repeatedly portrayed 
as areas where the questions of land, identity and power have been acute, in the history of violent 
conflict between Banyarwanda and other groups (Mararo 2002, Marthieu and Tsongo 1998). Not 
only because of the presence of Banyarwanda contested by other rival groups (especially Hunde), 
but particularly because Bashali has been an important place where social, economic and political 
struggles involving several actors have been going on for more than two decades. The second 
reason is that Masisi and Bashali in particular has remained a hot spot for violent conflicts and one 
where peacebuilding and humanitarian interventions have been implemented. In addition, the 
presence of a large UN Peacekeeping military base and field offices of international organizations 
make Bashali important to this study.  
Based on the pilot fieldwork research conducted in Bashali in early 2014, I have chosen Kitchanga 
and Kilolirwe (both in Bashali Chieftaincy), Rubaya and Sake in Bahunde Chieftaincy and finally 
Masisi-center, the administrative center of Masisi territoire. Kitchanga is the administrative center 
of Bashali. It is where both government services and customary institutions are located. Kitchanga 
hosts field offices of several organizations, both international (NGOs and UN agencies) and 
Congolese. Kitchanga is on the border with Rutshuru territoire and the Virunga National Park, 
which has attracted armed groups to set up their headquarters in the surroundings, as for example 
in the case of the CNDP rebellion between 2004-2009. The historical cleavages between different 
groups have remained explosive and a potential for violence. For example, some Hutu leaders 
continue to claim to be the first arrived ‘autochthons’ of Kitchanga, which has been the Hutu 
traditional headquarters since the immigration time, whereas Hunde customary chiefs contest this 
Hutu claim. Details are discussed in chapter six. 
Kilolirwe is about 70 km from Goma city and hosted the CNDP Headquarters till 2009. Powerful 
individuals, leading figures during the RDC and CNDP rebellions, own large areas of land and 
land-related conflicts are frequent. Kilolirwe also hosts a local committee created by LPI and ASP 
as a mechanism of conflict transformation. 
51 
 
Rubaya is located in Bahunde Chieftaincy north-west of Sake and south-west of Masisi-center, at 
around 55 km from Goma. Rich mineral deposits continue to attract the surrounding populations. 
The population of Rubaya was estimated at 100,000 persons in 2013 (Channel Research 2013: 9) 
and is expected to double in the next few years. People come from different ethnic backgrounds: 
Hutu, Tutsi, Hunde and Shi from South Kivu, Kano and Tembo originating from the border area 
of Masisi-Walikale. Besides the mining sector, Rubaya is the stronghold of ‘big men’ who control 
both the mining sites and huge plots of farmland. The headquarters of Nyatura, one of the most 
important armed groups in Masisi, are located in the surroundings of Rubaya. Like Kitchanga, 
Rubaya has also attracted both humanitarian and peacebuilding organizations. One of the examples 
is Search For Common Ground, an American NGO, which implemented a project entitled 
‘Peacebuilding in artisanal mining areas of North Kivu Province’ in 2012, in partnership with the 
UNDP, UNICEF and FAO and funded by the Japanese government.  
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Map 4 Research site areas 
 
Sake is a city located 25km west of Goma, at the crossroads between Masisi and the territoire of 
Kalehe in the province of South Kivu. Sake also hosts the land registry, a public technical service 
of land management for Masisi territory. Sake is one of the cities of Masisi which has attracted 
peace building interventions.  
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The city of Goma is crucial to this study, also for secondary data collection. Like Kinshasa, it is 
an important center for several actors who feature in this study. Goma as the capital city of North 
Kivu province hosts public institutions, UN agencies and international NGOs. Goma is also the 
headquarters of many Congolese civil society organizations, especially in the peacebuilding sector. 
Three categories of organizations were considered in this study. The first category is the political 
and administrative institutions of government. These include: The provincial ministry of land, the 
provincial division of agriculture, the provincial office of the national electoral commission, the 
provincial division of Titres Immobiliers, an administrative service of land management which 
includes the land registry, and STAREC. The second category is the international actors, which 
include UN agencies and NGOs. According to the list of organizations located in Goma published 
in 2015 by the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), Goma was then 
hosting 13 UN agencies and 92 international NGOs. The sectors of intervention varied from 
conflict management to humanitarian programs while integrating some cross-cutting themes such 
as gender, environment, capacity building, and advocacy. With the creation of the government’s 
stabilization and reconstruction program (STAREC) in 2009 and of the Stabilization Support Unit 
(SSU) by MONUSCO in 2010, these became the main planning and coordination framework for 
stabilization interventions in eastern DR Congo, with Goma being the operational center of this 
coordination. Apart from this coordination, there are other thematic cluster groups. One of them is 
the Coordination Foncière, which is a working group comprising all organizations (UN, 
international NGOs and Congolese organizations) intervening in land issues. Since 2009 when the 
Coordination Foncière was created, the chairperson of this cluster has been the provincial minister 
of land. The presence of all these organizations has made Goma a networking place where useful 
information can be collected.  
Another aspect is that many of the key informants in this study live in Goma. These informants 
include businessmen and political actors who have direct connections with Masisi. Goma was also 
the headquarters of the RCD rebellion between 1998 and 2003 and in 2009 the ‘Goma Conference’ 
brought several armed groups from North and South Kivu to negotiate a ceasefire with the 
government. Ever since, Goma has been a strategic meeting point for of a variety of actors, many 
of whom are the former members of different rebellions. Currently, powerful individuals with 
connections to different armed groups in Masisi are also located in Goma, from where they connect 
different levels: the local (Masisi) to the national (Kinshasa).  
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In order to reach some of these actors, this study included the city of Gisenyi in Rwanda. The first 
reason is that there is a sizeable Congolese Tutsi community living in Gisenyi since the RCD 
rebellion (1998-2003) and many of the active members of the CNDP and M23 rebellions (2005-
2013) are established in Gisenyi. With the defeat of these rebellions, former influential members 
continue to believe that their security is not guaranteed in DR Congo. Gisenyi has therefore become 
a sort of safe haven for them, since many of them applied for the amnesty promised by the 
government in 2013 but fear to return to DR Congo until this amnesty is implemented. Rwanda 
hosts them alongside M23 troops who are also waiting for their return and integration into the 
Congolese national army. The political negotiation between M23 and the Congolese government 
which was supposed to facilitate their return is pending. The second reason is that although some 
Congolese informants live in Gisenyi for various reasons, many of them spend their weekdays in 
Goma. When I was negotiating the time for interviews, it happened that weekends were a 
convenient moment for them.  
3.5 Data from primary sources  
The objective is to explore three dimensions of the study and research questions and the problem 
statement. The first dimension focuses on land, power and identity to understand how the dynamics 
of violent conflicts are shaped by this triangle and the ways in which it constitutes an analytical 
framework to perceive and to track different research aspects from the local to the international 
level, as shown in figure 3.3. The second dimension of the study examines the construction of the 
‘local’ by peacebuilding interventions. Programs are used as examples to discuss how ‘local 
communities’ are designed to be the target group for conflict resolution programs. Besides 
analyzing the programs’ content, a case study of a conflict transformation program implemented 
in Bashali by LPI and ASP provides an example of understanding the sense of the ‘local’ in 
peacebuilding interventions. The third dimension of this study traces the social, political and 
economic struggles from which powerful individuals emerged. This dimension explores how these 
struggles contributed to construct different scales and more importantly how they affect 
peacebuilding programs. To collect data on the above dimensions, four qualitative tools were 
employed with five categories of informants. 
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Table 1 Categories of participants in the study  
Category Aspects discussed   
Customary authorities ▪ Historical background of the violent conflict in 
Masisi. 
▪ Relationship between different actors involved in 
conflict and their motivations. 
▪ Land management: customary versus state 
institutions  
▪ Identification of ‘string pullers’ and their strategies  
UN agencies and NGOs experts ▪ Analyze of programs and projects implemented. 
▪ Categories of beneficiaries  
▪ Areas of project interventions 
▪ Relationship between land-power and identity 
aspects in project implemented   
Political cadres of armed groups  ▪ Motivations of armed conflicts  
▪ Relationship between land-power and identity 
aspects and armed groups’ claims 
▪ Connection between armed groups and ‘string 
pullers’ and their connection 
Public (state) authorities ▪ Analysis of the legal and institutional framework of 
land tenure management 
▪ Collaboration between different state institutions 
and international actors (UN agencies and NGOs) 
▪ State initiatives for conflict resolutions   
Other key informants (former 
cadres of AFDL, RCD, CNDP, 
PARECO rebellion), 
Businessmen, Lecturers, civil 
society leaders) 
▪ Analysis of the emergence of ‘string pullers’ 
▪ Armed groups’ motivations and relationship to 
‘string pullers’ 
▪ Peacebuilding strategies and collaboration with the 
Congolese civil society organizations 
▪ Relationship between land-power and identify and 
‘string pullers’ 
▪ Legal and administrative aspects of violent conflicts 
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3.5.1 Narrative interviews  
Narrative interviews ‘…are more likely to reproduce structures that guide the actions of individuals 
than other methods using interviews’ (Muylaert et al 2014:186). According to the authors, 
narratives can be considered as representations and interpretations of the world and therefore, they 
express the truth of a point of view in a particular time, space and socio-historic context. This 
technique of data collection was useful in two ways for analyzing the processes of scale production 
by actors and their networks. Firstly, it allowed a large amount of information to be generated from 
interviewees while avoiding direct questions, which might be politically sensitive and affect trust 
in the researcher.  
This risk was avoided by allowing informants to use the language of their choice without a 
translator. Secondly, as I found out during my previous research experience, informants are not 
always aware of the set terms used by researchers such as land tenure, power, politics or identity. 
Using narrative interviews helped to break down the inner meaning of each component of the key 
concepts of this study. For example, instead of saying ‘identity’ and its role in conflicts, many 
informants in several research sites used ‘ethnicity’ or ‘tribalism’, ‘belonging’. Practically, the 
intention was to hear from the informants, how they describe the rationalities behind social 
processes and political struggles and how different actors interact in everyday life.  
I applied the technique of narrative interviews by considering the four phases suggested by 
Jovchelovitch and Bauer (2007:7): (a) preparation, to formulate the initial topic for narration; (b) 
the main narration without interruptions, during which I used paralinguistic encouragement to 
continue telling the story; (c) the questioning phase, where I asked questions for clarifications and 
(d) small talk at the end of the narration, to reflect on what has been said. Muylaert et al. (2014) 
suggest using the first phase to prepare the exmanent questions. The exmanent questions refer to 
the researcher’s interests that arise from her or his approach to the topic of study, when developing 
a literature review and a thematic focus (field exploration). As a crucial task in the research process 
these questions must be transformed into immanent ones, which should at the same time anchor 
exmanent questions in the narration, always using the language of the informant.  
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Jovchelovitch and Bauer (2007) are also concerned with the limitations of this technique. They 
posit that researchers using the narrative interview often face two main problems. The first relates 
to the uncontrollable expectations of the informants, which raise doubts about the strong claim that 
the narrative interview is non-directive. Informants generally assume that the interviewer does 
know something about the story, and that they do not talk about what they know because they take 
it for granted. It can be problematic to stage a ‘pretend play’ of naivety, especially over a series of 
interviews where the informant knows that he or she is not the first to be interviewed and thus can 
manipulate and adapt the answer to what the researcher wants to hear.  
The second is what the authors term the ‘unrealistic’ role and rule requirements of narrative 
interview procedures such as exploring the field, formulating exmanent questions, using visual 
aids, no interruptions, etc. While these rules are formulated to guide the interviewer in order to 
avoid some controversial and sensitive information, the authors argue that these rules are not 
always as helpful as they are well intended. In any scientific research, there is no single technique 
or method that can allow us to understand a complex phenomenon. It is for reason that, besides 
narrative interviews, I decided to use semi-structured interviews in order to reach a particular 
category of informants for specific information.  
3.5.2 Individual semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews have been extensively used in qualitative research to collect additional 
information to explore particular themes or responses, as a complement to ‘closed’ questions. 
Although questions might be prepared beforehand, it gives informants the freedom to express their 
views in their own words. I have chosen this technique for its flexibility to address specific 
dimensions of research questions while also leaving space for informants to offer new meanings. 
Galletta and Cross (2013:2) contends that one can use semi-structured interviews to create 
openings for a narrative to unfold, while also including questions informed by theory. Specifically, 
this technique has been used in this study to reach different key informants in the selected sites, 
mainly in Goma and Gisenyi (Rwanda).  
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These informants were mostly experts with whom I discussed the content of different legal texts 
(Laws, Decrees, etc.) and different administrative procedures in land management, or the impact 
of decentralization law on power relations at the local level. This technique was appropriate in the 
sense that they did provide narratives but, and most importantly, I formulated specific questions 
they responded to. This allowed some of the general answers I got through the narrative interview 
to be complemented with precise answers. Questions were chosen and informants were identified 
based on the preliminary data analysis collected during the pilot research.  
3.5.3 Group interviews 
According to Frey and Fontana (1991:185) group interviews are a tool to obtain phenomenological 
data in people’s direct social environment. They argue that focus group discussions, as in my case, 
help to obtain data on any social context that is being studied in an ethnographic framework. For 
this study, they were useful as a tool to discuss specific cross-cutting themes related to this thesis 
as well as interrelated issues such as the link between the manifestations of land-related conflict 
and the perceptions of the role of peacebuilding organizations, or the link between armed groups 
and powerful individuals.  
The criteria for selection of participants were generally based on their activity and the position of 
each of them within the organizations they belong to (associations and cooperatives of women, 
youth, small-scale agriculturalists and pastoralists). To select the participants, I chose a single key 
informant who was familiar with each research place, who in turn proposed a list of participants. 
With my research assistant, I examined the list to make sure the above organizations were 
represented. The purpose of organizing one focus group discussion in Kilolirwe, one in Rubaya 
and one in Goma was to generate additional narratives concerning conflict dynamics: how conflict 
is managed and how peacebuilding organizations are perceived by these local organizations that 
are often targeted as beneficiaries of peacebuilding programs. 
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3.5.4 Observation  
Observation was also important to link up what informants said and how their claims appear on 
the ground. For example, some interviewees claimed that people are forced to live in IDPs camps 
because they were chased away from ‘their land’ by new owners, mostly powerful individuals with 
title deeds provided by the land registry. I used the observation technique while visiting both the 
IDP camps in Kitchanga and Rubaya to see their living conditions and to verify the information 
by having informal talks with some of the IDPs who cannot return to their homes.  
In Bashali, I visited villages where conflicts between farmers and pastoralists had occurred, in 
order to meet different parties to the conflicts. I also visited customary chiefs in Kilolirwe, Rubaya 
and Sake to informally discuss and understand how they solve such conflicts and what are the 
causes, particularly the context in which different stakeholders intervene. Most of the international 
NGOs and UN agencies claim in their different project reports to have set up local committees in 
several villages in Masisi. As I explained earlier in the choice of research places, observation was 
an important qualitative technique to verify if these committees exist, how they function and if the 
populations know and trust them. To do so, I had informal talks with members of these committees 
to understand how they work, I visited places they usually meet and I participated in some meetings 
organized in Kitchanga and Masisi-center. I also visited several places to see for myself some 
farms which informants mentioned as belonging to Big Men, while having informal talks with the 
people living around those farms to understand how they deal with access to land in such a context. 
In Goma, I attended a two-day workshop by International Alert and Search For Common Ground, 
respectively a British and American NGO, in March 2014. The aim of this workshop was to create 
a synergy of civil society organizations from North and South Kivu working in the peacebuilding 
sector. This was an opportunity for me to understand how international NGOs interact with local 
organizations and the ways in which the ‘local’ has been put at the center of intervention. This 
example is used in chapter four as an illustration of the ‘local’ construction process. During the 
same period, in February 2014 in Goma, I participated in another workshop organized by Forum 
des Amis de la Terre (FAT), a Congolese organization working on land governance. Here a 
research report on land tenure issues was presented and discussed by different stakeholders. It was 
followed by a lively and interesting debate that provided me with a broader understanding of the 
link between land-related violent conflicts and the legal system as well as state institutions (chapter 
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five discusses this aspect further). During the fieldwork, I also visited workplaces (offices) of 
different local civil society organizations in Goma and Masisi and participated in some informal 
meetings where issues related to my study were discussed.     
3.6 Data from secondary sources     
Secondary sources of data were collected and analyzed in three categories. The first one covers 
program and project documents. These include official documents produced by the Congolese 
government, international aid and UN agencies, NGOs, international think-tank organizations, 
media and individuals. They were collected both from private and public institutions such as the 
land registry, provincial ministry of land, provincial division of agriculture, and from individuals 
such as former civil servants, retired people, experts and human rights activists. Other documents 
such as reports by NGOs and international institutions (EU, World Bank, …) were available 
online, on the official websites.  
The second category refers to specific documents that discuss directly the data collected from 
primary sources. These documents comprise published books, academic works (journal articles, 
occasional papers, theses, published and unpublished articles); my own notes and feedback I 
received from different lectures and conferences I attended; online videos (conferences, debates, 
lectures and policy discussion).   
Thirdly, I collected a body of legal texts and official regulatory documents that I analyzed through 
a ‘document content analysis’ method. As Bowen (2009:27) puts it, ‘document analysis is a 
systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents - both printed and electronic 
(computer-based and Internet-transmitted) material. Like other analytical methods in qualitative 
research, document analysis requires that data be examined and interpreted in order to elicit 
meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical knowledge’. The author argues that document 
content analysis can be applied in qualitative, quantitative, and sometimes mixed modes of 
research frameworks and employs a wide range of analytical techniques. I used triangulation to 
identify and compare what was similar and different in documents, while preparing ‘new’ 
questions to develop further with the informants. These legal texts and official documents 
comprise laws, decrees, ordinances and edicts issued by government institutions both at the 
national and provincial levels. After collecting them, the first step was to read and to understand 
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how they may or may not relate to my research questions. The second step was to formulate some 
questions to discuss with expert informants, not only because they were written in technical terms 
which I was not familiar with, but also because I preferred to understand from experts the inner 
meanings and interpretations behind the text, which are covered in chapter five where I analyze 
and discuss the legal framework. Questions covered the issues of land tenure, nationality and other 
political dimensions such power relations, politics, authority and, in general, state-society 
relations.  
3.7 Data processing  
The first step consisted of listening to recorded interviews after meeting with informants. Some 
informants I met more than once and I could discuss more in depth aspects I was missing in the 
previous interviews. However, some informants did not allow recording and in this situation, I 
took notes. The second step was the review of all notes taken during group discussions. Quotations 
in this thesis are taken directly from both these transcriptions and documents analyzed, translated 
from the original languages into English. Although this thesis is written in English, all interviews 
were conducted in local languages (Kiswahili and Kinyarwanda and sometimes a mixture of both 
according to informants’ preferences).  
Doing research in local languages allowed me to give the informants more freedom to express 
themselves, especially for those chosen for narrative interviews. However, it took a lot of time to 
translate the transcriptions, especially the analysis of laws and official documents which require a 
careful and rigorous analysis when it comes to translating them. To make sure my interpretation 
and the technical terms I used for the legal and institutional framework analysis (see chapter five) 
did not contradict the original meaning, I consulted some legal experts who could help to translate 
French terms into the English equivalents.   
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The third step consisted of using the triangulation method to cross-check multiple data sources, 
both primary and secondary, in order to evaluate the extent to which all the evidence converged 
and answered the study questions. The triangulation method was useful not only to analyze data 
from multiple sources, but more importantly to reveal what is common to all the research sites and 
where they differ. For example, the question of access to land is posed in different ways in different 
places. In Rubaya for instance, people refer to some ‘string pullers’ as the ones who can provide 
land, but the cost of renting a plot of land is usually higher. In Kitchanga, on the contrary, people 
tend to refer to the customary chiefs as those holding authority over land. One of the effects is that 
in Kitchanga, the discourse of autochthons versus immigrants between Hunde and Banyarwanda 
groups is more salient, compared to Rubaya where the majority of the population are Hutu and 
most big landowners are Hutu Big Men. Triangulation helped to bring out these differences so that 
I could present a balanced and nuanced picture of how the land problem is faced by the population.  
Although this study does not claim to follow either a deductive or an inductive approach as such, 
the problem statement and research questions are developed from a general hypothesis which was 
informed by both my professional experience in the field of peacebuilding and the gap in the 
academic literature on the research topic. More importance is therefore given to what the empirical 
data provided after the analysis, rather than using a given grounded theory to corroborate or reject 
the hypothesis.  
3.8 Reflexivity and positionality  
Practicing reflexivity in order to understand and allow for the interconnections and mutual 
influence between the researcher and those being ‘researched’ is necessary to address the validity 
of the research conducted. This is crucial in order to limit my a priori interpretation of the data 
while, simultaneously, acknowledging my previous experience in the same research areas, thus 
my position in this study. To do so, I followed Burawoy’s (1998: 30) suggestion. He recommends 
a thinking process which includes the recognition that (a) we intervene in the lives of those we 
study; (b) we analyze social interactions; (c) we identify processes and dynamics that are in mutual 
determination with external social forces; and (d) we reconstruct a theoretical model/approach 
based on what we have learned during the research.  
I will discuss the reflexive character of this thesis while acknowledging that a researcher is part of 
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the social world he/she studies (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007:14). Therefore, the researcher 
must be aware of the context and the characteristics of informants as well as the social and political 
sensitivities that may affect the research process positively or negatively. The major priority was 
to work on my methodological approach, while simultaneously I had to choose informants and 
research places where I needed to collect data. The choice of multi-sited ethnographic approach 
was useful in the sense that it extended my possibilities to collect data beyond a single place, thus 
to increase chances for generalization. Prior to this thesis, as I explained in the introduction of this 
chapter, I added more places, more methods and diverse target groups to challenge my own pre-
knowledge. 
One of the challenges in conducting a study of land, identity and power in the context of Masisi is 
that this topic is associated with the work of international NGOs, which easily raises expectations 
of job opportunities. Before each interview and group discussion I had to explain many times that 
I am a ‘student’ and my research has nothing to do with project funding. Similar to this issue, 
although the presence of NGOs in the research sites represents an opportunity to understand their 
work, the downside has been that the ‘culture’ of paying a perdiem for any group discussion or 
any interview with an outsider has been quite normalized in the local mindset of the population. 
Knowing this in advance, I had to explain what this research is about and that I am not working 
for any NGO. This was important in order to prevent any misunderstanding or suspicious behavior.  
Another aspect in this study was my own personal background and the risk of being associated 
with a rival community group. Although I am not a native of Masisi, it was possible that 
participants in this study could easily identify the village which I came from, which could generate 
potential problems. Therefore, to gain their trust, I had to introduce myself and reassure them about 
my neutrality. Being a PhD student in Germany also played a significant positive role because 
even though I originally come from the neighboring region, the probability that I could be 
associated with any political or military group in Masisi was significantly reduced.  
All this preparation was informed by my previous experience working with international NGOs in 
communities. I knew that whenever people talk about NGOs and their work, the imagination 
commonly goes to whether NGOs succeed or fail to meet community needs. I was mindful that 
my informants might have ended up giving their opinions about the work of NGOs, what they 
think these organizations do in their communities. Although I chose narrative and semi-structured 
64 
 
interviews to let participants feel free to use their own words, this choice exposed me to the risk 
of falling into the trap of problem-solving narratives. To avoid this, I had to negotiate between the 
information I collected from informants and the research questions, in order to stay on track while 
at the same time focusing on the objectives of the study. At the beginning of my research, I 
considered the contribution to knowledge production of scholars and practitioners in the field of 
conflict study in the context of North Kivu and eastern DR Congo in general. It was for this reason 
that I decided to use both methodological and analytical approaches which allowed me to 
contribute not only to a new understanding of the conflict but also to a rapprochement between the 
fields of conflict studies and political geography. This could be tricky because I had to engage my 
informants in an unusual conversation, with relatively sensitive questions, for example the names 
and the role of ‘string pullers’ in conflict dynamics, such as land control, armed groups and ethnic 
rivalry.  
Undertaking this study involved various ethical concerns because of the sensitive character of the 
topic and diversity of actors. To deal with this, I had to preserve the anonymity of my informants 
when I changed sites to meet with other groups. Being seen as partly an ‘outsider’ could have 
negatively impacted on my positionality in dealing with the informants. The fact that I could speak 
local languages and consider the perceptions and attitudes of different groups to each other allowed 
me to negotiate data collection while reducing the risk of bias.  
3.9 Conditions of fieldwork and challenges of the study 
When I chose the topic of this study I was mindful of the sensitivity of some aspects of the research, 
especially those related to the dynamics of wars, actors and networks. With that in mind, it was 
not easy to discuss some sensitive topics openly. Most of the informants I met in different sites did 
not easily give the names of ‘Big Men,’ describe what they do or name the people or organizations 
they are affiliated with. This attitude was justified by fear of negative consequences. Mistrust of 
researchers in general was reinforced by reports released by UN and human rights organizations 
in which some of the names of those ‘string pullers’ appeared in association with conflict and 
violence. Because of this, some participants did not want to mention some names.  
To understand how ‘string pullers’ operate at different levels, I had to include on my list of 
informants some key persons who work or have worked closely with ‘string pullers’ in order to 
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understand different social connections and links between actors, but at the cost of not mentioning 
some names and highly sensitive information in this thesis.  
Moreover, it was difficult to reach all the targeted participants in their locations because some of 
them lived far away from the research area. To handle that challenge, I planned different phases 
of fieldwork, and often adapted to informants’ schedules on my research visits. Another challenge 
related to the lack of archives available in public institutions. For example, the registry office does 
not have mapping tools, statistics or figures that show exactly how land is distributed and located 
in Masisi. To deal with this, I used some figures available in the literature as a secondary data 
source. Although I managed to gather some data in the registry office, the information was not 
sufficient to cover the period of time I wanted to analyze. Some key informants I met in different 
interviews provided additional information to bridge this gap.   
Another challenge was to conduct research on a sensitive topic within a high-risk area. Masisi was, 
and is still, under the control of various armed groups with different zones of influence, including 
the zones in which I was conducting interviews and focus group discussions. The period of data 
collection also coincided with a military campaign by the National Army and UN Peacekeepers 
against those armed groups. Sometimes I had to cancel trips to remote villages for security reasons 
and wait for another opportunity to continue my research. Lastly, the absence of road infrastructure 
was a handicap to reach some villages on time because of the unusable roads in the rainy season 
(each year from March to May). During data collection, most roads that connect different villages 
were destroyed and I had to walk, sometimes the whole day.   
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Chapter 4 Peacebuilding and the construction of the ‘local’  
4.1 Introduction    
Over the last two decades, international organizations have intensified interventions in the eastern 
DR Congo in attempts to deal with the causes of violence. One of the dominant interventional 
frameworks, based on the peacebuilding and state-building paradigms, was based on the idea that 
Congo is an extreme example of a neo-patrimonial state in which powerful individuals maintain 
power through informal economic and military networks (see Ndikumana and Emizet 2003, 
Verweijen 2013). In the Kivu provinces, for example, while playing an ambiguous role in 
addressing the question of armed groups, the state sought to maintain its control over strategic 
natural resources like diamonds, tin, and coltan through privatized and violent modes of 
governance (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009:477). This picture of a ‘weak’ Congolese state in 
the minds of actors in the international community was strongly supported by a hypothesis that the 
origin of violent conflicts was situated at the State level: that is, that the State has lost both its 
monopoly on the use of violence within its national territory and, with regard to the role of 
neighboring countries, control of its borders.  
This assumption led international actors to focus efforts mainly at the national level. Donors to the 
Congolese government including UN agencies, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
and the European Union supposed that the causes of violence would be resolved by the government 
of the DR Congo, provided state institutions were adequately reinforced. Therefore, priorities were 
mostly oriented toward state building programs in the form of the organization of elections and 
the Security Sector Reforms (SSR). On the one hand, elections were supposed to provide a 
legitimacy to the post-electoral ‘democratic’ state institutions, whereas, on the other, the reform of 
the security sector was intended to address the question of insecurity through capacity building of 
the army, the police and justice.  
To this end, since 1999, the DR Congo has hosted nearly 20,000 UN peacekeeping troops in 
support of peace efforts and the democratic process. The organization of general elections in 2006 
and 2011 was largely supported by the international community and by bilateral donors, mostly 
European countries. In providing this support, the assumption was that an election would solve the 
problem of legitimacy and would therefore reinforce the state authority to deal with the causes of 
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conflict. However, different programs implemented by the Security Sector Reforms (SSR) in the 
aftermath of the first elections in 2006 did not succeed in delivering the promised security in vast 
areas of the country. While the Congolese government failed to take the lead to resolve the problem 
of insecurity, international actors such the EU and its partners also faced the challenge of lacking 
a coordination framework for implementing the reforms. As Justaert and Keukeleire (2010:20) 
clearly put it:  
The various European actors involved develop different programs based on own 
experiences and following their specific approaches and goals. This results in 
overlapping and sometimes even conflicting programs and approaches that 
hamper the effective problem-solving of the EU.  
This view is also shared by Trefon (2011: 1, also 2013, 149) when he contends that the overall 
picture of reform failure is the sum of a series of disconnected, uncoordinated and fragmented 
initiatives. Trefon condemns the fact that Congo’s bilateral and multilateral international partners 
did not share a common vision and often implemented contradictory reform programs. Froitzheim 
et al (2011, see also Boshoff et al. 2010) join Trefon in demonstrating that the European Union’s 
state-centered approach failed to deal with the realities of governance in the country. The authors 
emphasize the lack of a coherent strategy for the DRC, despite the large budget allocated. Their 
analysis concludes that the EU’s approach in the DRC has been more concerned with establishing 
a symbolic presence and a form of representation than with achieving specific goals.  
These critiques then led to another paradigm for intervention in which the ‘local level’ became a 
key feature for external peacebuilding interventions. Many of these interventions have been 
translated into programs and projects implemented by peacebuilding international NGOs with the 
emphasis on the ‘local community’ level. The central argument of this choice of the ‘local 
community’ by these NGOs was based on the acknowledgement that the causes of violent conflicts 
were rooted in the local dynamics around the issues of land, power and identity, as discussed in 
the literature review (chapter two). 
The aim of this chapter is to analyze and to understand the process by which the ‘local’ was 
constructed by international peacebuilding organizations as well as the conceptual and empirical 
implications generated by the ‘local’ approach. In the first sub-chapter I discuss how and why 
international organizations framed their intervention through the ‘local turn’ paradigm to justify 
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interventions; the second examines the role of the Congolese organizations in the process of ‘local 
community’ construction and the challenges arising from the local turn approach. The third 
demonstrates that land, unlike other dimensions of the conflict, is globally driven by donors’ 
agendas; that is why international NGOs fail to integrate other dimensions of the conflict in order 
to achieve consistent results. Lastly, the chapter demonstrates that peacebuilding intervention has 
fallen into its own trap of the ‘local’ by applying standardized approaches, which in turn 
disconnects land from other related drivers of conflict, depoliticizes ‘local communities’ and fails 
to account for the role of political, institutional and legal dimensions at different levels where land 
overlaps with power and identity questions.     
4.2 The local turn and the construction of the ‘local community’  
4.2.1 The international community’s shift of approach 
During the transition period, the role of the international community became crucial in providing 
financial and technical support to guarantee that the objectives and expected outcomes of the 
political transition met the timeline fixed by the Sun City Agreement. In this agreement, different 
parties agreed on the creation of an ‘International Committee for Support of the Transition’ 
(Comité International d’Appui à la Transition: CIAT) for the overall coordination of the 
international effort in support of the transition. The CIAT was composed of Ambassadors from 
the five permanent member states of the Security Council of the UN, the European Union, 
Belgium, Canada, South Africa, Angola, Gabon, Zambia, the African Union and MONUC (the 
UN peace keeping mission for the DR Congo). Although the CIAT was the ‘voice’ of the 
international community for a peaceful transition process, the definition of its mandate and the 
limit of its authority vis à vis the Congolese government were not clear and were at times contested. 
For example, when on January 7th 2005, the president of the National Electoral Commission raised 
the possibility of postponing the organization of the election scheduled for 2006, the CIAT did not 
hesitate to ask the Congolese parliament to organize a special session on the electoral law as 
quickly as possible. Unfortunately, both the parliament and the government rejected this request 
and accused the CIAT of putting the Congo under the tutelage of the international community. In 
November 2005, relations between the CIAT and the government became tense once again. While 
the government regularly used the rhetoric of state sovereignty to express its frustrations, the CIAT 
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stood firm on its position about the electoral calendar. This position was clearly expressed by 
Reinhard Buchholz, the German Ambassador, in an interview in November 2005 with the local 
newspaper ‘Le Potentiel’, saying that: ‘if there is no election in 2006, Congo will fall apart’ 
(MONUC’s press review of 22nd November 2005).  
When elections took place in 2006 the CIAT seemed to be satisfied with the achievement, although 
elections were only one of many objectives of the transition. For example, the Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reinsertion (DDR) of former combatants, the National Reconciliation Process 
and the restoration of peace and security in eastern Congo were all left aside by both the Congolese 
government and the CIAT in order to focus on the elections, with the assumption that the new 
institutions would allow the country to reach stability. Aside from the diplomatic presence of the 
UN in Congo via CIAT, a peacekeeping mission, the Mission of the UN in Congo (MONUC), had 
been established by the Security Council in November 1999, one year before the Sun City 
agreement was signed. According to Resolution 1279 (1999), adopted by the Security Council at 
its 4076th meeting on 30 November 1999, the main tasks of MONUC were: 
(a) To establish contact with the signatories to the Ceasefire Agreement at their headquarters levels, as well as in the 
capitals of the States signatories; 
(b) To liaise with the Joint Military Commission (JMC) and provide technical assistance in the implementation of its 
functions under the Ceasefire Agreement, including in the investigation of ceasefire violations; 
(c) To provide information on security conditions in all areas of its operation, with emphasis on local conditions 
affecting future decisions on the introduction of United Nations personnel;  
(d) To plan for the observation of the ceasefire and disengagement of forces; 
(e) To maintain liaison with all parties to the Ceasefire Agreement to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance 
to displaced persons, refugees, children, and other affected persons, and assist in the protection of human rights, 
including the rights of children. 
MONUC’s mandate was initially divided into four phases: the first phase was to facilitate the 
implementation of the Lusaka ceasefire agreement; the second was to monitor violations; the third 
was to focus on the process of disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and 
reintegration (DDRRR) and the fourth phase was to facilitate the transition to the organization of 
credible elections.  
 Although MONUC was the largest UN peacekeeping mission in the world, UN and human rights 
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organizations constantly reported that an increasing number of armed groups were controlling 
large parts of eastern DR Congo. Until 2008, MONUC could not cope with the generalized 
insecurity in eastern Congo, especially because it was operating under an ‘observation mandate’ 
which prohibited MONUC troops from the use of military force, even when civilians were targeted 
by armed groups. After a series of criticisms of MONUC’s mandate, its inability to deal with 
insecurity and its failure to protect civilians, the UN Security Council decided to reinforce and 
modify its mandate.  
It was under Resolution 1925 (2010), adopted by the Security Council at its 6324th meeting, on 
28 May 2010 that MONUC became MONUSCO (Mission of the UN for Stabilization of Congo). 
Unlike MONUC, MONUSCO could rely on chapter VII of the charter of the UN which allows it 
to use military force (if necessary) to protect civilians. Point (1) of the resolution reads that  
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security 
Council decides to extend the mandate of MONUC until 30 June 2010 and further 
decides that, in view of the new phase that has been reached in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, the United Nations mission in that country, MONUC, 
shall, as from 1st of July 2010, bear the title of the United Nations Organization 
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). 
The creation of MONUSCO happened in the context of the difficult implementation of the 
ceasefire agreement signed in Goma between armed groups operating in North Kivu and South 
Kivu provinces and the government in December 2008. With the support of the international 
community, the Congolese government created a mechanism called the ‘Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas’ (STAREC) in June 2009 as a channel to implement 
the Goma Conference recommendations.  
The entire STAREC program covers the Provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu, the Districts of 
Haut-Uélé, Bas-Uélé and Ituri in Province Orientale and the District of Tanganyika in Katanga 
Province. To support the STAREC program, the Stabilization Support Unit (SSU), a branch of 
MONUSCO, elaborated an International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS) as a 
UN mechanism to accompany the Government’s efforts toward the stabilization of the areas 
selected. 
To understand the context of the creation of STAREC, it is important to remember that at the end 
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of the second Congolese war (1998-2003), the international community chose to focus on the state 
level as a strategy to accompany the political transition (2003-2006) and to guarantee a more or 
less fair general election which was expected to take place in 2006. Although this support in 
organizing the election brought hope to the Congolese population, the presence and the activism 
of armed groups in the eastern part of the country undermined this hope. The end of the transition 
and the organization of the election of 2006 did not resolve the problem of armed groups and the 
historical tensions among local populations. The creation of STAREC and ISSSS was considered 
by both the Congolese government and the International Community as a response to deal with 
the above problems with the focus on the provincial and local level. Besides STAREC and ISSSS, 
some international humanitarian and peacebuilding NGOs as well as Congolese civil society 
organizations had begun implementing projects before 2008. Most of these projects dealt with the 
humanitarian response assisting the displaced populations in the rural areas while short-term 
projects of conflict management were developed.  
For example, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) has been working in North and South Kivu 
provinces since 2001, focusing its main activities on Camp Management (CM) and Emergency 
Food Security and Distribution (EFSD), Shelter and Education programs for the internally 
displaced (IDPs). Alongside its humanitarian response, NRC also developed, in synergy with other 
activities, a program called Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance (ICLA) aiming to deal 
with land-related tensions and other conflicts between displaced and the host populations. Apart 
from NRC, other peacebuilding NGOs have been working in North Kivu since the beginning of 
the 2000s.  
During phase one of the ISSSS (2008-2013) in collaboration with STAREC, sixty-nine projects 
with a budget of US$367 million were implemented (SPP-ISSSS report, 2012). According to the 
evaluation report (SPP-ISSSS report, 2013) of the ISSSS-Phase I, few results were achieved, 
mainly for four reasons. First, the lack of a common vision and common objectives of the different 
stakeholders; second, because the monitoring and assessment framework was overly basic and 
focused only on quantitative indicators such as roads and schools being built; third, because 
programs were conceived in an emergency, focusing on a top-down approach; and fourth, because 
the Government’s support for the work of STAREC was missing and sustainable reforms (in 
security, economy and justice) were not achieved as expected. This failure was not only 
condemned by the SSU-MONUSCO. It was recognized by a key figure responsible within 
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STAREC/North Kivu, who stated on the record that: 
 
we have done less than what we expected, for different reasons. Of the total 
budget approved by the government, less than 30% has been provided so far. For 
the rest, we apply for funds from other donors, notably international 
organizations, the World Bank or European Union. That is why most of our plans 
and projects have not been executed and are stuck on our shelves (Interview in 
Goma, IV.03.14). 
 
Moreover, since the creation of STAREC in 2008, it has not undergone any program evaluation. 
Even when the SSU-MONUSCO evaluated the ISSSS programs in 2013, STAREC was not part 
of this evaluation. According to the interview above, STAREC could not evaluate its programs 
partly because many of them have not been implemented yet, partly because neither the ISSSS nor 
the government support STAREC financially.  
The International Crisis Group’s report (2012:8) has shown that neither STAREC nor the ISSSS 
met the expected results in eastern DR Congo. This report strongly criticizes the programs 
implemented, for lack of consultation with the targeted populations, over-emphasis on material 
reconstruction at the expense of governance reform, lack of international coordination and lack of 
financial commitment from the Congolese government. International Alert’s report (2012) goes 
further in showing that various programs designed to restore peace in the East had achieved little 
success due to their failure to take on board the underlying causes of the conflicts in any 
meaningful sense and their strong focus on technical aspects, while neglecting underlying political 
issues. These critiques have not only led UN agencies and other international NGOs to revise their 
strategy. They have led some international organizations to the design of peacebuilding programs 
that emphasize the ‘local’, while simultaneously scholars on the Congolese conflict continue to 
question this discourse of the ‘local turn’. In the next paragraphs, I discuss how the local turn 
paradigm has been driven by the ‘local ownership’ discourse as debated amongst scholars and 
how, in the Congolese context, it allowed international peacebuilding interventions to construct 
‘local communities’.  
During the past decade, the conceptual discourses and empirical evidences of the local turn in 
peacebuilding have taken an important place in the academic debate. While both peacebuilding 
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and development actors agreed on the necessity of turning to ‘local’, a specific group targeted by 
these actors was (and remains to date) local actors. As result, the recognition that local actors 
should be in the driving seat of peacebuilding projects is firmly established in theory and practice, 
fundamentally inspired by Jean-Paul Lederach’s work on conflict transformation (1997) and by 
scholars such as Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013) from the field of critical peacebuilding research 
(Paffenholz, 2016:210). While Paffenholz acknowledges that the above two schools of thought 
offer a counter-narrative to outsider-driven international peacebuilding, she also demonstrates how 
the local turn paradigm directly derived from these narratives, which is the role of local actors and 
their capacity to build sustainable peace.  
Recently, the question how the capacity of local actors can be effectively promoted in international 
peacebuilding activities has been repeatedly raised as a core concern of both peace studies and 
development studies (Özerdem and Lee 2015:1). To address the limitations of standard 
peacebuilding approaches and to equip local actors to work effectively, Özerdem and Lee argue 
that international organizations have begun to emphasize the importance of ‘indigenous’ 
ownership of peacebuilding. Based on this necessity to promote local ownership, a number of 
international organizations, including UN agencies and bilateral donors, have confirmed their 
strong commitment to the promotion of local ownership. The term ‘local ownership’ has also been 
used frequently in debates on development and foreign aid and brings into focus the implied 
conditionalities of external (financial, technical) support and peacebuilding (Reich 2006:5).  
However, while the above organizations have taken local ownership for granted, assuming that 
peacebuilding programs would successfully be implemented in societies affected by violence, 
Özerdem and Lee challenge this belief. According to them, so far, in contemporary academic 
discussion about local ownership there is no clear definition of what actually constitutes the ‘local’. 
Recently, Sarah von Billerbeck joined this debate on local ownership in the context of a UN 
peacekeeping intervention. In questioning this concept, she asks why the UN advocates for local 
ownership based on a set of purported benefits while operationalizing it in a way that undermines 
the achievement of those very benefits (Billerbeck, 2017:3). She argues that the emphasis on local 
ownership may be viewed as an attempt by the UN and other international organizations to 
reconcile the two major principles (self-determination and non-interference) in countries of 
intervention. By giving local actors a leading role in peacekeeping, the author continues, 
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interventions are supposed to minimize the degree of imposition entailed by their operations and 
maintain the ability of local actors to determine their own political path.  
In the above discussion, although the local turn paradigm and the local ownership discourse 
strongly emphasize the need to include direct actors at the local level, all the authors seem to agree 
that there is no clear definition of what these concepts mean on the operational level. While 
conceptually there is a common sense of how they may relate to each other, the challenge arises 
when external interventions, in terms of programs and projects, have to be evaluated based on the 
conceptual meaning of local ownership. Still, one would wonder ‘which actors actually own what’, 
and at what level the ownership is practiced? The next section discusses how ‘local community’ 
in the Congolese context has become recurrent in the discourse of peacebuilding organizations as 
a translation of the local turn and local ownership.  
4.2.2 The construction of the ‘local community’ in the Congolese context  
The scholarly analysis of conflict dynamics has not only influenced peacebuilding organizations 
by providing arguments against the top-down approach: it has also become a springboard for an 
approach that would differentiate peacebuilding NGOs from institutional donors such as the EU, 
UKAID, USAID and certain UN agencies. Around 2010, some of these NGOs started to develop 
a new narrative about the importance of taking the ‘local’ into consideration as a modality to 
achieve durable peace.  
To grasp the meaning of ‘local community’ in the context of this study, I rely on an idea that 
‘community’ is socially constructed and, as such, it is used both as a concept and as a targeted 
category of population from which projects can be framed by institutions and organizations. 
Wiswanath et al (2000:30) for example discuss the notion of ‘civic engagement’ as a community 
tie. They contend that engagement with ‘local community’ issues is helpful in a participatory 
democracy in the sense that membership in community organizations is not usually based on 
vertical relations, but rather on horizontal relations of trust, solidarity and interdependency. These 
authors believe that networks of horizontal ties within communities can facilitate the flow of 
information, and boost participation and action to solve community issues.  
This view of community as a ‘given’ entity in which members may need an external intervention to 
shape its organization and to improve people’s life insinuates the idea of members’ vulnerability. It is 
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in this sense that Christmann et al (2014:148) introduced a constructivist thought into vulnerability 
and resilience concepts, assuming that social constructivist approaches can better explain the 
emergence of socially shared perceptions within societal processes. In this regard, social 
construction of a community can be shaped where potential threats are collectively assessed and 
negotiated by its members. Therefore, conclude the authors, constructing vulnerability means that 
a given entity, which is defined as being valuable and to be preserved, is delimited and located at 
the center of an actor-network structure at a certain point of time.  
This construction of the community, based on the vulnerability of members, is also supported by 
Stoutland (1999:168) in her study of the levels of the ‘Community Development System’. She 
argues that ‘community development’ is defined to include all people who live or work in low-
income neighborhoods as well as actors (both people and organizations) at city, state, and national 
level whose work serves (or is supposed to serve) these neighborhoods. This categorization of 
communities on the basis of income level has also inspired development interventions to design 
programs to improve the quality of life of the people living in those communities (Ferguson and 
Dickens 1999:5). Although the above discussion of the construction of the ‘local community’ 
emphasizes the external dimension (in the etic perspective), members of a given community may 
not be passive agents in the process of the construction of the ‘community’ idea (emic perspective).  
This was already demonstrated in the 1970s by Kasarda and Janowitz in their studies of community 
attachment in mass society, in which they discuss how the dynamics of local communities 
function. They emphasize how ‘location in communities of increased size and density does not 
weaken bonds of kinship and friendship between members of a local community’. They discovered 
that even when the size and the density of a local community increase, community sentiments 
often remained compatible with a desire to avoid the negative features of local community life 
(Kasarda and Janowitz, 1974:338). From the above discussion, it is noticeable that the idea of local 
community is discussed as a geographical construction in which groups of people are seen as 
locally settled. Alongside this construction of the ‘local’ in academic work, policy makers continue 
to design programs based on the idea that local communities exist and are geographically locatable. 
Before I provide examples of how ‘local communities’ are constructed and emphasized in some 
peacebuilding programs, I first introduce the conceptual meaning of ‘local community’ in the 
Congolese legal framework.  
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When one refers to the idea of ‘local community’ in the Congolese context, what comes to mind 
is the representation of ethnic groups. Ethnic identity as both a political and sociological 
construction in many African societies has been used by scholars as an important category to 
describe opposing groups in the context of conflict (see John Lonsdale, 1994; Carola Lentz, 1995; 
David Welsh, 1996). In the DR Congo, for example, Lumuna (1998:52) recognizes the 
preponderance of ethnic identities when he argues that the democratic process launched in the 
early 1990s failed because of the superposition of ethnic and tribal groups that conflicted with the 
democratic principles put forward by the democratization attempts. As I discussed in chapter two, 
reference to local communities in conflict analysis in the literature often means associated 
population groups and their ethnic affiliation, such as Hunde, Nande, Hutu, etc. However, ‘local 
community’ as based on ethnic group is not a category constructed by peacebuilding workers per 
se, but has a juridical foundation in the Congolese legal framework. 
Article 388 of the Land Law, for example, refers to ‘land occupied by local communities’. This 
law, however, does not define who constitutes the ‘local community’ although it recognizes the 
existence of such communities. The Forestry Code attempts to provide a definition in Article 1, 
which holds that the ‘local community is a population traditionally organized on the basis of 
customs and united by the links of clan solidarity or blood ties which form its internal cohesion. It 
is characterized however by its attachment to a homeland’ (Article 1, section 17).  
This definition provided by the Land Law and the Forestry Code concerning ‘local communities’ 
produces two effects: one, it raises the distinction between two categories of groups, one which 
identifies itself as natives or autochthons and another seen and described as non-autochthon. For 
example, when the Forestry Code connects the entitlement of a clan to its attachment to a 
homeland, the population that claims to be the native population (the Hunde in this study) tend to 
claim the exclusive right to own land over those considered as non-natives (Banyarwanda in this 
study).  
This happened in Masisi when the Banyarwanda arrived during colonial rule: keeping the status 
of immigrants, the Banyarwanda continued to struggle for national citizenship even after 
Congolese independence. This notion of ‘local community’ has not only affected the notion of 
citizenship, it has reinforced the use of ethnic identity to designate communities. This explains 
why, for example, Willame (1997), Lemarchand (2009), and Mararo (1997) referred to the violent 
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conflict of the early 1990s in Masisi as ‘interethnic’ or ‘intercommunity’ conflict. Taking this 
understanding of ‘local community’ on such a basis, several conflict resolution projects in the early 
2000s began to target ‘local communities’ portrayed in these NGOs’ discourse as ‘victims’ of the 
violent conflicts. However, International NGOs and UN agencies are not only the ones using the 
‘local community’ discourse. For example, in 2015, to implement the second phase of the 
stabilization plan, the ISSSS and STAREC defined a Provincial Strategy which emphasized that: 
supporting local and provincial dialogue initiatives aims to articulate a collective 
vision for a clear and long-term peace and to affirm the essential role of 
communities in improving the political, security and socio-economic situation in 
the eastern DR Congo (p. 67). 
International NGOs also used the category of ‘local community’ as beneficiaries in their 
interventional framework in some of their programs.  
The first is the ‘Tufaidike Wote’ (working together for everyone’s benefit), a project implemented 
in North and South Kivu provinces by a consortium made up of CARE, the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) and International Alert from January 2012 to December 2016. Funded by 
USAID, this multisector project was based around three pillars: (1) reinforcing the capacity for 
conflict prevention, management and resolution in communities; (2) improving citizen 
participation and good governance of community assets; and (3) promoting agricultural 
livelihoods and alternative livelihoods. The overall aim of the project was to strengthen the socio-
economic stability of the communities through the promotion of management mechanisms and 
conflict prevention, good governance and livelihoods.  
The second project is ‘Social Cohesion and peaceful cohabitation in Masisi and Rutshuru 
Territoires’ implemented by Search For Common Ground in 2015. The objective of this project 
was to ‘Promote peaceful cohabitation between local communities and to strengthen the 
intercommunity links in order to contribute to a reduction of conflicts and intercommunity 
violence.  
The third example is a program called Community capacity building in conflict management and 
peace promotion in the eastern DR Congo’, funded by the Government of the Netherlands to 
support the stabilization strategy undertaken by ISSSS and STAREC since 2012. Under the 
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heading ‘Projet Chapeau’, some UN agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, FAO, MONUSCO) and 
international NGOs (International Alert, Life & Peace Institute, Norwegian Refugee Council) 
implemented several projects in the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Province Orientale. 
The overall objective of this ‘Projet Chapeau’ was to contribute to the emergence of conditions for 
peaceful dialogue amongst communities. In North Kivu, the Territoires of Masisi and Beni were 
selected as sites for the project activities.  
 
The fourth example is a Conflict Transformation program implemented by Life & Peace Institute 
(LPI) in partnership with a Congolese organization (Action pour la Paix et la Concorde-APC) 
between 2008-2009. A participatory action research (PAR) conducted in the Territoire of Kalehe 
identified four population groups (Tembo, Havu, Hutu and Tutsi) under the label of ‘local 
communities’. This PAR found out that the major conflicts between these ‘local communities’ are 
related to land, power and the presence of armed groups which are affiliated to those communities 
(Life & Peace Institute report 2012). In 2011, after consultation with these local communities, 
local committees for dialogue and mediation (CDM) were set up in Kalehe as mechanisms to 
manage intercommunity conflicts. While I was working with LPI, I was part of the team that visited 
Kalehe in early 2011 to meet different delegates from all the four communities. The purpose of 
the visit was to prepare an intercommunity roundtable which was supposed to bring all these 
communities together to agree on an action plan to be implemented by CDM. Similar to this APC 
program, LPI supported another Congolese organization (Action Solidaire pour la Paix-ASP), also 
focusing on ‘local communities’ in North Kivu, specifically in Bashali (Masisi). I discuss this in 
chapter six as an illustration of the ‘local trap’. 
 
From the above examples of international peacebuilding programs, one can notice how the ‘local 
community’ is constantly emphasized across several peacebuilding programs. This ‘local’ shift in 
the eastern DR Congo context can be understood from two perspectives. Firstly, at a time when 
MONUSCO-ISSSS (stabilization strategy phase one) recognized its own failure in dealing with 
the causes of violence, some international NGOs were able to raise funds directly from 
international donors by promising to fill the gap that UN agencies overlooked (International Alert 
2012). Although this shift to the ‘local’ has been constantly claimed by peacebuilding NGOs, 
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programs in many places in the eastern DR Congo are not implemented exclusively by them. UN 
agencies are also becoming involved in projects, as in the examples of programs given above. 
  
Secondly, the opportunity for international NGOs to access funding from donors such as the EU 
or UN has become slimmer as the UN mission in DR Congo (MONUSCO) started to directly fund 
Congolese organizations (for example STAREC). At the same time, one cannot clearly distinguish 
which organizations are peacebuilding ones. During fieldwork for this study, I noticed that because 
of the lack of coordination in the international funding framework, there is a multiplicity of donors 
and, on the ground, the programs and projects sometimes overlap. A joint evaluation of ‘conflict 
prevention and peace building in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ carried out by Research 
Channel (2011) put it clearly that: 
when it comes to addressing the key drivers of peace and conflict, the problem 
arises in the multiplicity of policies and coordination mechanisms. The 
multiplication of budget lines, of decision making locations (capitals, embassies, 
projects, contractors, national authorities, local authorities) follows the strategies. 
The absence of synergy in donor approaches layers on to this complexity (p. 67-
68) 
Another example is the local structure for conflict management (CLPC) created by the ISSSS 
through STAREC while at the same time similar structures (such as Paillottes de Paix, CDM, 
CITC) had already been created by other international NGOs through Congolese local 
organizations. Despite this lack of coordination and harmonized approaches, both UN agencies 
and international NGOs continue to use the ‘local community’ discourse to legitimate their 
intervention on the local level. The main strategy used by these organizations to reach the ‘local 
community’ as target has been and still is based on collaboration with Congolese civil society 
organizations, which I term ‘peacebuilding brokers’. In order to implement their ‘local’ strategy 
of engagement with the ‘local communities’, international peacebuilding NGOs sought out 
Congolese organizations to partner with, ones which were assumed to enjoy a certain legitimacy 
and social support among ‘local communities’. Next, I discuss how local Congolese civil society 
organizations have constituted an entry point for intervention by international NGOs and UN 
agencies. 
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4.2.3 Local organizations in the process of the ‘local community’ construction 
Local Congolese organizations were active in DR Congo from the 1980s onwards as members of 
civil society, many of which used to intervene in the development programs sector (Matsuura, 
2015:58). An important shift occurred in the aftermath of the second Congolese war in the early 
2000s, when humanitarian and peacebuilding efforts had become a focus of international 
organizations. In this new context, many Congolese local organizations were ready to abandon 
their initial strategic plans in order to accommodate international NGOs’ programs, in the hope of 
benefiting from the funding available at that time on the one hand; while on the other, international 
NGOs needed ‘broker partners’, whereby local organizations were seen as merely intermediaries 
between international NGOs and ‘local communities’. Over the last decade, this ‘marketization’ 
of peacebuilding interventions was accelerated by the massive presence of international NGOs in 
areas where ‘local communities’ were seen as peace ‘clients,’ only too ready to accommodate 
peacebuilding programs through collaboration with Congolese local organizations.  
The ‘marketization’ of peacebuilding fell into the realm of civil society when international donors 
expressed concerns about the inability of states to manage public aid effectively during the 1980s. 
The proliferation of armed conflicts and the increased level of violence in the post 1990s period 
have led the international community to step up its engagement in peacebuilding in the countries 
affected: in Africa for example, grassroots-level NGOs, mostly working for indigenous 
development (in sectors including public health, agriculture and small business) were perceived 
by international peacebuilding organizations as reliable partners to address the causes of violence. 
Based on the perceived importance of local NGOs in the areas of welfare and development aid, 
Western institutions developed the idea that local NGOs enjoy the social recognition of local 
communities as well as working within distinct spheres of activity (Neubert 2014:6).  
 Yet, during the 1990s, the concept of civil society was not commonly used in local discourse and 
it remained difficult to categorize local NGOs as civil society actors in terms of the Western 
understanding of what civil society means. Neubert (2014:18), for example, observed that the 
concept of civil society with its rigid normative standards is too narrow to allow the description of 
different processes through which local organizations emerge, shift and develop, which may often 
defy conventional expectations. Nonetheless, in post-conflict areas, a thorough understanding of 
civil society’s roles and potential for peacebuilding is still required. This need is well expressed 
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by Paffenholz and Spurk (2006:33) when they suggest that merging civil society discourse and 
civil society peacebuilding would lead to a much clearer and focused understanding of what one 
would expect as the role of civil society in conflict resolution. In spite of this understanding of the 
concept of civil society, one should remain cautious that its role, its mission and its function can 
vary and can be shaped by the political or socioeconomic context within a country in which these 
organizations emerge.  
In DR Congo, for example, there are generally two groupings of civil society organizations. The 
first is what is known as the ‘official’ body and is engaged in politics, often as a member of the 
political opposition. It is organized in different structures, from the local to the national level, and 
its member organizations work in different sectors. From time to time, this body has been accused 
by some of its members of taking the regime’s side instead of being on the population’s side. 
During the past ten years, internal divisions among member organizations of the official civil 
society body have led to the creation of a radical platform, which claims to be the ‘real voice of 
the population’. This body was created in 2013 under the name of ‘Dynamique de la Société Civile 
en République Démocratique du Congo- NDSCI-CHUNVI YA CONGO/ Dynamic of the civil 
society in DR Congo) and works in parallel to the previous one.  
Meanwhile, local NGOs (associations, cooperatives, faith-based organizations, etc.) continue to 
claim their affiliation to civil society. The distinction between the two bodies of civil society was 
at issue when international organizations wanted to select local partners, even though within each 
of the two bodies there are differences based on the sector of intervention, which in turn, changes 
and shifts depending on opportunities for funding. This opportunistic situation relates mostly to 
the second category, in which some Congolese organizations recognize themselves as 
peacebuilding civil society organizations. For example, in March 2014 in Goma, I attended a 
workshop organized by International Alert and Search For Common Ground, respectively a British 
and an American peacebuilding NGO, during which a new synergy of civil society organizations 
was created by several local Congolese organizations from North and South Kivu. The official 
name this platform took was ‘Les Acteurs de la Paix à la Base-Actors of peace at the grassroot 
level’ whose members are exclusively peacebuilding-oriented organizations.  
Prior to the creation of the above platform, Life & Peace Institute, for example, selected local 
partners in North and South Kivu in 2008; the conditions for partnership were that the institutional 
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and financial support it provided would be allocated to those organizations which would agree to 
abandon the other activities they were involved in (such as education, public health, and the 
environment) and devote themselves entirely to conflict transformation. Those organizations 
which signed the deal became ‘Professional Centers for Conflict Transformation’. Thus, 
international organizations did not only influence a change in focus of many local Congolese 
organizations through this money-based partnership; one of the consequences was that Congolese 
organizations lost track of the priorities they were focusing on before international peacebuilding 
became marketized. Clearly, international organizations needed to partner with local ones, not just 
as civil society members per se, but as an organizational bridge to reach beneficiaries.  
In the context of peacebuilding interventions, Shinoda (2008:98) explains this principle of local 
ownership in two ways. First, because international actors involved in the process of peacebuilding 
have never abandoned the framework of the sovereign nation-state as the basis of international and 
domestic order, respect for local ownership is often highly expressed. Second, no matter how long 
international actors remain involved in the process of peacebuilding, they rarely enjoy direct 
results without the ownership and the active participation of the so-called beneficiaries. Hence 
local ownership is desired as a strategy to build and maintain durable peace. However, the local 
ownership principle posits that international intervention should not directly engage with local 
communities. For years, most donors have been unanimous in agreeing that the local civil society 
must be reinforced institutionally, technically and financially in order to serve as intermediaries 
between international programs and local communities.  
 In the Congolese context, this principle of ownership has been used by international NGOs not 
only as a way of avoiding the top-down approach largely criticized by scholars, but also as an 
argument to be used in fundraising, presenting Congolese local organizations as community-based 
initiatives suitable for building durable peace. This call was followed by several local 
organizations that claimed to work for peace. Under EU funding, for example, International Alert 
report (2010) conducted an inventory of peace initiatives in the eastern Congo, finding 171 
organizations (81 active in North Kivu, 69 active in South Kivu, and 21 operating in both 
provinces) identified as operating in the peace, governance and human rights sector; 25 of them in 
Masisi. Today, this number has increased even more. In brokering peacebuilding deals between 
international and local organizations, the idea of local ownership was quickly assumed by both 
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parties without a deep understanding of the links between conflict actors, conflict dynamics or the 
scales involved in the conflict. Based on the fact that violent conflicts have been driven by the 
triangle of land, power and identity, one could question if peacebuilding programs have always 
considered this triangle in their interventions. 
Since scholars such as Mararo (1997), Van Acker (2005), Vlassenrrot (2013), Autesserre (2008) 
have emphasized the relationship between the land, power and identity triangle in the Congolese 
conflict, international actors took this triangle as the interventional framework through which 
programs and projects can be implemented. Some of these organizations, for example, 
International Alert (2010), Oxfam (2012), Search For Common Ground (2014), published reports 
in which they emphasized the need for addressing the causes of violence using the triangle lens. 
Moreover, in 2014, the SSU-MONUSCO decided to launch a series of conflict analysis and need 
assessment for stabilization from the perspective of implementing Phase Two (2013-2017) of the 
stabilization plan. The objective was to produce a coherent and effective programmatic approach 
for intervention, based on key dynamics of conflict identified after the evaluation in the first phase: 
the security dilemma (trying to understand the persistence of violent conflict despite military 
efforts by the government and UN troops), land and identity issues, exploitation of natural 
resources and regional dynamics (the role and connections of neighbor countries in the Congolese 
crisis). Beyond the triangle of conflict, MONUSCO decided to add these four dynamics, not only 
to avoid the failure of Phase One, but also as a strategy for MONUSCO and other UN agencies 
(UN Habitat, UNDP, …) to join peacebuilding NGOs who had been working with Congolese 
organizations on the community level. For example, the ISSSS-MONUSCO provided financial 
support to conduct this conflict analysis and need assessment for stabilization in several areas (Life 
& Peace Institute in South Kivu, International Alert and Search For Common Ground in Masisi). 
In Kitchanga (Bashali-Masisi), it was reported by Search For Common Ground that the most 
frequent conflicts that divide communities were around questions of land, power and identity 
(SFCG:2014). 
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Table 2: Summary of conflict identified in Kitchanga-Bashali 
Dynamics of conflicts Types of conflicts 
Land ● Farmers vs pastoralists 
● Complex land tenure legislation 
● Large-scale land owners vs peasants 
● Women excluded from land inheritance 
● Land scarcity 
Identity ● Armed groups organized in terms of shared ethnicity  
● Customary chiefs’ support for armed groups 
● Political leaders’ support for their fellows of the same ethnic groups 
● The Banyarwanda (Hutu and Tutsi) seen as foreigners, thus without 
right to land  
● Security forces (army and police) tend to favor populations of their 
own ethnicity  
Power ● Customary vs state authority 
● Armed groups support leaders of the same ethnic group  
● Authorities privilege nepotism and patron-client relations 
● Complicity between customary chiefs and armed groups 
SFCG, 2014: p. 32 
Observations made during the fieldwork showed that for security reasons (mostly), the population 
continues living in camps as IDPs. These camps are built in areas which are far from IDPs’ homes, 
which has increased the demand for land for their survivors because there is little humanitarian 
assistance in terms of food production. Because the available farmlands surrounding IDP camps 
often are owned by private individuals, this means access to even a small plot of land for 
agricultural activities has become expensive and not affordable for the displaced population. 
However, some of these landowners have agreed in some places (Rubaya for example) to rent 
some plots of land but still the rental price per hectare is very high compared to the population’s 
standard of living. The information I gathered during a focus group discussion in Rubaya revealed 
that anyone in need of land would pay between 300 and 400 US dollars, only for one cropping 
season (about 5 months).  
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IDPs camp of Rubaya (Masisi)   
  
Rubaya-center (Masisi) 
 
In these agglomerations of population, space for survival and for agriculture has become another 
source of tensions. On the one hand, these settlements are surrounded by huge pastoral lands 
owned by some powerful individuals (politicians and senior officers of the Army), which makes 
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it difficult for the families to live in proximity to the farms. Not only do these families need some 
plots of land for survival, they also need a guarantee from state authorities for their rights to use 
the land they occupy. These tensions have still not been resolved by peacebuilding organizations 
working in these areas.  Families that can afford the price can negotiate a few hectares for rent for 
some agricultural activities. In Kilolirwe, compared to Rubaya, one hectare costs around 300 US 
dollars per cropping season (or sometimes payment can be made with agricultural products after 
the harvest). Testimonies gathered in several research sites of this study showed that because of 
this lack of opportunities to access land, some families were to move to other areas, still, as 
displaced people expecting to receive humanitarian assistance to survive, as shown in the pictures 
below.  
     
IDPs camp of Mungote in Kitchanga (Masisi) 
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 IDPs camp of Kahe in Kitchanga (Bashali-Masisi) 
The exact number of IDPs in each of the sites is not known because of the fluidity of people’s 
movements searching for safe areas and where some land can actually be accessible. In its report 
of March 2016, UNOCHA claimed there were 782,000 IDPs in North Kivu, of whom 75% were 
in Masisi and Lubero. In the previous year, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC: 
2015.13) published a survey report giving a number of 1,003,400 IDPs in North Kivu with 60% 
of them in Masisi. The very weak land tenure management, as I discuss in chapter five, the 
persistence of armed groups and the political control on the local level by ‘string pullers’, continue 
to characterize the situation in Masisi in general and Bashali in particular. It is in this complex 
picture that peacebuilding organisations, especially MONUSCO decided to pursue another phase 
of the stabilization process. 
The operationalization of the second phase, based on these findings, is supposed to run until 2017. 
In addition to MONUSCO’s attempt to implement projects in areas identified by the ISSSS 
strategy, several activities and projects were already being implemented but other international 
NGOs. The question then is, if land, power and identity are the main factors of violent conflict, to 
which extent have these factors been considered in the programs implemented? The next section 
uses some examples of activities by international organizations on the local level and examines 
the link between these programs and land, power and identity. 
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4.3 Program implementation and the ‘land-power-identity’ triangle  
After the peace agreement between the government and armed groups in Goma in 2009, the 
establishment of STAREC and the ISSSS benefited from the collaboration of certain UN agencies 
and international NGOs involved in conflict resolution. Some academic work published around 
this time (see Mararo 2009, Lemarchand 2009, Autesserre 2009) had already emphasized the need 
to deal with local tensions and to some extent advocated for a more thorough understanding of the 
conflict drivers. This call was largely heard by a number of international organizations which 
responded with a series of diagnostics at the community level, not only for the sake of conflict 
diagnostics but also in terms of building a strategy that would allow projects to be implemented.  
Map 5 Peacebuilding organizations and areas of interventions in Masisi 
 
 
In May 2009, UN-HABITAT in partnership with UNHCR implemented a program which aimed 
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to prevent and mediate land conflicts in Masisi and Rutshuru Territoires. In Kitchanga (Masisi), a 
land mediation center was set up by UN-HABITAT where the center staff are expected not only 
to offer training and raise awareness in the local population, but also to mediate conflicts at the 
request of the different parties involved. In 2012, Search for Common Ground (SFCG) in 
partnership with UN HABITAT and Dynamiques des Femmes Juristes (DFJ), a Congolese 
organization, implemented a joint project aimed at contributing to a quick response to the 
protection of IDPs and social cohesion in both Masisi and Rutshuru. The main objective of this 
project was to reinforce community resilience to violence and human rights abuse. According to 
the evaluation report written by the three organizations, the project and activities focused mainly 
on the capacity building of community members (including local authorities, leaders of 
associations and cooperatives at local level, and faith-based organizations) in monitoring and 
implementing activities relating to conflict prevention and conflict transformation around land (see 
evaluation report of the ‘project chapeau’ 2015, Search For Common Ground 2014). Some of the 
types of conflicts identified involve opposing groups such as (a) agriculturalists vs. pastoralists; 
(b) populations living around Virunga National Park (claiming that the park area belonged to them 
until it was confiscated by the colonial state) vs. the state bodies of the park management; (c) small 
farmers against large-scale landowners; (d) conflict between families around land heritage; (e) and 
conflict between individuals about shared land boundaries. 
From 2010 to 2012, under the heading ‘Promotion of community dialogue,’ the UN Peacebuilding 
Fund (PBF) financed a project covering eastern DR Congo. This project was implemented by 
UNHCR, PAM, UN-Habitat, UNOPS, GIZ and NRC. Like some of the programs that I mentioned 
previously, the main objective was to ‘contribute to the process of peacebuilding in the eastern 
DRC through capacity building, with strong emphasis on land conflict management’. Alongside 
these UN agencies, other international NGOs including the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), 
International Alert and Caritas International framed conflict resolution in terms of land issues 
among local communities. At the national level, the government has created local structures for 
reconciliation (Comités Locaux Permanents de Conciliations- CLPC), through STAREC, as a 
space where conflicts should be settled. These local structures are composed of members 
representing the population at the village level, the government, customary chiefs and security 
services (that is, the army and police).  
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In 2009, the Congolese organization Forum des Amis de la Terre (FAT) benefited from financial 
support from the EU through partnership with the French NGO CCDF-Terre Solidaire in carrying 
out a study on conflict in Masisi and Lubero. The aim of this study was to understand land issues 
in North Kivu in order (a) to build the capacity of Congolese local organizations in land conflict 
management and (b) to come up with a strategy to address the conflicts around land. The two major 
recommendations made by this study were the implementation of local mechanisms of mediation 
and reconciliation of land-related conflicts, and advocacy for land reform and new modes of land 
tenure management. According to a local expert on land issues I met during my fieldwork in Goma, 
the rationale behind this diagnostic was to advocate for a legal mechanism that would allow 
protection of land used by small-scale farmers and families. He said for example that  
land-related conflicts remain very important than other types of conflict in 
Bashali and other places in Masisi. It is for this reason that many UN agencies 
and international NGOs have been focusing on the prevention of violent conflict’ 
(interview Goma V.01.15). 
As one can notice, although different analyses of the conflict in Masisi and its surroundings 
strongly emphasize the three factors of violence, the focus on land issues has become a central 
theme in several programs implemented, with very little (or even no) consideration of the question 
of power and identity. Some of the project documents I collected from different organizations can 
show this clearly. In 2013, for example, UNDP, UN Habitat and FAO implemented a joint program 
titled ‘Program of the securization of land tenure for the integration and community recovery in 
eastern Congo’. Two main arguments were given by the organizations behind this program. The 
first was that peacebuilding in eastern DR Congo depends on a durable solution to the problems 
caused by land issues. The second, along the same lines as the first, emphasizes that the recovery 
of land for the purposes of meeting the population’s needs, particularly in rural areas, depends 
upon access through the use of ‘secured’ land and other natural resources. This program is 
premised on the idea that most small-scale farmers have only limited access to arable land; 
moreover, that the limited access to land they possess is in danger of expropriation by large-scale 
farmers known as ‘grands concessionnaires’. These two arguments, widely put forward by civil 
society organizations, both Congolese and international, since 2008, have led to the development 
of a number of initiatives around land questions both at provincial and national levels. 
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The first major initiative was the creation of a Land Coordination Group called ‘Coordination 
foncière’, a working platform that included UN agencies, Congolese and international 
organizations involved in land issues. This initiative was taken in 2013 by UN Habitat in 
cooperation with the provincial Ministry of Land Affairs of North Kivu. Members of the Land 
Coordination Group meet once a month to share their experiences and to discuss how they can 
better coordinate their efforts on the ground. Although the provincial ministry leads regular 
meetings, UN Habitat acts as the secretariat of the platform and continues to show a strong interest 
in taking a leadership role, especially in policymaking. In 2013 for example, UN Habitat drafted 
an Edit (different from a law, an Edit is a legal text equivalent to the law but at the provincial 
parliament level) which proposed guidelines for a collaboration between customary authorities and 
public institutions on land management. This Edit successfully persuaded the provincial Ministry 
to advocate a vote for it in the provincial parliament so that the Governor would sign it. When the 
minister was replaced, the legal procedure slowed down and the Edit has still not been 
implemented.  
Even so, international and Congolese NGOs remained concerned by land issues and continued to 
advocate for what could be a long-term solution and one which could involve the government of 
the DRC. It is from this perspective that International Alert (see International Alert report 2012) 
expressed the need for what it termed a ‘grounded approach to peacebuilding’. To this end, two 
Congolese organizations (Forum des Amis de la Terre-FAT and the Federation des Organizations 
des Producteurs Agricoles du Congo-FOPAC) received financial support from International Alert 
to carry out a series of concerted efforts at the ‘local community’ level, both in North and South 
Kivu provinces.  
Unlike the general Land Law (discussed in detail in chapter five) the Land Code is precise and 
focuses on the local mechanisms of conflict resolution. One of these members mentioned that 
‘…the Land Code will provide effective tools to deal with the current land-related conflicts, 
namely when I see different stakeholders who are supposed to be working in the structures this 
law provides…’ (Interview Goma, III.03.14). Different informants I met were, however, 
pessimistic about the chances of implementing the Land Code if the central government does not 
support it through a deep reform of the land tenure system. Meanwhile, the necessity to push the 
government toward this desired reform is clearly expressed by international organizations through 
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different funding programs. For example, in order to support this idea of ‘securitization’ of land, 
USAID granted UN Habitat a fund to boost the land reform process. At the same period, the Global 
Land Tool Network (GLTN) followed the same example in funding UN Habitat for one year to 
support land reform and other related initiatives. At the time I was collecting data during fieldwork, 
I was interested in the outcomes of these programs. Apart from a few workshops organized by 
these UN agencies there was nothing concrete related to land ‘securitization’ or any relevant step 
towards the promised land reform process on the provincial level.    
These joint efforts finally led the Congolese government to announce a land reform process 
(discussed in chapter five). The first step was the organization of a national workshop on land 
reforms held in Kinshasa in 2012. During this workshop, participants identified three major 
concerns: the need to set up a legal mechanism that would promote the ‘securitization’ of small-
scale farmers; clarification of the extent and limits of authority between public services at different 
levels; and the need to clarify the status of customary chiefs, as defined by Article 389 of the Land 
Law of 1973 and Article 207 of the constitution. The second step in land reform was Decree No. 
13/016 of 31 May 2013 issued by the National Ministry of Land for the establishment, organization 
and functioning of the National Committee in charge of the land reform process. While actions 
relative to this decree were supposed to end by 2017, the roadmap signed by stakeholders in 
Kinshasa during the national workshop has not been implemented yet. So far, both the land code 
and all the Edits cited above have not yet been approved by the parliaments.  
Again, what was supposed to a peacebuilding approach that would deal with the entire spectrum 
of conflict causes and drivers at different levels turned into an approach focused only on land 
issues, disconnected from other dimensions of the conflict. Both UN agencies and international 
NGOs failed to provide an integrated approach to conflict resolution, despite collaboration with 
Congolese civil society organizations and local populations developed over the past two decades. 
The question which remains here is why such a strong focus on land? I discuss and argue in the 
next section that external peacebuilding intervention by UN agencies and international NGOs 
reflects the global agenda which relates to natural resource management discourse as a way to 
prevent violence (Bruch et al:2016). In this discourse, land has become subject to a variety of legal 
and governance frameworks in foreign policy aimed to prevent conflict, supported by international 
agencies such as the UN Environment Program (UNEP), USAID, and recently the World Bank 
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(see World Bank report 2015).  
4.4 Land as development asset versus land as conflict driver  
When the UN and other international donors intensified their activities in the DR Congo around 
2010, land issues were one of the most important issues several programs wanted to address. While 
some peacebuilding organizations continued to see land as a local conflict driver and raised funds 
to address land issues at the local level, land is still depicted in global policy as one of the key 
drivers of socio-economic development and therefore in need of good governance. For example, 
in 2003, the World Bank published a report advocating for strong land policies, identifying the 
promotion of secure property rights as crucial in poverty reduction. The report argues that ‘for 
most of the poor in developing countries, land is the primary means for generating a livelihood 
and main vehicle for investing, accumulating wealth and transferring it between generations’ 
(2003: xix).  
In February 2014 in New York, the International Organization of Migration (IOM) held a session 
during which several actors agreed on the fact that good governance of land can promote 
peacebuilding:  
it was generally agreed that neither durable peace nor sustainable development 
can be achieved without giving due attention to land, access to land and hence 
land rights. It was widely noted that land tenure and property rights are important 
tools for promoting peacebuilding and durable peace, and should therefore be 
included in the UN Post-2015 Development Agenda’ (IOM 2014:1).  
 
Recently, in March 2015, the World Bank conference in Washington under the heading ‘Linking 
land tenure and use for shared prosperity’ again re-emphasized the need to strengthen land 
governance as the cornerstone of poverty reduction and foreign investment for the better use of 
land. Even the African Union in its framework and guidelines on land policy (2010:1) clearly 
associates land with development and poverty reduction. These opposing views of land (as conflict 
driver versus economic asset) between international donors and some peacebuilding agendas is 
well pictured in the case of Masisi.  
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As I have shown in the previous section, it is not surprising that land concerns became the central 
theme of the international organizations which are advocating for land reform. For example, the 
same international agencies (FAO-UNDP-UN Habitat) intervening in land-related conflict in DR 
Congo have been advocating for the ‘securitization’ of land rights, not necessarily as a mechanism 
to deal with the roots of violence, but more generally, in the promotion of agriculture and the 
reduction of poverty. FAO, UNDP, USAID, EU, and UN Habitat also practice along these lines in 
terms of land issues. In Masisi, for instance, Beck (2012:56) observed that most of the activities 
supported by these organizations range superficially from mediation to capacity building to 
advocacy. He argues that the basic approaches of the different actors seem to be largely congruent, 
and most organizations seem to share the same global objective of the creation of a pro-poor land 
tenure system, as recommended by the World Bank and other international donors.  
However, the consequence of all this is that land conflicts have been disconnected from the entire 
analytical framework (land-power-identity) and set aside to be separately considered as a single 
issue that can be tackled by land reform and secure land tenure. This disconnection was clearly 
identified by some informants working with the Congolese civil society organizations, arguing 
that international peacebuilding NGOs have so far failed to utilize the funding from donors and 
channel it in ways which include other aspects of the conflict, not only land. One these informants 
for example said:  
international NGOs do not associate us in the project design process where we 
can suggest what the real needs of the population are. As they have money, they 
spend it on land and very little on other aspects of the conflict (interview, Goma 
II.02.16). 
The second point is that the local turn approach which emphasizes the driving role of the local 
populations (seen as beneficiaries) has largely allowed international organizations to escape the 
criticism directed at the top-down approaches supported by international donors. It is in this shift 
to the ‘new’ approach that Congolese civil society organizations played the role of intermediaries 
or ‘brokers’ so to say, based on assumptions that they represent the aspirations of local populations, 
but in reality, they were more often merely project implementers. As an informant put it,  
although the presence of international NGOs provided a financial attraction to the 
Congolese organizations, the basis of the collaboration between the two remains 
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on the financial mutual benefit and not on the content of projects that address the 
needs of communities’ (interview Goma II.0 2.16).  
It is agreed by many informants in this study that neither these local Congolese organizations nor 
the local populations are consulted about the needs that these projects are supposed to meet. Here 
is where one can argue that international organizations are falling into their own trap. This trap 
consists of putting the local ownership label and ‘local community’ discourse in their intervention 
framework but without actually allowing any meaningful ownership by local communities.  
The principle of local ownership remains far from being a reality in the context of globally-driven 
agendas such as land issues, as I stated at the beginning of this section. Yet as long as peacebuilding 
NGOs depend on the funding generated by these agendas, very little can be expected and the 
promised alternative approaches to top-down will remain absent on the ground. Taken from the 
angle of local ownership, Von Billerbeck (2016:4) recently found in the case of DR Congo that 
UN agencies adjust and limit local ownership both conceptually and in practice, relying on it 
primarily as a discursive tool for legitimation but not an operational principle to achieve an impact 
among the population affected by the conflict. Throughout different research sites, especially in 
Masisi where most of projects are implemented, complaints about the lack of consideration of the 
‘real’ needs of the populations were raised by some farmers, local traditional and public authorities 
I spoke to. One of the informants I met mentioned that  
international NGOs profit from the political chaos in our country to make money 
and sometimes fund our governmental institutions. In such a context, it remains 
difficult for the government to hold them accountable for what they do and the 
impact of their programs’ (interview, Goma II.02.16).   
The third point is that not only are local populations excluded from designing the projects premised 
on the principle of local ownership, but the projects implemented under the banner of local 
ownership have reduced the whole complex system underlying conflict to questions of land, as 
shown in the previous section. Such is the gap between the conflict analysis in the literature and 
the practices on the ground. But even in questions solely to do with land, very little indicates the 
input of the population that is supposed to benefit from the programs; land issues continue to be 
treated through the globalized lenses of donors, who approach land issues with international 
standards and expectations. This plays out in strategies such as land ‘securitization’, land reform, 
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capacity building and mediation, all of which exclude dimensions of the conflict other than land. 
Throughout several reports and projects I collected from international NGOs, it is almost 
impossible to see how they associate land issues with identity and power questions in the activities 
on the ground.  
As discussed in chapter two, the literature clearly shows that land in Masisi has never been an 
isolated factor for the ongoing violent conflict. Though the literature agrees, in theory, with a multi-
layered analysis of conflict among local populations, in practice they have lost their empirical 
sense in the types of peacebuilding intervention currently implemented. One of the crucial missing 
points of this intervention is the ‘de-politicization’ of land issues. As shown, land in Masisi has 
very little to do with the conflict in terms of economic assets. Land has played a significant role in 
the negotiation of local citizenship between Banyarwanda and so-called autochthons and has 
driven violent conflict for decades in eastern DR Congo. Since 1970s, the Banyarwanda political 
elite (especially in Masisi) has sought land not primarily for economic reasons but as proof of 
being a Congolese citizen. This quest for land has been contested by other community groups 
because land has been used as political tool through which patron-client relationships between the 
elites and their constituencies remain salient.  
Peacebuilding interventions have totally overlooked this complex set of issues, extending far 
beyond local land disputes; the approaches used have also totally depoliticized local communities, 
fundamentally failing to recognize them as ethnic groups (as they see themselves) that are linked 
to ethnic fellows who are political elites in positions of power. Land issues have been expected to 
be addressed through land tenure reforms, all the while ignoring that the implementation of these 
reforms depends very much on the political elites who act as members of the government and the 
parliament. Because the outcome of the reform would inevitably affect land allocation through 
land redistribution, some of these elites in state institutions are the Banyarwanda who would like 
to see the reform blocked.  
4.5 Concluding remarks 
The aim of this chapter was to analyze and better understand why international peacebuilding 
organizations chose to construct the ‘local’ as a response to the critiques of top-down approaches. 
In the aftermath of the second Congolese war resulting in the formation of a transitional 
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government in 2003, the international community demonstrated apparently strong support for 
political transition in the Congo. This support was premised on the assumption that strengthening 
political institutions through elections would legitimize them to effectively address the root causes 
of conflict. Several macro-scale programs were implemented and huge amounts of funding were 
directed towards key sectors such as DDR and SSR, the development of infrastructure and 
improving public administration.  
While the international community has been concerned with restoration of the state authority, this 
chapter expanded upon substantive critiques made by scholars and policymakers of this top-down 
approach used by international institutions. A considerable body of literature and the failure of 
these approaches on the ground suggest that the international community’s intervention has failed 
to address the real causes of violence, namely the question of land, power and identity, which 
generate conflicts between local communities at the local level.  
In response to these critiques, I provided examples through the programs and projects of some UN 
agencies and peacebuilding NGOs which have tried to follow the recommendation of addressing 
the conflict at the local level. This chapter discussed how the construction of the ‘local’ by 
international agencies largely relied on the belief that after they have been strengthened, ‘local 
communities’ would be capable of addressing the causes of violent conflicts. This short-cut to 
understanding local dynamics was partly influenced by a narrative that portrays the conflict in 
Masisi and many other places in eastern Congo as between opposing ethnic groups around the 
triangle land, power and identity, and not limited to a concrete conflict-affected category of a group 
of people these organizations would rely on to transform conflict and to build a durable peace. 
Local community, as I have shown, is a discursive concept and under construction, whereas the 
Congolese legislation does not make a difference between a community and an ethnic group. It is 
discursive in the sense that it provides international NGOs with a narrative to raise funds, but when 
it comes to the implementation of funded programs, ethnic groups’ claims come to the fore.  
I found that the intervention of peacebuilding organizations has not only largely focused on land 
issues at the expense of other key drivers of violence (identity and power), but that these 
organizations, under the banner of ‘local ownership,’ have also created a category of local 
intermediaries which play the part of brokers. These intermediaries are the Congolese 
organizations that were supposed to facilitate the implementation of programs. As a consequence 
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of these compromising bargains, most Congolese local organizations have not only become clients 
of the internationally driven peace market, but also failed to play the serious role of interface 
between international organizations and the local population as they are supposed to do. 
Drawing on discussion by Neubert (2014) and Paffenholz and Spurk (2006) on the definition and 
the role of civil society, I have argued that attempts by international organizations to categorize 
Congolese organizations as civil society agencies were used strategically to legitimize their 
presence on the local level; and also as a mechanism to channel advocacy (for example about land 
reform) towards the Congolese authorities. It was noted that in the present configuration of 
international intervention, Congolese civil society organizations may continue to play the role of 
‘brokers,’ having limited scope to participate in any other role due to lack of both strategy to 
address the causes of conflict and the necessary financial resources.  
I argue in this chapter that international peacebuilding organizations have indeed considered the 
key drivers of violence to justify their intervention on the local level, but that the programs they 
implemented nonetheless failed to account for the whole of the triangle at the center of conflict. 
Some of the key programs I described in this chapter lack coherence and clear strategies to 
incorporate all the dimensions of conflict. I have shown that to a large extent this is because both 
local populations and Congolese civil society organizations are ignored in the design of 
peacebuilding programs, also that international organizations still do not share the same vision of 
what is peacebuilding intervention and what is not.  
Here is where the major trap in dealing with the local enters the picture. First of all, while most 
programs deal with land, the solutions envisaged seem to shift from the local level to the national 
and international levels, one example being the advocacy for land reform. Secondly, land has 
suddenly been taken to be merely an economic issue by peacebuilding programs, overlooking its 
crucial function as a factor in multi-layered conflict. This is because peacebuilding NGOs continue 
to receive funding from donors whose thinking and priorities lie with an economic agenda for the 
use of land: not only in DR Congo but in other African countries. 
Finally, I examined why international organizations failed to address the entire triangle and 
focused mainly on land. I have shown that it is not because other dimensions (identity and power) 
are less relevant than land but because land fits well in the global agenda driven by international 
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donors. Although donors tend to prioritize land at the expense of other dimensions of conflict, it 
came out in this chapter that even by funding land-related programs, there is still a lack of a long-
term strategy to address the root causes of violence and concrete population groups as 
beneficiaries, instead of a vague concept of local community. Land, power and identity and the 
related conflicts are not solely local. Although they drive violence on the local level as the literature 
has shown, they are structurally imbedded and overlap in a set of political, institutional and legal 
frameworks at different levels. Trying to address them on one level (local) is simply counter-
productive. I explain this claim in the next chapter.    
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Chapter 5 Land, power and identity as multi-scalar issues  
5.1 Introduction 
As discussed earlier in chapter two, there is a considerable consensus on how the issues of land, 
power and identity interconnect in many societies in Africa and beyond. This recognition has not 
only been widely discussed among scholars (see Sikor and Lund, 2009 ; Lund, 2011 and Boone, 
2014); it has also been embraced by policymakers designing programs that aim to address related 
conflicts, as shown by the World Bank (2015) or the International Land Coalition (ILC) in its 
2016-2021 strategy to promote land rights. In the case of Masisi, the previous chapter demonstrated 
how peacebuilding organizations focused their programs at the local level, putting ‘local 
communities’ at the center of interventions. In so doing, it was emphasized, these organizations 
failed to address the causes of violence related to land, power and identity, in two ways.  
The first way refers to the construction of the ‘local’ by peacebuilding organizations as the scale 
at which interventions take place and at which communities are seen as a category of actors 
attached to one particular spatial scale, namely the local. Drawing on the examples of 
peacebuilding projects, I have shown how the definition of ‘local communities’ in the Congolese 
context refers to ‘ethnic groups’. Taken in this sense, these groups have been de-politicized by 
international NGOs, hence their links to the ‘string pullers’ at higher levels have not been taken 
into consideration in several programs. The second way lies in the fact that peacebuilding actors 
have taken a reductionist view of the local in their haste to distance themselves from criticized 
macro state-building interventions. For example, focusing only on land (not on power and identity 
dimensions) and on the local has only sidelined the other interconnected drivers of conflict and 
has completely ignored other scales.  
It was also shown in the previous chapter that the temptation to advocate for land reform seems to 
be a recognition that other scales matter in addressing the causes of conflict. However, so far, this 
resort to the high scale (central government) as a way to tackle land issues has never been part of 
integrated strategies of the different organizations mentioned, to link the local to other scales.  
Considering the above two points, this chapter takes a step forward in arguing that land could not 
be isolated from other factors, as it is linked to power and identity and these factors are by no 
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means exclusively local. Instead they are embedded in a framework of legislation and institutions 
across scales. This chapter seeks to examine the questions of land, power and identity at local, 
provincial and national scales and to figure out to what extent peacebuilding programs are likely 
to address the causes of violence.  
The first section provides a historical overview of how the arrival of Banyarwanda in Bashali 
triggered issues of access to land, and at the same time, led to contestation over nationality by both 
Hunde customary chiefs and the Congolese state. It is demonstrated how these two pillars (land 
and nationality) came to constitute the core of the current problems and the means by which ‘string 
pullers’exerted influence beyond the local level. The second section discusses some key laws 
related to land tenure management and nationality of the Banyarwanda as avenues to grasp how 
the scales are constructed and the ‘string puller’s strategies to control those scales. The third section 
discusses how ‘string pullers’managed to ‘jump’ across scales through legal pluralism (mainly 
around land and nationality) to control strategic political positions and connect the scales.      
5.2 The immigration of Banyarwanda in Masisi and the contested integration 
When the former German colony Ruanda-Urundi came under Belgian mandate in 1922, the 
abundant workforce in these two countries attracted the attention of Belgian mining and 
agricultural enterprises located in eastern Congo. Around 1937, the colonial power set up an 
administrative structure, the Mission d’Immigration de Banyarwanda (MIB), in order to stimulate 
and organize the resettlement of Rwandans in the Congo. A first wave of immigrants (organized 
by both colonial and Rwandan authorities) arrived in Bishari from 1937-1945. A second category 
of immigrants was transplanted to other areas of Masisi (1950-1955) by which time the area was 
becoming overpopulated. A third category of ‘spontaneous’ immigrants continued coming (1955-
1959) and lastly came Rwandan political refugees who arrived from 1959 onwards, mostly Tutsi 
fleeing from attacks by the newly installed Hutu regime. Tegera (2009:213) reminds us that the 
MIB was expected to settle 2,500 families per year, but already about 60,000 persons registered 
around 1950 (Willame, 1997: 41). 
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Although the Banyarwanda (both Hutu and Tutsi) were supposed to be under the local authority 
of Hunde chiefs, in reality they remained under the authority of the Rwandan king Mutara 
Rudahigwa, who nominated a couple of chiefs to rule over the immigrants in the villages where 
they were settled. In agreement with the colonial administration, the Rwandan king nominated 
Joseph Bideri as the ‘big chief’ of all Rwandan immigrants in the autonomous chieftaincy of 
Gishari. Bideri was later replaced by Wilfrid Bucyanayandi. To deal with the issue of 
‘cohabitation’ between immigrant and host (mainly Hunde) communities, the colonial 
administration decided, at the request of the Banyarwanda chiefs, to create autonomous territorial 
entities for the immigrants, which were out of the Hunde chiefs’ control. To successfully settle the 
immigrants, the colonial administration enlisted the help of André Kalinda, a Hunde traditional 
chief who had benefited from the support of the colonial authorities to become chief of the entire 
Bahunde area (Stearns, 2012:13). The collaboration between Chief Kalinda and the colonial 
authorities resulted in the purchase of 34,910 hectares of land from Kalinda by the colonial 
administration in 1939. This area became the autonomous chieftaincy of Gishari (Tegera 2009: 
189).  
After 1945, when the colonial administration declared Gishari chieftaincy an overpopulated area, 
thousands of Banyarwanda moved to the neighboring chieftaincy of Bahunde where the chief 
André Kalinda received them and facilitated their integration. By 1957 the colonial authorities 
were actively discouraging further immigration. The chief Bucyanayandi was arrested by the 
colonial court accused of insubordination to the colonial authority. During the same year, the 
chieftaincy of Gishari was abolished and returned to Bahunde, and all Banyarwanda came under 
the authority of Hunde chiefs.  
This merger of Gishari and Bahunde was not a simple coincidence, it was a strategy to better 
control and to prevent any insurrection or territorial claims from Banyarwanda. As Rukatsi 
(2004:140) put it, this happened in the international context of the end of World War II and the 
creation of the United Nations, which fostered the ideas of decolonization. Rukatsi explains that 
the United Nations, through the Trusteeship Council, recommended that all colonial powers should 
consider the political aspirations of the populations under colonial rule. The Trusteeship was 
created as one of the main organs of the UN in 1945, under Chapter XIII of the UN charter, which 
assigned to it the task of supervising the administration of Trust Territories placed under the 
Trusteeship System. The main goals of the System were to promote the advancement of the 
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inhabitants of Trust Territories and their progressive development towards self-government or 
independence.  
This establishment of the Trusteeship Council clearly constituted a sort of pressure on colonial 
authorities, while at the same time the direct links that the Rwandan king had with the 
Banyarwanda immigrants in Congo constituted a serious concern for the colonial administration. 
Both Rukatsi and Tegera comment that this international context could have provided grounds for 
strong demands by Banyarwanda leaders to contest both Hunde and colonial authorities. To 
prevent such an outcome, Gishari was abolished in 1957 by the colonial administration as an 
autonomous entity of immigrants and the Banyarwanda were put under the jurisdiction of the local 
Hunde indigenous chiefs.  
This political change, comments Tegera, created a situation in which Hunde chiefs imposed their 
authority on Banyarwanda who were clearly not enthusiastic to collaborate. Fortunately for the 
Banyarwanda, this period of tough cohabitation with the Hunde coincided in 1957-1959 with the 
liberalization wave across Africa which culminated in the creation of political parties in 
preparation for independence. 
In Congo and in Masisi in particular, imminent independence became an opportunity for 
Banyarwanda elites who hoped to compete with Hunde along two major fronts. First of all, already 
in 1959 (one year before Congolese independence), of approximately 30,000 families living in 
Masisi, 23,000 were Banyarwanda as compared to approximately 7,000 families of Hunde and 
other groups (Tegera, 2009:225). I did not find any source which could provide the exact number 
of persons corresponding to the above families. Nonetheless, these demographics were a major 
asset in the competition, particularly on the political level of winning positions if elections were 
to take place after independence. Secondly, even without elections, an independent Congolese 
state and institutions at provincial and national level were seen by Banyarwanda elites as an 
opportunity to escape from the customary authority of Hunde over the land and at the level of local 
power, and furthermore for Banyarwanda elites to seek opportunities for power beyond the local 
scale. The next section discusses how the Banyarwanda, despite local opposition by the Hunde, 
worked hard to access land and power in the post-colonial Congolese state.   
 
  
104 
 
5.2.1 The Banyarwanda struggles in the aftermath of the independence  
The two major concerns of the Banyarwanda after the abolition of Gishari were access to land and 
nationality. The land they received from the colonial authorities (before Gishari was merged with 
Bahunde chieftaincy) and which was returned to the authority of Hunde chiefs, in addition to the 
nationality question and political rights, became the center of their political strategies. In the 
aftermath of independence, the central government of the Congo envisaged reorganizing its 
territorial administration. Thus, in Leopoldville (renamed Kinshasa after independence), a 
roundtable was held from 25 January to 16 February 1960, proposing a possible new territorial 
division under a federal system and taking into account ethnic affinity, economic needs and other 
relevant factors. However, the decision to create new political entities divided the political leaders 
in what would become North Kivu, the Banyarwanda leaders on the one hand and leaders of other 
communities on the other.  
Table 3 Legal texts related to the study 
Law/reference Description 
Electoral law n°13 of 23 March 1960  
It reserved the exercise of political mandates to 
individuals recognized as Congolese  
The constitution of 19 May 1960 
This was the basic law devised by the Belgian 
parliament as a provisional constitution in 
order to prepare for independence and could 
serve as template for a new constitution to be 
written by the Congolese parliament after 
independence.  
The constitution of 1 August 1964  
 
This was the first constitution of the Congo 
post-independence, replacing the previous one. 
Ordonnance – loi n° 66 / 343 du 07 juin 1966 
Commonly called the ‘Bakajika law’. The 
purpose was to nationalize all companies, 
especially those in the mining sector, which 
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had been owned by the Belgian government 
and other international firms until then.  
Law n °1972-002 of 5 January 1972  The first law to grant nationality 
Law n ° 73-021 of 20 July 1973 The main law on land tenure management 
Law No. 1981/002 of 29 June 1981  The law that cancelled the nationality law of 
1972 
Organic-Law n ° 08/016 of 7 October 2008 It concerned the composition, organization and 
functioning of decentralized territorial entities 
and their relations with the State and the 
provinces. 
The constitution of 4 April 2003 was promulgated during the government of 
transition as recommended by the political 
agreement in Pretoria between the government 
and rebel movements. The aim was, among 
others, to grant nationality once and for all to 
the Banyarwanda.  
The constitution of 18 February 2006 The current one. It completed the previous but 
was adapted to the new political context, 
especially to prepare the first general 
(including presidential) elections since 1965. 
 
On March 26, 1962, elected Nande, Hunde and Nyanga officials jointly signed a petition calling 
for the creation of new provinces out of the province of Kivu-Central (comprising the current 
North Kivu, South Kivu and Maniema provinces) whose capital was in Bukavu (South Kivu). The 
Banyarwanda representatives were opposed to the idea of dividing the province, which would have 
affected their numbers in the parliament of the new province of North Kivu. This was because if 
Kivu-Central province was partitioned, the Banyarwanda delegates would have been obliged to 
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run for election in the new parliament (Goma was to be the capital of North Kivu) with a risk of 
losing given their limited number compared to the coalition of Nande, Hunde and Nyanga who 
were the majority.  
To avoid any negotiation for a consensus with Banyarwanda, a coalition of Nande, Hunde and 
Nyanga officials called for a referendum to vote for the division of Kivu-Central. In so doing, 
Nande, Hunde and Nyanga leaders hoped that in the new province they would have a majority in 
parliament and would be able to isolate the Banyarwanda and limit their political influence through 
a lack of political allies and a lack of electoral constituencies. Also, in the case that a referendum 
was to succeed, the Nande and their allies hoped to gain a monopoly in politics and business, 
cutting out the Banyarwanda. Before this referendum had even been authorized by the national 
parliament, tensions mounted between the Hunde, Nande and Nyanga on one side and the 
Banyarwanda. 
In the course of the tensions around March 1963, a parliamentary commission released a report 
concerning the situation in Kivu and accusing the Commissar of Goma District, who was a Tutsi, 
of having recruited large numbers of Rwandans to settle illegally in Congo, receiving voter 
registration cards for their participation in the upcoming referendum to vote against the attempt to 
divide the Kivu-Central province. The parliamentary commission concluded that, in the case of a 
referendum, the Banyarwanda were likely to prevail in the two disputed districts and advised 
cancelling the referendum to prevent violence. This decision did not please the supporters of the 
referendum and escalated tensions. The Hunde obtained the help of Nande and other groups and 
got a vote which resulted in the replacement of all local Banyarwanda chiefs by Hunde chiefs in 
Masisi (Willame 1997:50). In Bashali, farms, cattle and many other goods were forcibly seized 
from Banyarwanda by Hunde and their allies. In the course of these conflicts, the election of 1965 
finally led to a referendum. The ‘yes’ vote won the majority and North Kivu became a new 
province. Nande, Hunde and Nyanga became the leading political forces while the Banyarwanda 
elites contested the referendum result in vain, and attempts to organize protests failed. 
In October 1965, the provincial parliament issued a ‘resolution-law’ aimed at the expulsion of all 
Banyarwanda from Congolese territory, using accusations that the Banyarwanda were organizing 
a separatist militia. On 24 November 1965, the military coup by Mobutu drastically changed the 
power dynamics in the Kivu region. On 7 June 1966, concerned by the situation, Mobutu signed 
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an ordinance which aimed to address ‘ethnic-based tensions’ in the eastern provinces. Through 
this ordinance, Mobutu urged a reduction of the 21 provinces created in 1963 to only 8, while still 
keeping Goma and Rutshuru as districts of North Kivu.  
With the arrival of the new regime under Mobutu, the Banyarwanda apparently abandoned politics 
at the local level. By the end of the 1960s, most Banyarwanda elites in the region, especially Tutsi, 
were predominantly involved in business rather than in politics. As Willame explains, the 
Association for the economic promotion of Banyarwanda, a business-based association, became 
prosperous and Mobutu therefore became interested in collaborating with it: 
the support given to the Banyarwanda was part of Mobutu's political strategy of granting 
political power to the representatives of ethnic groups who did not pose a threat to his 
regime’ (Willame, 1997:  p53). 
  
At the beginning of the 1970s, many Banyarwanda elite gained high political positions while 
maintaining their business networks in Kivu and beyond. Willame argues that this period marked 
an important turning point for politics in North Kivu with the emergence of ethnic-based exclusion 
arguments on the political scene, which would serve in terms of both economic competition and 
political mobilization.  
The political and economic breakthrough of Banyarwanda at the beginning of the 1970s 
represented a fundamental shift in the political trajectory of Banyarwanda leaders. On one hand, 
the ongoing opposition to Banyarwanda citizenship rights by Hunde, Nande and Nyanga was 
exacerbated by fears that if Banyarwanda collaborated with Mobutu’s regime, they would gain 
influence at the national level and eventually influence laws in their favor. On the other hand, for 
Banyarwanda, working with Mobutu had a huge impact on questions of both rights to citizenship 
and access to land. The first significant political opportunity for Banyarwanda happened in May 
1969 when President Mobutu appointed Barthélémy Bisengimana as the chief of cabinet, his ‘right 
hand’: his occupation of this position became a ‘golden opportunity’ for Banyarwanda to negotiate 
their rights to citizenship. 
In March 1960, shortly before the declaration of Congolese independence, the Belgian parliament 
had passed a law that determined who had the right to vote and to stand for office. Article 1 
recognized the right to citizenship of any person born to a Congolese mother, but who can prove 
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that he/she comes from the Ruanda-Urundi territory and who has been living on Congolese 
territory for ten years (between 1950 and 1960). As Tegera (2009: 290) reminds us, the population 
from Ruanda-Urundi transplanted to the Congo between 1950 and 1955 were allowed only to vote 
but could not be elected, becoming de facto stateless. Although the Banyarwanda could vote 
without having any representative in parliament, Tegera comments that the Belgian parliament set 
the grounds for a political conflict between the Banyarwanda established in large numbers in 
Masisi and the ‘autochthonous’ Hunde who considered Banyarwanda as secondclass citizens’. One 
wonders if the Belgian parliament deliberately left this gap hoping that the Congolese independent 
state would resolve the problem of Congolese citizenship.     
The Congolese constitution of 1964 was clearly concerned with the question of nationality, not 
only in regard to Rwandan immigrants but also regarding other populations situated along the 
national borders with potentially more than one nationality. Article 6 of the constitution insists 
‘…there is only one Congolese nationality. It is given to anyone descended from a person who is 
or was a member of one of the tribes established on the Congolese territory on 18th October 1908’. 
Thus, Article 6 is at odds with the law passed by the Belgian parliament which specifies that the 
right to nationality is for those who were established on Congolese territory between 1950 and 
1960. The question of the nationality of the Banyarwanda remained unsolved up till 1967, when 
Bisengimana entered office.  
With Bisengimana at the center of Mobutu’s regime, an ordinance (no 69/067 of 25 February 1969) 
was signed immediately. The decision was to replace the certificate for indigenous peoples 
(certificats d’indigènes) with an identity card (national ID). One year later, the distribution of ID 
cards began; in Masisi, however, local political authorities refused to deliver the cards to 
Banyarwanda, arguing that Banyarwanda were not Congolese citizens (Rukatsi 2004:165). To deal 
with the tensions generated by this refusal to deliver ID cards, a government commission was sent 
to Masisi. Afterwards, in July 1970, an official statement was made that all Banyarwanda were to 
be recognized to be citizens. This decision became an ordinance-law (no 71-020 of 1972), 
specifying that all citizens from Ruanda-Urundi living on Congolese territory on the 30th June 
1960 can qualify as Congolese citizens. Although this law seems to be favorable to Banyarwanda, 
a problem arises in that this law recognizes the status of who can be granted nationality, but does 
not itself grant nationality per se. 
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This gap was emphasized by a member of parliament in 1978, who criticized the law of 1972 
stressing that granting nationality to all Banyarwanda established in Congo in 1960 was not correct 
because immigrants, political refugees and other ‘undocumented’ immigrants had all been merged 
into one category. Another argument made by the parliament was that most of the Rwandan 
refugees (largely concentrated in Masisi) held Rwandan nationality. Granting them Congolese 
nationality en masse was argued to be unconstitutional. A group of the members of parliament 
went so far as to accuse Bisengimana of having manipulated the law of 1972 in favor of 
Banyarwanda. According to Rukatsi (2004: 153), one year after Bisengimana was dismissed from 
his strategic position in 1977 the parliament voted in favor of a law that abrogated Article 15 of 
the 1972 law. Their argument was that there were no legal grounds for granting Congolese 
nationality to Rwandan immigrants on the same basis as persons who were Congolese by ‘origin’. 
Although President Mobutu refused to promulgate this law, Bisengimana’s absence from the 
government left a space for sharp cleavages to arise on the national scale. Moreover, Hunde and 
Nyanga political lobbying seemed to have succeeded in making an impact, but the 1972 law on 
nationality still remained valid at this point.  
In 1980, the question of nationality was put at the center of political debate by the national 
parliament; parliamentary members from North Kivu also attacked the Banyarwanda right to 
access land, denouncing what they termed an ‘illegal acquisition’ of land. The first casualty was 
RWACICO, a company owned by a Tutsi, close collaborator of President Mobutu, who owned a 
farm of 230,000 hectares. As the result of parliamentary pressure, the Minister of Land Affairs 
cancelled the title deeds of RWACICO’s farm. In March 1981, a petition was addressed to Mobutu 
by members of parliament backed by customary authorities originating from Kivu (Hunde, Nande 
and Nyanga) in the following terms: 
We, Bahunde, have always considered our Rwandan brothers as foreigners in our 
country ... We were convinced that after the famine in Rwanda, the Banyarwanda would 
return to their country. But they did not because they have found our land rich ... They 
settled in our land but on condition of not demanding at any time customary and political 
rights. Today we digest badly that those we have received according to the African 
hospitality, are sharing political rights, access to land and even nationality on the same 
conditions like we do ... This country has been bequeathed to us by our ancestors and it 
is not possible to claim that the Banyarwanda also have the right to Zairian nationality 
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for only having belonged to pre-colonial North Kivu ...we demand and insist that the 
Zairian nationality be withdrawn from Banyarwanda ... In the case the nationality could 
be carefully granted to some of them, we highly recommend that they leave Masisi to 
other places in the country and to not let them being the majority on the land of Muhunde 
tribe’ (Rukatsi 2004: 166). 
This pressure had a severe impact on the political status of the Banyarwanda. Under parliamentary 
pressure, President Mobutu promulgated a new law no. 81-002 of 29 June 1981, replacing the 1972 
law that had favored Banyarwanda interests. One of the features of the new law was the 
suppression of the collective character of the acquisition of nationality (of the 1972 law) and the 
requirement of individual application for nationality (Article 9). Taking this even further, Article 
4 of the 1981 law states that membership of one of the tribes established within the geographical 
limits of Congolese territory on August 1885 is a key requirement for applying for Congolese 
nationality. As the law understood it, there was no proven presence of any Rwandan population 
on Congolese territory in 1885. If establishment on Congolese territory by this date was to become 
a key condition of obtaining nationality, all Banyarwanda would face one of two options: 
remaining stateless in Congo, or returning to Rwanda.  
The next opportunity at which Banyarwanda could hope to solve the question of nationality was 
the National Conference (CNS) of 1991. This conference took place amidst considerable tensions: 
on the one hand, the Banyarwanda were in an extremely uncomfortable situation with regard to 
the nationality law of 1981. Furthermore, Hunde and their allies could use the potential withdrawal 
of nationality from the Banyarwanda as legal leverage for withdrawing Banyarwanda land rights. 
The problem however was that the 1981 law did not completely resolve this issue from the 
perspective of the Hunde and their allies, because the law established conditions for obtaining 
nationality but without establishing any political or juridical mechanism for its implementation. 
By default, the Banyarwanda somehow wound up in a position to claim the right to nationality. 
Another gap in this law was that it referred to the date of 1885 without differentiating the groups 
of Banyarwanda immigrants who arrived at different periods, under different conditions and at 
different locations. For example, it intermingled the Banyarwanda living in Rutshuru, who are less 
concerned with migration disputes, with Banyarwanda living in Masisi.  
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5.2.2 The struggle of Banyarwanda after 1990  
This political and juridical gap left by the 1981 law was exploited by Hunde, Nande and Nyanga 
when the government organized the elections of 1987. One of the consequences of the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, the democratization of ideas across the African continent and the promotion of multi-
party regimes in the late 1980s was the organization of elections at all levels. When the Congolese 
government organized local elections in 1987, the Banyarwanda candidates from Masisi were 
deemed unqualified to stand for local election on the basis of the 1981 law. In early 1990, the 
multiparty wave was rising. President Mobutu was under pressure to face the new reality of 
needing to share power with the opposition and likely to lose the next election, if there was to be 
one. In his speech of April 1990, considered to be the announcement of the third republic, Mobutu 
offered the country an apparently new direction, toward a multiparty political system.  
As observed by Mararo (1997: 530), Mobutu’s speech had significant repercussions, both locally 
and nationally. While Mobutu’s authority was contested everywhere in the country and followed 
by the loss of control of local administrative entities, the regime was competing with the emergence 
of hundreds of political parties, all created in the beginning of 1991. With existing tensions among 
local communities, the formation of political parties relied on support from ethnically based 
organizations (Mutualités) that had arisen in several regions of the country. In North Kivu, for 
example, Nande were organized around the Kyaghanda organization, Hunde around Bushenge and 
GEAD (Groupe d’Etudes et d’Appui au Développement), the coalition Hunde-Nyanga-Tembo 
around ACUBA, Tutsi around ACOGENOKI, Umubano, ACODRI and AMICOR and Hutu 
around MAGRIVI.     
While national political actors were focusing on the national conference (CNS) in Kinshasa, these 
ethnic-based political movements also wanted to make their voices heard during the conference. 
For example, participants from the coalition of Hunde, Nande, Nyaga and Tembo raised the 
question of the nationality of the Banyarwanda during the conference. After they succeeded in 
convincing other political factions to vote against Banyarwanda participation in the conference, 
the Banyarwanda were excluded from the list of participants: only a small number of Hutu 
participants, members of MAGRIVI in Rutshuru, participated; not a single representative of the 
Banyarwanda of Masisi attended.  
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While the Banyarwanda wanted the question of nationality to be resolved during the conference, 
all of the recommendations made in favor of Banyarwanda nationality were contested by the 
coalition of Hunde, Nande and Nyanga leaders (Mararo 1997:531). The conference ended without 
any resolution. Not only was the nationality question not resolved, the overall conference created 
frustrations among participants who returned to their respective provinces unsatisfied. At least, it 
was agreed that Etienne Tshisekedi would be the prime minister once the government of transition 
was formed at the end of the conference, although the designation of Tshisekedi was contested by 
several political forces. On the local level, frustration at the failure of the conference to resolve 
tensions left local population using “any means necessary” in taking their fate in hands.  
It is important to note here that the question of nationality affected the Banyarwanda of Masisi, 
not those in Rutshuru. This was because the immigration organized by the colonial administration 
settled the population from Rwanda in Masisi, not in Rutshuru. This is why the term Banyarwanda 
was (and still is) contested by Hutu and Tutsi of Rutshuru because they continue to consider 
themselves as citizens of the DR Congo claiming to have been living in Rutshuru before the current 
national borders were established. This claim seemed to be accepted by the government because 
the Hutu and Tutsi of Rutshuru were officially invited to the national conference, but not the 
Banyarwanda of Masisi, as an informant put it: 
nobody from the Banyarwanda of Masisi was invited to the national conference because 
they were considered as Rwandan refugees without any political status that could allow 
them to participate. None of them could be candidate to election or any administration 
post. The first leader of Banyarwanda from Masisi to be appointed to an official post 
was Nzabara Masetsa as the Mayor of Goma town in 1998 by the RCD rebellion. 
(Interview Goma, III.04.14) 
On March 20th 1993, only five months after the end of the national conference, a war started with 
the massacre of Hutu peasants by a Nyanga group in Ntoto village (Walikale territory) (Mararo 
1997: 534). Three weeks after this massacre, the Hunde in Masisi followed in the Nyangas’ 
footsteps. In Mararo’s analysis, the aim of the Nyanga and Hunde offensives was to chase Hutu 
out of Masisi and Walikale. In the face of this threat, the Hutu in Masisi were swift to benefit from 
support from the Hutu of Rutshuru, who were already organized around MAGRIVI. During this 
Congolese political deadlock, the solidarity between Hutu of Rutshuru and those of Masisi was 
strengthened by the establishment of MAGRIVI in Masisi. On the other side, Tutsi of Masisi were 
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in a difficult situation and created solidarity with Tutsi of Rutshuru (Mararo 1997:530).  
At the regional level, the campaign led by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) against the Hutu 
regime of President Habyarimana from 1990 onwards reinforced the existing mistrust and division 
between Hutu and Tutsi of Masisi and Rutshuru. Moreover, the progress of the RPF against the 
Habyarimana regime coincided with the frustrations and fear of Congolese Tutsi, which 
encouraged them to look for an opportunity for a strategic alliance with the RPF. Between 1991 
and 1993, many Congolese Tutsi families sent young people to Rwanda via Uganda in support of 
the RPF rebellion (Braeckman et al 1998:44). They speculated that once the Tutsi were in power 
in Rwanda, they would benefit from military and political support from the new regime. When the 
genocide was stopped by the RPF in July 1994, the massive number of Hutu refugees who fled to 
Congo constituted a security concern for Congolese Tutsi. This was because among the Rwandan 
refugees were ex Rwandan military forces and other Hutu militias and were all armed (Belaid 
2008:9). While the arrival of Rwandan Hutu refugees was welcomed by Hutu of both Masisi and 
Rutshuru, thousands of Tutsi (from all phases of migration) from Masisi and Rutshuru crossed the 
border to Rwanda after the RPF took power, many of whom were accommodated in refugee camps 
where they remain until today. 
On one side, local tensions between Congolese Hutu and Hunde and Nyanga in Masisi on the one 
hand and with Nande in Rutshuru on the other were still at play. On the other side, Congolese Tutsi 
in refuge in Rwanda remained determined on their political struggle, especially the right of 
nationality. It was only an opportunity to act that was missing. When the Congolese rebellion 
(AFDL) started in 1996, it was not by accident that the General Secretary of AFDL was a Tutsi 
from Masisi. When the AFDL took power in Kinshasa in May 1997, the question of nationality 
immediately become one of the political priorities that the parliament was supposed to address. 
But when President Laurent Désiré Kabila took power in Kinshasa, only one year later, he decided 
to get rid of the AFDL allies (Rwanda and Uganda) as well as Tutsi collaborators and founder 
members of AFDL. In such a context of political turbulence, the questions of nationality and local 
tensions around land access could have not been resolved.  
The creation of the RCD rebellion in August 1998, however, brought leaders of both Hutu and 
Tutsi Congolese together in a political military movement. Two years later, a Hutu leader, Eugene 
Serufuli, became the governor of North Kivu, replacing a Tutsi, Leonard Kanyamuhanga. The 
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RCD war against the regime of Kabila ended in 2003 with a political agreement signed in Sun City 
(South Africa) and culminated in a government of political transition.  
The transitional government of 2003 to 2006 allowed a significant number of Tutsi and Hutu elites 
from the two Kivus to participate in both the parliament and the Government and offered a ‘golden 
opportunity’ to solve the nationality issue. The new constitution of April 2003 stipulates in Article 
14 that  
all ethnic groups and nationalities whose individuals were established on the 
Congolese territory on 30th June 1960 have the same right and must equally 
benefit from the state protection…The Congolese nationality is one and 
exclusive…  
However, during a parliamentary session of 22nd September 2004, members of the political, 
administrative and juridical commission did not agree on the wording of Article 14 with regard to 
the stipulation regarding “all ethnic groups and nationalities whose individuals were established 
the Congolese territory on 30th June 1960”. The commission argued that as long as the Rwandan 
constitution does not revoke the right to nationality when the holder takes a second one, the case 
of the Banyarwanda would present the problem of potentially retaining a Rwandan nationality 
while applying for a Congolese one.  
The overriding political factor that allowed the government to overcome opposition to Article 14 
was the privileged position of former RCD Banyarwanda elites in the government, notably the 
Tutsi Azarias Ruberwa as Vice-President of the Republic in charge of Defense and Security. In a 
context where the Banyarwanda political party (RCD) represented only 3% in the parliament (15 
seats out of 500 members of parliament), the Banyarwanda elites needed to use serious political 
pressure to get the nationality question solved. Missing the ‘golden opportunity’ of the political 
transition would be cause for considerable despair given that, in the likely outcome of elections 
scheduled for 2006, the Banyarwanda would disappear from the national political scene. It is not 
a coincidence that the dissident General Laurent Nkunda emerged some months after the transition 
began in 2004 after he had refused to join the national army, claiming to stand up for the protection 
of the Banyarwanda community and their rights.  
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The military incursion led by Nkunda in Bukavu city (South Kivu) in support of another Tutsi 
dissident senior military officer, Jules Mutebutsi, in August 2004, allegedly to protect the Tutsi 
community, has been interpreted as a strategic exercise of pressure on the government regarding 
the question of nationality (Omasombo and Obotela 2006:254). An important factor to remember 
here is that this military incursion of Nkunda and Mutebutsi happened in August, only one month 
before the contestation of the above Article 14. It is undeniable that the creation of CNDP by 
Nkunda in 2005 added significant pressure to solve the nationality question, only one year after 
the new constitution of 18th February 2006 provided a legal basis for addressing the question of 
nationality. In Article 10, the constitution states that all individuals and ethnic groups who were 
on Congolese territory on 30 June 1960 are Congolese citizens. One of the major outcomes of this 
legal victory of the Banyarwanda was the national elections, which made them the second most 
powerful political force in North Kivu after the Nande. In Masisi, the Banyarwanda were elected 
without any contest with regard to nationality. Until today, they are the leading political force in 
Masisi, which has not pleased Hunde, Nyanga and Nande in Masisi at all. 
Although the constitution recognizes the Banyarwanda right to nationality, one could still argue 
that nationality has provided political rights to Banyarwanda under the category of ‘national 
citizenship’ but not under the category of ‘local citizenship’ explained in the study by Nguya 
N’Dila (2001). In their struggle, the Banyarwanda needed to gain nationality as the key to 
obtaining political rights: once legally recognized, they could go on to claim rights to local 
citizenship which would entail rights to local belonging and access to resources. In the 
understanding of Nguya N’Dila, local citizenship is not always legislated because it is assumed to 
be a matter of negotiation through kinship with customary authorities. In other words, even though 
the nationality question was decisively resolved by the constitution, the so-called autochthonous 
Hunde and other communities still do not regard Banyarwanda as natives of Masisi and still 
continue to believe that only customary authorities can grant the right to access land. One of the 
Hutu leaders from Masisi stated that. 
what matters for us is not the national nationality provided by the constitution, 
but the local citizenship which implies that we can be considered by other 
communities as such. Being a citizen of Masisi is more important than being a 
Congolese citizen because the national citizen profits only to a few political elites 
who do not change our situation – Banyarwanda. (Interview Gisenyi, III.02.15)  
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This view was stressed by one of the former RCD members in the national parliament (2003-2006) 
and who participated in the debate about nationality during the transition. She mentioned that:  
although the nationality question was solved by the constitution, that was more 
of a legal victory but it does not solve entirely the conflict between Banyarwanda 
and other local communities around land. Up to now, Hunde, Nande and Nyanga 
continue to contest the ownership of land held by Banyarwanda and the 
constitution does not provide any alternative on how having the nationality would 
secure our land. That is why the ‘cahier de charges’ of CNDP rebellion strongly 
emphasized the return of Congolese refugees from Rwanda to Congo and 
occupation of their land occupied by other communities. (interview Gisenyi, 
III.03.14)  
This idea of linking nationality to land access shows that solving the question of nationality by the 
recognition of national institutions has been a political victory for Banyarwanda while at the same 
time providing a legal cover to claim land rights. The problem here is that in the understanding of 
the other communities of Masisi, the nationality right only grants national citizenship but access 
to land has to be granted locally by customary chiefs. To escape this local dependency on 
customary authority, the Banyarwanda preferred to use all kinds of opportunities offered by the 
laws. As an example, in spite of the denial of nationality to Banyarwanda in 1981, affluent 
Banyarwanda were able to capitalize on the 1972 law and to acquire large tracts of land in Masisi 
and beyond, due to the land law that was promulgated in 1973.  
However, the law on nationality was not enough in itself to acquire land. The presence of certain 
Banyarwanda elites in strategic national and provincial institutions served as assets in the 
negotiation of title deeds for large tracts of land. Here is where, clearly, the idea of jumping in 
scales comes in. It would not have been possible for the Banyarwanda to acquire land without 
holding political power at different levels. Indeed, though political struggle over the right to 
nationality caused major human suffering for over two decades, from 1981 to 2006, conflict with 
regard to land at the community level continues to perpetuate a cycle of violence until today. 
Before analyzing the land issues, it can be argued that, like the question of nationality, violent 
conflict over land is embedded in national juridical as well as institutional landscapes. The next 
section expands on this hypothesis. It considers the structures and dysfunctions arising from the 
different laws and institutions that relate to land tenure governance: in Congo and, more 
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importantly, on land in rural areas. 
5.3 The multi-scale analysis of land tenure governance in DR Congo  
5.3.1 Institutional and administrative organization of the land tenure system 
The legal landscape of land management in the DR Congo is made up of multiple coexisting 
regulation systems and both formal and informal mechanisms for settling conflict, with custom as 
an important source of regulation (Mukokobya 2013: 58). Research on legal pluralism in DR 
Congo has largely been oriented towards questions of land, emphasizing contradictions in the 
existing legal framework and the lack of a transparent land governance frame (Mugangu 2007:386; 
Huggins, 2010:12). The major characteristic of legal pluralism in land tenure management in DR 
Congo has been the overlapping of laws within the existing legal framework as well as the conflict 
of competence between institutions in charge of the implementation of these laws.  
Another problem is how these laws and institutions apply in rural areas where customary 
authorities continue to claim ownership of land and the authority to distribute it. In this section, I 
intend to outline the structures and institutions related to land tenure management in the DR Congo. 
Afterward, I will discuss the setting of land-related laws and show how violent conflicts around 
land are deeply rooted in and fueled by a framework of laws and institutions. By so doing, I intend 
to argue that the analysis of the legal framework and institutional setting of land management can 
help to connect scales, from local to provincial and national.  
The aim of this chapter is to follow up on the claim made in the fourth chapter that peacebuilding 
organizations both overemphasize the local level and disconnect it from other levels. This analysis 
of the legal and institutional framework for land tenure management provides an account of how 
scales are connected to each other and provide avenues for ‘string pullers’to secure land and 
political power. As the chart from the central government below illustrates (Figure 5.1), ministries 
dealing directly with land do not all follow the same logic in terms of hierarchical lines. While the 
Ministry of Land functions with its local structures in a ‘déconcentré’ logic, the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs functions in a ‘décentralisé’ logic.  
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Figure 3: Conflict of competence in land management between state institutions  
 
To explain in more depth, ‘deconcentration’ is a process of unitary state planning which consists 
of establishing administrative authorities representing the State in local administrative districts. 
These authorities are deprived of all autonomy and legal personality. They cannot be elected; 
instead they are appointed by the national Minister. Meanwhile, decentralization implies a unitary 
state management process that involves the transference of administrative powers from the state 
to local entities (or communities) distinct from the state. These local entities have autonomy and 
public authorities in these entities are elected representatives. In DR Congo, ‘deconcentrated’ 
entities have existed since the first and second republic dating from the 1960s. Although the 
decentralization law has existed since the 1980s, the first substantial outcome was the creation of 
provincial government and assemblies in 2005. From then onward, both ‘deconcentrated’ and 
‘decentralized’ entities have co-existed and functioned in parallel, with the result of generating 
contested decision-making and perpetuating an ongoing crisis of authority between the two 
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administrative systems. 
Through the decree-law n° 081 of 2 July 1998, which provided for the administrative organization 
of entities as modified and completed by the decree-law no 018/ 2001 of 28 September 2001, the 
government decided to create provincial governments and assemblies in 2005. With the creation 
of the provincial governments, each of which had a Ministry of Land and Customary Affairs, land 
tenure affairs came to be entirely managed by the National Ministry of Land via the Division of 
Land Tenure (see Figure 5.2 below). Since 2005, the National Ministry has operated via the 
Division of Land Tenure while at the same time the provincial Ministry of Land Affairs functions 
in parallel with the Division. The decentralization structures are controlled by the provincial 
government whereas the ‘deconcentration’ system is composed of the services that directly 
represent national ministries on the provincial and territorial level through structures called 
‘Divisions’ for each national ministry. However, the terms of collaboration and the limits of 
competences in land management between decentralized and ‘deconcentrated’ structures are not 
provided thus far by any of these laws. Before discussing the conflicting role allocation between 
decentralized and deconcentrated structures, the organization of land tenure management might be 
useful to consider. 
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Figure 4: Conflict of competence in land acquisition procedures  
 
The organization of land tenure administration depends on the Ministry of Land Affairs in 
Kinshasa and the Division of Land Tenure (Circonscription foncière) at the provincial level. The 
latter is composed of the ‘Conservateur des titres immobiliers’ (Conservator of Title Deeds) and 
the ‘Division du cadastre’, a technical service. The national Ministry of Land Affairs is responsible 
for the allocation and management of all land through the ‘Circonscription foncière’ in each 
province. For North Kivu Province, two ‘Circonscriptions’ were created in 1996. One is in the city 
of Butembo and covers Beni and Lubero Territories and the second is located in Goma covering 
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Goma town; Masisi, Walikale, Rutshuru and Nyiragongo Territories. Under the Ministerial Arrêté 
(order or decree) of 22 May 2004, Masisi and Walikale formed their own ‘Circonscription’. 
According to the delegation of decision-making provided by the law, these ‘Circonscriptions’ 
report only to the national Ministry of Land, not to the provincial Ministry. The provincial Ministry 
of Land can only propose policies or Edits to the provincial government or Assembly to deal with 
specific land tenure issues, which limits its competence in the decision making process.  
As an example of this, the Constitution of February 18 2006 gives provinces the exclusive authority 
to deliver title deeds. While the modalities of application of these competences have to be further 
clarified by a specific law, the Provincial Ministry of Land Affairs, in theory, can legislate on land 
issues under the form of an edict or decree. For example, an edict was proposed by the Ministry 
and voted in 2012 by the Provincial Assembly of North Kivu. This edict was meant to clarify the 
responsibilities, duties and rights of different stakeholders of land tenure management at the 
provincial level. This edict has not yet been implemented because the lines of competences 
between the provincial Ministry of Land and the division of ‘Circonscription foncière’ (Division 
of Land Tenure) have not been clearly established, which continues to pose a serious problem for 
land tenure management in North Kivu, as Figure 5.2 shows.  
These conflicting roles were recognized by a provincial Minister of Land Affairs: 
the decentralization law has created the conflict of competence between the 
provincial Ministry and the division of ‘Circonscription foncière’ when it comes 
to land acquisition. We hope that the next reforms of land tenure systems will 
clarify our mutual competences in land tenure management. (interview Goma 
IV.01.15) 
In this situation, the Provincial Minister of Land seems to have only a political and not a legal role 
in land management; his collaboration with the Conservator of Title Deeds remains ambiguous 
and competitive. On the territorial level, the ‘Administrateur de Territoire’ is deconcentrated, as is 
the President of the Tribunal de Paix/Peace Court (in 2013, this court replaced customary courts 
which had existed since Congolese independence), but neither are authorized by the law to 
intervene in issues of land tenure management such as providing a title deed. However, the 
Chefferies (chieftaincies) such as Bashali are decentralized entities and the ‘Mwami’ (chief of 
chieftaincy) is supposed to collaborate with the administrator of the territory, at least on an 
122 
 
administrative level, without reporting to him on land management or financial management of 
the ‘Chefferie’. Within this context of difficult collaboration between the two authorities, a further 
complicating factor is the fact that the officials of the division of ‘Circonscription foncière’ at the 
territorial level do not report to either of the above authorities. In the table below, one can see that 
the ‘Conservator of title deeds’ has the authority to issue a title deed, not the provincial Minister 
of Land: 
Table 4 Land acquisition, Institutions and levels of competence 
Level  Rural land Urban land 
Parliament (national level) ≥ 2000 ha ≥ 100 
President of the Republic >1000 ha and <2000 ha > 50 ha and < 100 ha 
Minister of Land Affairs (national level) > 200ha and ≥ 1000 ha > 10 ha and ≤ 50 ha 
Governor of the Province ≤ 200ha ≤ 10 ha 
Conservator of Title Deeds (provincial 
level) 
< 10 ha < 50 ha 
  
This lack of coordination and lack of clear limits regarding competences in land tenure 
management was attested by the President of the ‘Tribunal de Paix’:  
the real problem is the lack of coordination and transparency between public land 
management services. Most of the time, these services issue land title deeds to 
two or more persons but for the same plot of land. Conflicts generated by these 
situations are transferred to us, unfortunately without adequate resources. 
(Interview Masisi, IV.10.14) 
Still, in Masisi, a considerable number of the people who have received land from customary chiefs 
have managed to acquire title deeds from the ‘Circonscription foncière’ in order to legally cover 
their land. This quest for titles deeds has frustrated customary chiefs, not only because they no 
longer receive a fee on the land covered by title deeds, but also because the public authorities in 
the ‘Circonscription foncière’, both in Masisi and at the provincial level, do not make a distinction 
between land acquired in chieftaincies and land acquired in the public domain. In the customary 
domain, the chief can offer land to a family representative: not as a commercial transaction, but as 
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a means of survival for members of local communities. Many of the people who received land 
from customary chiefs and later on managed to register it are somehow independent from 
customary authorities who continue to consider this way of accessing land a usurpation of 
customary authority. Yet, even some customary chiefs also registered some parts of customary 
land in order to get title deeds; some even apparently procured title deeds in their own names and 
not for the people under their authorities. This was criticized in interview: 
during our research in Bashali, we found that the Mwami (Customary Chief) is 
selling land to individuals who are not members of the Hunde community while 
this land belongs to the Hunde royal family. We can say that what the Mwami is 
doing contradicts, in principle, the Hunde's indigenous philosophy claiming that 
the land of ancestors is undeniable. Some local Hunde leaders begin to question 
the legitimacy of the Mwami. (interview Goma, II.01.15). 
As the political dimension in land disputes seems important in conflicts over land, the question 
becomes whether or not it would be useful to transfer the role and authority of the ‘Conservator of 
title deeds’ to the Provincial Ministry. In doing so, one would assume that there would be no 
overlapping of authority in land tenure management, at least on the provincial level. During the 
discussion with the provincial Minister, he seemed to hope that the land reforms announced in 
2012 would tackle this issue. It is also important to note that although the provincial Ministry of 
Land is assumed to be playing a political role whereas the division of ‘Circonscription foncière’ is 
assumed to be playing a technical role, in practice, not only do the competences overlap, the 
position and role of the chairman of this Division has also been subject to politics. For example, 
during the RCD rebellion (1998-2003), the chairman of the North Kivu Division was nominated 
by the rebel administration, not by the central government.  
The fact that during the AFDL and RCD rebellions first a Tutsi and later a Hutu served as the 
Governor of North Kivu province, allowed an easy access to land and title deeds, at least for some 
Hutu and Tutsi elites. This was made possible on two levels. On one level, by nominating a 
Conservator at the Division, powerful individuals in the rebel administration and other close 
collaborators of the administration acquired huge tracts of land and legalized title deeds. An 
example of this is the Société Internationale de Commerce et des Industries Agricoles (SICIA), a 
former colonial plantation acquired by Mr Mwenenge, a close collaborator of President Mobutu, 
during the zaïrianization in the aftermath of the land law of 1973. This plantation, which is 
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approximately 4000 hectares, was divided into 28 plantations in 1998 with the authorization of the 
governor and shared between only 10 or so RCD individuals (senior founder members of RCD). 
In November 2014 when I visited this former SICIA plantation, I managed to meet with a group 
of people among the hundreds of families that were expelled between 2000 and 2002 by the new 
owners. Many of these families are still living in IDP camps.  
Moreover, since the time of the RCD administration under Serufuli as Governor, the Conservator 
of Title Deeds has been and is still to the present day a Hutu, from the same ethnic community as 
Serufuli. Not only did certain Hutu and Tutsi members of the RCD rebellion manage easily to 
acquire title deeds: Some of them, including senior military officers, obtained title deeds of up to 
200 hectares (the maximum a Governor can offer, as shown in the table above). On the second 
level, during the political negotiation between the RCD and the government, it was agreed that all 
juridical acts of the RCD administration, including court decisions, appointments to administrative 
posts and title deeds, would be considered as ‘legal’ by the new government.  
At the beginning of the government of transition in 2003, many former RCD senior cadres gained 
administrative and political positions at the national level. These positions allowed them not only 
to secure their land in Masisi and elsewhere within eastern DR Congo but to acquire even more 
land and to register this land at the national level: some of them even gained land certificates of 
perpetuity. Different rebellions have allowed the Banyarwanda elites to access not only land but 
also political power across local, provincial and national scales. Although land tenure management 
in the DR Congo continues to foster patterns of violent conflict at the local level, the maintenance 
of this institutional dysfunction seems to provide ‘string pullers’ with avenues to navigate across 
scales. 
5.3.2 Land tenure as a political niche for Banyarwanda elites 
As discussed in the previous section, the struggle for citizenship rights mobilized the Banyarwanda 
elites as it was a way to access and to secure land. In this section, particular attention will be given 
to an analysis of key laws affecting the land tenure system: the ways in which they contribute to 
ongoing conflict, while powerful individuals simultaneously benefit hugely from inherent 
ambiguities within the legal framework around the land tenure system.  
The first post-independence land-related law in 1966 was called the “Bakajika Law” and targeted 
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the nationalization of the Katanga mining sector. It was only in July 1973 that a more general land 
law was introduced: this law of 1973 still remains the most important legal reference in current 
land tenure management. For example, Article 53 of this law clearly states that ‘the land is the 
exclusive, inalienable, and imprescriptible property of the Congolese state’. In this regard, the 
State has become the exclusive owner of the land both in rural and urban areas. This begs the 
question why the state would be so keen to emphasize this exclusivity, since in any case, the state 
is sovereign and can make any decision.  
At the time when this land law came out, only one decade after independence, many agricultural 
companies in the Kivu were still owned by Belgians. This law of 1973 became the legal device for 
claiming a state monopoly over all resources and particularly to get rid of both external control of 
mining companies and even customary supremacy over certain rural lands. The 1973 law not only 
reinforced the Bakajika law of 1966 but also opened up a legal avenue for political elites close to 
the regime to acquire huge plantations that once belonged to the Belgian companies. Another 
contextual factor regarding the land law of 1973 is Mobutu’s ‘Zairianization’ ideology, active from 
1975, consisting of nationalizing all companies held by foreigners. Before discussing how this law 
contributes to the current violent conflict, an analysis of its key references is needed to understand 
how ‘sting pullers’ control land across scales. 
One of the problems with the land law is that it begins with the distinction between what it terms 
‘terres du domaine public’ and ‘terres du domaine privé’. ‘Public land’ means areas in which public 
services or specific activities by the state can be located, whereas ‘private land’ refers to areas in 
which the state can offer a plot of land to individuals or companies. The land under customary 
authority in chieftaincies has been defined as ‘private land’. According to Article 53 of the land 
law, the state can grant land to any individual or company, both in public and private land areas. 
Here is where the current tensions between customary chiefs and the public institutions are rooted. 
In designating customary land within the category of ‘private’ land, there was no longer any 
distinction between which kind of land customary chiefs could exercise their authority over and 
which land the state could use without interfering in customary land transactions. Customary chiefs 
continue to complain as public services in land tenure management continue to issue title deeds on 
customary areas based on Article 387, which stipulates that the ‘land occupied by local 
communities enters, from the entry into force of the land law, into the public area’.  
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However, in promulgating the land law, parliament seemed to anticipate eventual tensions over 
Article 387, and in Article 389 provided details of how anyone could acquire a plot of land in areas 
where local communities are settled. This article states that a ‘Presidential Ordinance will be 
issued to clarify the status of land occupied by local communities as well as customary competence 
on those lands’ (Article 389). However, no ordinance has been issued since 1973. The remaining 
puzzle is how customary land areas (entities in which local communities are recognized to be 
subject to the chief’s authority) should be managed in the absence of this ordinance. 
For Mugangu (1997:390), the question raised by this article is whether parliament intended, 
through the promise of an ordinance, to maintain the status quo and to leave the issue of rural land 
tenure to a future law. He suspects that if the answer is yes, then it could be argued by the Supreme 
Court that until the promised presidential ordinance is signed, this land must be managed according 
to the customary rules. In practice, public institutions continue to prevail and issue certificates, and 
thus to reinforce the dualism between customary authorities and public agents. Incidentally, this 
dualism is far from being resolved, even though the 1973 law apparently gives exclusive 
management of land to the State. An alternative pathway to resolution seems to be offered within 
the Constitution of February 2006: Article 34 provides that ‘public services of land management 
must respect all rights acquired in accordance with the customary procedures,’ meaning that 
public institutions cannot issue any certificate to peasants who received land from customary 
chiefs. Unfortunately, Article 34 remains subordinate to Article 389 of the land law, which also 
refers to the presidential ordinance.  
Considering that violence around land is reportedly experienced mainly at the local level due to 
the involvement of the local community, peacebuilding organizations have bought into a 
dichotomy between state authorities (legal and institutional frameworks) and customary 
authorities. In Masisi and Bashali specifically, there is a widespread narrative of land conflict, 
centered on the idea that land in Masisi belongs to autochthonous communities (Hunde, Nyanga, 
Nande). This is because, first of all, the distinction between the two categories of land mentioned 
in the land law are not documented and mapped, meaning it is no longer possible today to locate 
the real boundaries between customary areas and public land areas. Secondly, there is a strong 
assumption held by customary authorities that the land in Bashali and Bahunde chieftaincies is 
exclusively customary property.  
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This dualism has extended beyond functioning as a narrative: it has also been taken on board 
through several peacebuilding programs. Local committees implemented by international NGOs 
in different villages of Masisi to promote dialogue and to resolve land-related conflicts clearly 
reflect this binary conception: this is apparent when one looks at the composition of the members 
of those local committees. Each committee, for example, includes both customary chiefs and local 
state representatives, carrying the assumption that both parties can provide common ground for 
transitional solutions to violence.  
This dualism has been strongly emphasized in the existing literature concerning land in eastern 
Congo. However, this dualism has to be treated with a degree of caution. According to the cadastral 
service, not all land in chieftaincies is necessarily customary property, as claimed by customary 
chiefs. This duality was already rooted in the colonial administration where customary entities 
were recognized as territories within which customary chiefs had the authority to distribute 
resources, mainly land, to community members. The problem is that, while recognizing customary 
authority over land, the colonial administration privatized thousands of hectares of land for 
farming in Masisi, regardless of whether or not this land was in customary areas. After 
independence, what the land law of 1973 did in nationalizing the land was to legally allow any 
individual or company to access any land, anywhere through public institutions. 
It is in this context that many Banyarwanda elites acquired almost all the former colonial farms 
with fertile soils and, more importantly, ideally suited for cattle farming. As shown by a report by 
Action Solidaire pour la Paix (2014:55), the colonial administration had already divided Bashali 
into ‘plantations’ in the 1950s. The table below reflects approximately the number of farming 
‘blocks’ that are registered today in Bashali.  
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Table 5 Farming ‘blocks’ identified in Bashali in 2014 
N°  Name of the ‘Plantation’ Code Date of creation Tract/Size 
01 Lwama M2 14/03/1940 1200ha 
02 Ngandjo M4 14/06/1940 2035ha 
03 Burungu M5 10/06/1940 500ha 
04 Mushununu M36 15/09/1949 81ha 
05 Mbati Mukungo M42 24/10/1949 90ha 
06 Luama Ngoniba M44 08/05/1952 373ha 
07 Bushaalanyabula M45 06/05/1952 504ha 
08 Kalonge M46 06/05/1952 66ha 
09 Kipfunwe Mulinde M47 24/06/1952 127ha 
10 Kalembe M48 06/05/1952 425ha 
11 Mihara M49 06/05/1952 478ha 
12 Kihunda M51 06/05/1952 480ha 
13 Kirumbu M51a 17/05/1952 520ha 
14 Ndotsho M54 22/05/1952 2320ha 
15 Entre lacs Mbalukira et Mbita M59 15/06/1952 305ha 
16 Hinduka-Biriba M66 22/07/1952 184ha 
17 Rusoma M69 15/08/1952 500ha 
18 Ndeko M70 26/09/1952 480ha 
19 Muhu M73 28/11/1952 428ha 
20 Kihimba M74 14/12/1952 525ha 
21 Ngereko M91 18/12/1952 268ha 
22 Mulinde M93 15/03/1953 275ha 
23 Mutsiru M94 16/04/1953 460ha 
                                           Total area = 12,624 ha (126.24 km²) 
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Altogether at least 12.5% of the entire area of Bashali was divided into blocks. This share is 
generally seen by both customary chiefs and NGOs as belonging to the public area, with the 
remaining land (87.5%) under customary authority. Here is where the frustrations of customary 
chiefs come from: Article 54 of the land law completely ignores this perception of land distribution 
and instead stipulates that all kinds of land in any area belongs to the state; access to land must 
therefore follow formal procedures in accordance with the law. The question that remains today is 
how these laws and institutions apply in such a complex situation in which customary claims 
remain dominant: peasants owning land without title deeds; and when there is no official geospatial 
data to locate land.  
Given the dire ramifications of the dysfunction of the land management system, various actors 
within civil society have expressed the increasing need to reform the land sector: even the central 
Government seems to be committed. Civil society actors, provincial and national authorities have 
already demonstrated willingness to push the government towards a land reform. However, 
expectations and priorities for reform vary according to whether this comes from the government 
(national or provincial), from civil society (local or international) or from foreign investors. A 
national workshop on land reforms in Kinshasa in 2012 identified two major concerns. Firstly, 
legal security for peasants’ lands and issues of governance involving harmonizing collaboration 
between public services (that is, the decentralized and the deconcentrated). Secondly, the need to 
clarify the status of customary chiefs as defined by the 1973 Land law and by article 207 of the 
Constitution. The expected outcome is the legal redistribution of land in order to reduce inequality 
between landowners and peasants. Decree No. 13/016 of 31 May 2013 on the establishment, 
organization and functioning of the National Committee of land reform is an important step toward 
beginning this process. However, the roadmap signed by different stakeholders has been not 
implemented yet, even as the expected actions were supposed to be finished by 2017. 
In some African countries, experiences in land governance have shown that having policies is one 
thing and implementing them is another (Boone 2007:559). This is particularly the case with regard 
to sensitive issues such as natural resources. Even though it is commonplace to understand land 
reforms as a form of direct state intervention in property relations, the capacity of the state in most 
African countries to carry out land reforms is severely limited: especially so when it takes the form 
of redistribution or resettlement. Often, it is less the result of direct state action and more the result 
of the actions of private individuals within the state (Manji 2001:328). As seems to be the case in 
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the DR Congo regarding the land reform process, initiatives and activities are largely carried out 
by local NGOs with the support of international organizations and UN Agencies.  
The Congolese Government’s role in this reform falls short of willingness to get fully involved. 
One of the reasons for this is the potential costs of reforms that may be too expensive to implement. 
Another factor is that political elites from North Kivu may fear negative repercussions of land 
reform, since they are among the biggest landowners, even as they hold power in key institutions 
supposedly boosting the land reform process. An individual example is Eugene Serufuli, who was 
the Governor of North Kivu during the RCD rebellion, later the National Minister for Rural 
Development and currently the Minister of Small and Medium Enterprises. Considering his current 
position and his personal interests in Masisi and Rutshuru, he is one of the important actors (also 
a ‘string puller’) that are key to facilitating land reform. At the present moment, the abounding 
legal ambiguity within the land tenure system seems not to be a concern for ‘string puller’. As long 
as the plurality of laws and institutions provide this maneuvering space, the role of ‘string puller’ 
and their strategies across scales will continue to challenge current approaches to account for the 
rationales of conflict dynamics in Masisi and other places in the eastern DR Congo.  
5.4 Concluding remarks   
At the beginning of this chapter, the struggles of the Banyarwanda community in North Kivu to 
obtain citizenship and the right to access land provided a case study of how these parallel struggles 
were displayed across scales, becoming at the same time political spaces in which powerful 
individuals emerged and became ‘string puller’ across the spectrum. Rather than being exclusively 
local problems, as they are often incorrectly depicted, the citizenship question and questions of 
land access are both strongly embedded in a larger legal framework that in turn continues to 
maintain confusion which directly impacts on local tensions. Even as the legal framework for 
questions of nationality and land tenure have fueled violent conflict in the case of Banyarwanda, 
the same problematic framework has allowed the Banyarwanda elites to succeed in navigating 
across scales (locally, at the provincial and national level) and gaining legitimacy and power across 
them. It is within this challenging relationship between ‘string puller’ strategies and the current 
legal and institutional frameworks that I intend to discuss the notion of legal pluralism.      
  
131 
 
Instead of focusing on the general notions of legal pluralism, I prefer to restrict myself to what 
Kyed (2009:88) terms, “legal pluralism as a policy concept”. Kyed has observed that, on an official 
level, legal pluralism tends to convey recognition of the socio-cultural diversity of the legal domain 
within a nation state. This is exemplified by the import of non-state 'law' into state law and by 
recognizing the role of existing non-state authorities, such as traditional leaders, chiefs, clan elders, 
and religious institutions, in matters of justice and dispute resolution. Kyed argues that this state 
recognition of non-state legal orders is not a technical, neutral process, but rather an inherently 
political one. This process occurs through public institutions in which political actors often include 
non-state actors (customary chiefs, community leaders, etc.) in policy programming in order to 
serve multiple purposes, one of them being to build up constituencies. At same time, non-state 
actors seek legitimacy and the protection of their interests through collaboration with political 
actors, both in formal and informal ways.  
In most African societies, this phenomenon was already apparent in the colonial period, when local 
traditional chiefs became collaborators and nominees of the colonial administration, and when 
traditional regulations were accommodated into the colonial legal systems through what is known 
as an ‘indirect rule’ system (Matthieu 1937:434). After decolonization, this complicated 
embeddedness and negotiation between the two systems was replicated in different ways in the 
new post-colonial states, in many cases with some of the attributes of customary authority 
becoming a part of state legal systems (Mamdani 2002:494). This has been further complicated by 
the government's direct role in land allocation in some African countries, which has created direct 
relations between land users and the state institutions, rather than mediated through neo-customary 
brokers. Boone and Nyeme (2014:8) argue that a direct linkage is visible in the presence of 
institutional channels by which land-related conflict can “scale up” through a hierarchy of national 
judicial and electoral institutions. One of the factors to be considered within this hierarchy of 
institutions and their effects on the relations between political elites and particular interests is the 
ambiguity caused by a multiplicity of institutions that compete to sanction and validate rival 
claims, in attempts to gain authority (Lund 2011:72).  
An under-explored area of contemporary legal pluralism studies is an account of how actors and 
networks interact with competing interests and fight to maintain their power and positions across 
scales of institutions. Tamanaha (2008:409) observed that people and groups in social arenas with 
coexisting, conflicting normative systems will, in the pursuit of their objectives, play these 
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competing systems against one another. Sometimes, argues Tamanaha, these clashes can be 
reconciled or put aside: they can even operate in a complementary fashion, with major social and 
political ramifications. This is likely to occur in situations of overlapping authority between 
institutions and laws, obliging social actors to refer their claims to a variety of legal political 
institutions across levels of scale.  
The preceding analysis of the Banyarwanda fight for nationality and other political rights and its 
implications regarding rights to land tenure not only allows us to detach so-called ‘local’ conflicts 
from a vague local scale and to see them in light of a larger legal and institutional framework 
within DR Congo: the preceding analysis also challenges the assumptions of peacebuilding 
interventions in Masisi. It is arguable that what peacebuilding actors continue to narrate as local 
conflict is not only local - at least, not in an epistemological sense. Local conflicts are the 
manifestations of the causes that are deeply embedded in legal systems and institutions beyond the 
local scale. 
The two key factors used in this chapter to illustrate this hypothesis have been the land tenure 
system and the question of the Banyarwanda’s nationality. Even while criticizing the 
peacebuilding organizations in their focus on land conflicts, one must admit that the land tenure 
management system continues to play a significant role in ongoing conflicts in Masisi and many 
other places in eastern Congo. In a recent publication, Mathys and Vlassenroot (2016) recognize 
that many land-related disputes are not only about land but are also an expression of the effects of 
the Congo’s governance crisis. Both authors stress that many of the attempts initiated by donors 
to address land conflicts have failed to deal with the fact that land remains a highly valued political 
stake. They suggest that structural responses to land governance challenges should be addressed 
in terms of conflict resolution rather than in terms of conflict management which has been focusing 
on tensions at the individual level on a daily basis: furthermore, that there needs to be better 
grounding of mediation efforts in local understandings of land tenure systems and state law, as 
well as more support from local and higher-level authorities. 
While this is true, one can argue, however, that these suggested solutions seem to be falling under 
a policy-based approach to land tenure management because of the authors’ ‘normative’ view of 
the preponderant role of the state in land conflict management. What we can learn from the 
example of Masisi is that what makes the Congolese state is both formal institutions and actors but 
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who sometimes perform effectively in informality as we see it with ‘string pullers’. These actors 
include highly placed politicians and senior officers in the national army who control land and 
other resources. Suggesting that the Congolese state (in the Weberian sense) is the key actor to 
resolve land-related conflicts is true but might be only a theoretical track of solution. In a context 
where these individuals are involved in informal networks and play the role of ‘string pullers’, any 
attempt to solve structural problems is likely to fail. In analyzing the legal and institutional 
framework that shapes land tenure governance, this chapter has shown that, in the case of the 
Banyarwanda community, the nationality question and its impact on land access have been at play 
more through military victory through rebellion and through informal control of scales rather than 
through political will of the central government and formal institutions. If it is the case that 
resolution of land disputes must involve higher political authorities, under the assumption that the 
state is by nature keen to solve conflict, current efforts to solve structural conflict (such as over 
land) are likely to remain without impact. This chapter criticizes current policy-based approaches 
towards land and argues that land reform is more of a political process than a technical matter of 
policy (normative). While peacebuilding organizations strive to make conflict resolution a state-
driven process, powerful individuals through informal networks will continue to pull hidden 
strings wherever any intervention efforts threaten to compromise their interests.  
Through this chapter my intention was to demonstrate how conflict around the triangle land-
power-identity in Masisi is not a local phenomenon per se. The examples of the nationality and 
land questions as contested between Banyarwanda and other local groups (Hunde, Nyanga, Nande, 
…) supported the argument that this triangle is located within juridical and institutional levels 
beyond the ‘local’. Current efforts to solve the related conflicts have ignored this multi-scalar 
character of the conflict: even as several programs focus on land at the expense of power relations 
and questions of identity, the presence of ‘string pullers’ in formal institutions will continue to 
challenge current intervention efforts unless and until peacebuilding actors revise their approaches. 
At the moment, it is difficult to imagine this happening in the near future. This chapter analyzed 
the legal pluralism of both nationality and land tenure institutions in DR Congo, showing how they 
are connected to different levels and how what are seen as local conflicts are, in reality, the 
symptoms of multi-scalar causes. One can argue that the existing dysfunction of institutions and 
confusions in land management are politically and economically preserved or tolerated by 
powerful individuals who can afford to gain power at different institutional levels. In this sense, 
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navigating across scales has been a strong strategy for Banyarwanda leaders to better negotiate 
power in order both to gain the nationality right and to access and control land. The next chapter 
analyzes and discusses different strategies of the production of scales by powerful individuals. An 
example of a conflict transformation project is also discussed as to what extent are peacebuilding 
interventions capable of bringing ‘string pullers’ into the peace process across levels.  
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Chapter 6 ‘String pullers’, conflict transformation and the ‘local 
trap’ 
6.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapter I discussed the construction of the ‘local’ as the most important scale of 
conflict resolution by peacebuilding interventions and how these interventions failed to provide an 
approach that could link the ‘local’ to other levels. By focusing on land and nationality questions 
as parts of the triangle of conflict, I demonstrated that this triangle of conflict is far from being 
exclusively ‘local’. Further, I argued that conflict resolution by peacebuilding interventions failed 
to consider the legal and institutional framework in which land, power and identity issues are 
structurally embedded and are controlled by powerful individuals. It was stressed in the previous 
chapters that it is the current legal as well as institutional framework that has provided possibilities 
to the Banyarwanda elites to navigate across scales in order to secure their citizenship and land 
tenure rights.  
The analysis of the legal and institutional frameworks of land tenure and citizenship as the main 
sources of violent conflicts perpetuated over decades between the Banyarwanda and other groups 
in Masisi has provided an account of how different scales matter. Linking the local to other scales 
and showing the cross-scale dimensions of the conflict has not only questioned the ‘local’, it has 
also explained the extent to which the Banyarwanda elites have been able to navigate across scales 
to control land, political power and identity (expressed in terms of citizenship). It was shown that 
the widespread narrative through which peacebuilding organizations often tend to locate the causes 
of conflict on a local scale has failed to provide an approach to intervention that takes other scales 
into account. This intervention on the local scale has also largely ignored the role and the influence 
of ‘string pullers’ across scales. It is this gap that I will address in this chapter. 
As previously discussed, the literature about the main Congolese wars (1996-2003) has largely 
relied on the regional and international context to provide the reasons and agendas behind these 
wars (e.g. International Crisis Group 2010:2; Spittaels and Hilgert 2008:5), with very little on 
dynamics at the local level. In this chapter, I will discuss the conditions under which armed groups 
emerged in Masisi and how they involved multiple actors at the different levels. I argue that local 
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dynamics and actors, such as claims for control of land, customary power, etc., and the role they 
have played in different wars are often overlooked and reduced to general narratives of economic 
wars. The aim of this chapter is not to provide details about rationales and the ‘resource war’ 
explanation of different rebellions. Rather, it is to demonstrate the relationship between armed 
groups and powerful individuals on the one hand, and to explain how peacebuilding NGOs’ 
interventions are challenged by these individuals on the other hand. 
This chapter is organized around five points. It begins with the rise of powerful individuals through 
the analysis of three armed groups: CNDP (Congrès Nationale pour la Défense du Peuple, 
established by Laurent Nkunda), Nyatura (linked to former Governor of North Kivu Eugene 
Serufuli and Robert Seninga) and APCLS (Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et 
Souverain, led by a military leader Janvier Karairi). For the purpose of this study, I chose these 
three groups for two reasons. First, that the process of their formation contributes to the 
understanding of how land, power and identity are linked to violent conflict and second, the three 
groups are active in the research area of this study. Taken in this sense, I do not approach the rise 
of armed groups as primarily the causes of violence, rather as the response by various actors to 
claim specific interests. In this perspective, I intend to show how armed groups became a 
springboard for some actors to connect different scales. The second part of this chapter examines 
the strategies through which scales were produced. Networks I am referring to are formal and 
informal alliances and rivalries among a set of actors. They include ethnic based organizations, 
political parties, and armed groups. The third part discusses an example of a conflict 
transformation project in Bashali. The aim is to understand how networks function and the extent 
to which they constitute a challenge to peacebuilding interventions. The fourth part brings the 
politics of scale into the discussion to explain how the choice of the ‘local’ has become a trap for 
peacebuilding work, providing both a theoretical contribution to the peacebuilding approaches and 
a policymaking outlook for current and future conflict transformation initiatives.  
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6.2 The rise of ‘string pullers’ through the ‘first’ and ‘second’ Congolese wars 
(1996-2003) 
The resource war explanation which has frequently been employed with reference to the DR 
Congo largely follows the ‘greed and grievances’ theoretical model elaborated by Paul Collier and 
Anke Hoeffler in the 1990s. The assumption that natural resources play a key role in triggering, 
prolonging and financing conflicts (Bannon and Collier, 2002:17) has influenced a growing body 
of research on the causes of civil wars, with several examples from sub-Saharan Africa. However, 
this narrative, which was dominant for a long time, has been more and more questioned with regard 
to political, social and territorial control (see Autesserre, 2008, 2009, 2010; Vlassenroot, 2013; 
Huening, 2013; Mararo, 1997). 
For example, Ndikumana and Kisangani (2003) analysed the causes of eight civil wars that 
occurred in the DR Congo since 1960, and investigated how the Congo case fits the Collier and 
Hoeffler model of civil war. They found that the struggle for control over natural resources by 
domestic and foreign actors, the manipulation of the law on nationality and the influx of refugees, 
which are factors not formally included in the Collier-Hoeffler model, also increased the risk of 
war. The authors noted that there are important factors that are not formally accounted for in the 
existing models of ‘civil war’ that are critical in explaining the timing of rebellions and the risk of 
conflict in Congo, and suggested three factors beyond natural resources and foreign interests to be 
considered.  
The first one is the identity question and the law on nationality that targeted the Banyarwanda 
community. The second is the influx of Rwandese Hutu refugees in eastern Congo in 1994, which 
disrupted the ethnic balance and threatened and marginalised the Congolese Tutsi. The last one is 
the cross-border presence of Tutsi-supporting regimes in Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda and the 
political and military support these countries provide to the Congolese Tutsi. However, what the 
authors left out of their analysis is to explain how these armed conflicts have led to the emergence 
of ‘string pullers’ and allowed them to navigate across scales. In this chapter, I focus on Masisi to 
analyse how local actors got involved in different wars in North Kivu between 1996 and 2013 and 
to understand the extent to which land, identity and power continue to sustain the violence and 
challenge peacebuilding intervention. 
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The ‘first Congolese war’ was launched simultaneously in the provinces of North and South Kivu 
in October 1996. In May 1997 the AFDL overthrew President Mobutu and took power in Kinshasa. 
The commander in chief who led the war was James Kabarebe, a Rwandan senior officer and ‘right 
hand’ of Paul Kagame. Kabarebe became the chief of staff of the allies’ armies (AFDL, RPF and 
Ugandan forces). Shortly after the AFDL took power in Kinshasa, the relationship between Kabila 
and Rwanda and Uganda rapidly deteriorated when Kabila decided to expel his Rwandan and 
Ugandan allies in order to structure his own political regime and control of the military without 
any interference in Congolese affairs by Rwanda and Uganda.  
The breaking of this alliance immediately led to a new rebellion by the newly formed 
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD, Congolese Rally for Democracy) in August 
1998. The RCD set up its headquarters in Goma, from where it occupied a third of the national 
territory until it joined the transitional government after the Sun-City agreement in 2002. In 2003 
RCD became a political party, but without any significant political influence, until today.  
At the creation of RCD in 1998, some Hutu leaders in Masisi did not join the rebellion, but 
preferred to ally themselves to Kabila, which allowed a rapprochement between Hutu combatants 
and some Mai-Mai groups (local self-defence militias) and facilitated the formation of a potential 
military force on which Kabila could rely against the RCD. However, this alliance only lasted for 
a while. While the rebels expanded their political, military and economic control in the entire 
eastern DR Congo, the Hutu leaders in Masisi became more and more isolated from the national 
government in Kinshasa (both politically and because of the distance), especially after the 
assassination of Laurent Désiré Kabila in January 2001. Internal disputes between the Hutu 
community leaders led to the formation of two groups. Robert Seninga, Bigembe, Miganda and 
Ngirira as well as Colonel Mugabo decided to attach themselves to RCD whereas Colonel 
Mayanga and his battalion resisted and joined the government’s side. 
During this period, Congo was politically and militarily divided into three parts. One was 
controlled by the RCD supported by Rwanda, the second by the ‘Movement pour la Liberation du 
Congo’ (MLC: Movement for the Liberation of Congo) supported by Uganda, and the third by the 
Government. 
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Map 6 Areas under control of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) 1998-2003 
 
The cease-fire of 1999 prepared the way for the ‘Global Congolese Dialogue’ in South Africa, 
with strong support from the international community, which saw the reunification of the country 
as a priority.  
With the Sun City peace agreement in 2002, which resulted in the formation of a transitional 
government in 2003, one of the crucial points to implement was the ‘Brassage’ operation, which 
consisted of merging the former rebel troops with the national army in a single structured 
command. At that time stakeholders considered this ‘Brassage’ as the end of the armed groups, 
although armed groups in the eastern Congo were excluded from the Sun City talks. To launch the 
‘Brassage’, President Kabila explicitly asked Colonel Mugabo with his troops to join the 
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‘Brassage’ centre located in Mushaki (Masisi). After the ‘Brassage’, only Colonel Mugabo was 
promoted to a higher position in the national army. Many disappointed Hutu fighters withdrew 
from the re-structured army units and returned to their strongholds in several places in Masisi. At 
the same time, Laurent Nkunda, opposed to the presence of FDLR, created the ‘Comité Militaire 
pour la Défense du Peuple’ (CMDP) installed in Kitchanga (Bashali/Masisi) where the majority 
of Tutsi families were living. In order to avoid being seen as solely a protector of the Tutsi 
community, Nkunda created the ‘Synergie Nationale pour la Paix et la Concorde’ (SNPC: National 
Synergy for Peace and Concord) in 2004. This was welcomed by Hutu leaders in Masisi, many of 
whom were disappointed by the government plan to deploy former rebels to other provinces, far 
from North Kivu. Since the message of CNDP was officially to protect the interests of the 
Banyarwanda in general, some important Hutu and Tutsi leaders from Masisi joined Nkunda. One 
year later, in 2005 SNPC was replaced by CNDP with headquarters in Masisi, from where it started 
fighting against the government until 2008 when a cease-fire agreement was signed in Goma.  
The end of the RCD as a rebel movement and its political integration in the transitional government 
in 2003 had led to the reconfiguration of actors and alliances at the local level. The creation of 
CNDP (2005) and PARECO (2007) (Coalition de Résistants Patriotes Congolais) in Masisi 
constituted a shift from the regional dimension to the local, although, at this point, it is difficult to 
identify in the discourse and claims of these armed groups the issues related to land and identity. 
What is clear is the quest for political positions and military ranks. The next section examines the 
political and military survival of the CNDP and PARECO and then identifies the link between the 
new claims and the land, power and identity triangle. 
6.2.1 CNDP, PARECO and the Amani Program  
The ceasefire signed in 2008 led to two major events in the dynamic of armed groups. The first 
event was the surrender of CNDP and PARECO troops to the government military structures and 
the second the arrest of Laurent Nkunda (principal leader of CNDP) by Rwandan authorities on 
20th January 2009. On 21st March 2009, under the auspices of former Nigerian President Obasanjo 
with the diplomatic support of the international community, three ‘Acts of Engagement’ were 
signed at Ihusi Hotel in Goma town as the follow up to the 2008 ceasefire agreement. The first 
was signed between the Congolese Government and armed groups of North Kivu, the second 
between the government and armed groups of South Kivu and the third between the government 
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and CNDP. In reality, the Goma agreements between CNDP and PARECO and other Mai-Mai 
groups from North and South Kivu was rather an agreement of surrender because all the troops 
had already been integrated into the national army in 2008. In this situation, leaders of these armed 
groups could hardly negotiate their demands because they were in a weak position. One of the 
PARECO leaders who signed the Goma agreement put it in this way: 
we were caught in a difficult trap because we were forced to sign under some 
promises by the government of political positions and the recognition of military 
ranks for our officers. This arrangement actually was made possible through a 
political deal between Congolese and Rwandan authorities, without even the 
involvement of the international community. (Interview Goma, III.01.15) 
However, to make this ‘unofficial’ political arrangement, the Congolese authorities suggested to 
the mediators to jointly draft the three ‘Acts of Engagement’, and asked the armed groups’ 
representatives to sign them. According to the above informant, this ‘forced’ integration of former 
rebels in the national army was a great benefit to some of them who got promoted to high ranks 
whereas very little was done for the political cadres. A good number of political leaders who were 
unhappy about this integration could have led to the resurgence of a new rebellion. It was to prevent 
this eventuality that the Goma agreements provided that the Congolese government would create 
a specially funded program to implement the agreements and to prevent any escalation. This 
program was called the Amani program, established by a Presidential Ordinance No. 08/008 of 2nd 
February 2008 for a period of 6 months.  
The Amani program was designed as an executive body in charge of the implementation and 
monitoring of the Nairobi Agreement I of November 2007 between CNDP and the Congolese 
government and of the Goma Acte d’engagement signed on 23rd January 2009. The Nairobi 
Agreement I was about a cease-fire between CNDP troops and the government army (FARDC) 
whereas the Acte d’engagement was about the commitment of different armed groups to surrender 
and to be integrated into the FARDC.  
The aim of the Amani program was to provide conditions for the security, pacification and 
stabilization of North and South Kivu provinces. It had two main executive bodies. At the national 
level, there was the monitoring committee composed of the Minister of the Interior, the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Social 
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Affairs. The second was the Coordination Unit. It was chaired by a coordinator and four deputies, 
each with a technical commission. The Peace and Security Commission, the Pacification and 
Reconciliation Commission, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Commission and the Finance 
and Projects Commission. Besides these commissions, there was a body of international players 
involved in the Amani program which formed a Task Force created in January 2008 and whose 
role was to facilitate the implementation of several projects and the above agreement between 
former armed groups and the government. Members of this Task Force were the United States, 
Belgium, UK, France, Canada, South Africa, the European Union, the UN, the African Union and 
the Southern African Development Committee (SADC). 
The implementation of the Amani program became difficult because of this configuration of actors 
and unclear agenda, also because of the bureaucracy caused by a difficult chain of communication 
between the members of the commissions. For example, one of the priority tasks of the peace and 
security commission was to organize the absorption of the armed groups' troops into the national 
army. However, the execution of this task divided those affected into two different tendencies. 
According to Mararo (2009: 128), the first was of the Mai-Mai armed groups and a faction of 
PARECO who complained that the presidential ordinance (which established the Amani program) 
had appointed the CNDP delegates to the strategic posts in the Amani program, to the detriment 
of the other groups. This tendency also thought that the disarmament of their troops should be 
achieved through negotiation and not by force.  
The second tendency was that of the CNDP's representatives. On the one hand, the CNDP 
demanded that the FDLR should return to Rwanda and the Congolese refugees in Rwanda should 
be assisted to return to DR Congo and, on the other hand, the CNDP demanded higher positions 
in the government and the army while the Congolese Government did not want to give in to these 
demands. In such a complicated coordination, many complaints from members of different 
commissions started to emerge when everything seemed to be stuck. Some delegates from these 
commissions started to denounce the Government’s lack of political will to push the Amani 
program forward. At this point, it is important to remember that the Amani program was based on 
the Acts of Engagement agreement of January 2009. One of the major concerns expressed by 
parties involved in the program was the need to eliminate foreign armed groups present in North 
and South Kivu provinces, notably the FDLR. The first attempt was joint military operations 
against the FDLR called Umoja wetu (in Swahili meaning Our unity) from 20th January to 25th 
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February 2009, involving the Congolese army and Rwandan army in collaboration with the UN 
mission in the DR Congo.  
These operations ended while the Nairobi Agreements I of November 2007 between the 
Government and CNDP was still pending. Not only were CNDP leaders not convinced about the 
results of Umoja wetu operations, the Nairobi agreement of 2007 was only a ceasefire agreement 
without any significant political engagement reflecting the demands of both sides. It was on 23rd 
March 2009 (two months after the Acts of Engagement were signed) and the end of the above 
military operations that the government and CNDP (without other armed groups) signed the Goma 
agreement. The main points in this agreement were (a) the transformation of CNDP into a political 
party (art 1), the release of political prisoners, members of CNDP (art 2), an amnesty for CNDP 
leaders (art 3), the resolution of local conflicts that pit ethnic communities against each other (art 
4) and the return of Congolese refugees still living in neighboring countries (art 6). Disappointment 
increased in the CNDP camp, which accused the government of not implementing the 23rd March 
agreement. As result, René Abandi (representative of CNDP in the Amani program), a most 
important member of one of the key commissions (peace and security), decided to resign, followed 
by some PARECO representatives who also suspended their participation. The culmination came 
in April in 2012 when some ex-CNDP military officers decided to create another rebellion called 
the Movement of 23rd March (M23) demanding the full application of the Goma agreement of 23rd 
March 2009 by the Congolese government. 
Unlike when CNDP was created, many important Hutu leaders in Masisi did not join M23, for two 
main reasons. The first one relates to how M23 started. Several Hutu leaders from Masisi I spoke 
to mentioned that the motivation for the new rebellion and its goals were not clear to them. 
Additionally, they were convinced that compared to previous rebellions, M23 did not have mass 
support from the population and that its political vision was vague. The second reason was the 
national legislative elections of 2011, which had given some Hutu leaders in Masisi an opportunity 
to gain political power peacefully without fighting. Only a very small number of Hutu leaders who 
did not win in elections joined M23. M23 was defeated by the Congolese army supported by UN 
troops in 2013; troops and political cadres are still in refuge in Rwanda and Uganda. The end of 
the RCD as a rebel movement and its political integration in the transitional government in 2003 
had led to the reconfiguration of actors and alliances at the local level, precisely in Masisi. The 
rise of CNDP and PARECO in Masisi allowed, to some extent, to bring the dynamics of actors 
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locally into a broader regional picture of actors that has been emphasized in the literature 
mentioning the Rwandan and Ugandan military support to AFDL, RCD, CNDP and M23. Up to 
this level of analysis, it is nevertheless difficult to identify in the discourse and claims of these 
armed groups the issues related specifically to land and identity. What is clear throughout this 
analysis is the search for political positions and military ranks. The next section examines the place 
of land, power and identity through the claim of Nyatura and APCLS armed groups as well as 
current influential individuals and their networks.   
6.2.2 Nyatura: The quest for land and power in Masisi 
Origin of Nyatura, its aim and the ‘string pullers’ 
Nyatura (whose meaning in Kinyarwanda is beat, kick out, castigate) resulted from two major 
situations experienced by the Hutu community in Masisi. The first incident was when many Hutu 
leaders in Masisi withdrew from CNDP after Laurent Nkunda’s pronouncements in which he 
repeatedly emphasized the protection of the Congolese Tutsi community. This mention of Tutsi 
(in priority over other communities) was not well received by influential Hutu leaders who then 
preferred to stay away from the CNDP movement. The second incident was the Goma conference 
after signing the Acts of Engagement in 2009 followed by the integration of ex-armed groups in 
the Congolese army. According to a former influential leader of PARECO whom I have met: 
this military and political integration in government institutions did not profit the 
ex-PARECO leaders compared to the ex-CNDP. A few PARECO leaders who 
received positions within the army preferred to withdraw from the Amani 
program because of an unfair distribution of political and military posts. 
(interview Goma: III.02.16).  
Although the Hutu elite controls Masisi politically, military and economically, Nyatura still does 
not have a single chain of command. Within Nyatura there are several factions located in different 
villages, each obeying a group of leaders based on where their interests lie, and the links between 
these factions and some leaders are not always politically and ideological stable and coordinated 
(interview supra). Initially, it was a group of young Hutu many of whom were former PARECO 
combatants. They were informally organized in several villages in Masisi, without any particular 
name. According to the interviewee (interview Goma- V.03.16), these young people became 
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actively violent against some owners of large tracts of land in the areas where Hutu were living, 
claiming this was to protect the Hutu. When the Hutu peasants realized that huge tracts of land 
were increasingly being purchased by some individuals (political and economic elites), which 
prevented them accessing land for their own agriculture activities, violent resistance became their 
strategy to force land owners either to leave a piece of land to allow surrounding peasants to 
cultivate it, or to face violent eviction. This is what happened for example, in 2011, when an 
individual purchased a farm in Kaniro (Masisi), whereas this piece of land was at that time 
occupied by many Hutu families who considered it theirs despite the fact that none of them 
possessed any title deed. When the new owner asked those families to leave the land without any 
negotiation, a group of Hutu young men killed more than 200 cows, as a strategy of forcing the 
owner to leave the area.  
A local Cooperative (CAJEL) working in Masisi shared a report with me in which they reported 
that 19 cows were killed in July and 102 in August 2014, and between February and March 2015, 
68 were killed in Kitchanga (Bashali). This strategy of killing cows continues to be used in Masisi 
by unidentified groups. CAJEL senior members suspected this killing to be done by some Nyatura 
and APCLS groups of people, as a strategy to force land owners to negotiate or leave the land. 
However, in some places in Masisi there have been some negotiations whereby some farmers 
provided spaces to peasants who might need land for their survival activities, as a strategy to 
prevent violence. 
Another example of local Hutu resistance is the case of Mwangacucu Hizi International-MHI, a 
company owned by Mr. Mwangacucu, a Tutsi of Masisi who obtained a business licence to exploit 
minerals in Masisi. For many years, MHI has experienced strong resistance from Hutu peasants 
who claim not to recognize the legality of the MHI licence. Tensions between MHI and peasants 
over the mining sites were extremely high until a deal was negotiated between MHI and a local 
cooperative society of miners (COOPERAMMA), represented by Robert Seninga, one of the most 
influential Hutu leaders in Masisi and a member of the provincial parliament, also known as one 
of the key leaders of the Nyatura militia (see chapter one).  
It was only after the 2011elections that some Hutu political leaders wanted to have a strong local 
control, not only to deal with APCLS resistance but also many other Mai-Mai groups in and around 
Masisi. To achieve this, Nyatura started to be organized and structured by some leaders in order 
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to build up a strong constituency in many villages in Masisi. A recent report by UN experts on the 
DR Congo (2017: 11) identified local armed groups operated in Bashali. According to the report, 
these armed groups use the name Nyatura, an umbrella term for most Congolese Hutu militias. 
The three strongest are led by “Colonel” Kasongo Kalamo, “Colonel” Ndaruhutse Kamanzi, also 
known as Domi, and “Lt. Colonel” Muhawenimana Bunombe, also known as John Love. This UN 
report seems to be careful not to give the names of the ‘string pullers’ I identified during my 
interviews, who remotely control local Nyatura commanders. The reason is probably because the 
report is a highly politically sensitive tool based on which, in the past, UN sanctions targeted some 
of the Hutu leaders in higher institutions of the country. What remains tricky at the moment is that 
informal connections between local leaders of Nyatura and those at provincial and national levels 
are not clear to be easily drawn on paper. In addition to these informal connections, the mode of 
operation is also fluid and dynamic. Local leaders are often replaced, locations of troops keep 
changing as well, not only within Nyatura, but likewise within APCLS.  
 
6.2.3 APCLS: the quest for land and customary power in Masisi 
Origin of APCLS, its aim and the ‘string pullers’ 
In the early 1990s when tensions between Hutu and Hunde occurred in Masisi, each side organized 
a self-defence system to protect its people. At that time Hutu leaders created a small group of 
resistance against the coalition of Hunde and Nyaga under the name of ‘Wakombozi’ (Liberators) 
in which a young man called Janvier Karairi emerged and later on, with significant support from 
Mai-Mai groups from Walikale Territoire. In 1996, when the AFDL rebellion started, Janvier 
Karairi joined the AFDL Army as a fighter on Kabila’s side. In 1998 when the RCD rebellion was 
created with strong support from Rwanda against the Kabila Government, Karairi deserted from 
the army and started to organize local Hunde peasants in a militia (Mai-Mai) in Masisi against 
Hutu and Tutsi, considered by Hunde as Rwandan citizens.  
When the operation of brassage described earlier (integrating former rebel combatants into a more 
structured national army) started in 2003 (following the Sun-City agreement), RCD, PARECO and 
all Mai-Mai groups in North Kivu gathered for training and briefing in Mushaki (Masisi) before 
being deployed in different provinces. However, Karairi soon became unhappy about the situation, 
and left the operation to return to his headquarters in Lukweti (Masisi). In December 2008, after 
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signing the Acts of Engagement during the Goma conference between the Government and 
different armed groups operating in eastern Congo, PARECO, CNDP and other Mai-Mai groups 
agreed to end the fighting and integrate into the national army through mixage (same operation as 
brassage in 2003). Karairi refused to sign this peace deal. This was the beginning of his militia 
group dropping the name of Mai-Mai and taking that of APCLS. Karairi’s main argument was that 
both the mixage operation and the Goma agreement favored Hutu and Tutsi at the expense of the 
‘autochthonous’ groups of Masisi (audio record of Karairi’s speech officially launching the 
APCLS). In February 2011, Karairi addressed an official letter to the UN Secretary General 
representative in Congo and copied different embassies saying that “we inform you that APCLS 
will never allow to live under the Rwandan and western countries’ neo-colonialism, and decided 
to protect the population at any cost…” In a public audio declaration of January 2012, one can 
hear Karairi arguing that “the objective of APCLS is to fight against the countries that invaded our 
country which are Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and their western supporters, in order to protect 
our sovereign and prosperous Congo” (APCLS audio record).  
In the same way as NYATURA, the Hunde community is not homogeneous in terms of political 
and ideology interests. Indeed, there are several trends and leaders with different visions. What 
seems to be common for all Hunde in Masisi is the idea of sharing the same culture, language and 
customary rites, which remain central to all ideological trends. However, when it comes to whether 
APCLS is a federating force that represents the interests of all Hunde, the views of Hunde leaders 
are divergent. For example, the Vice Governor of North Kivu is a Hunde, but his influence within 
the entire community is not clear, though his links with the APCLS leadership are highly 
suspicious. 
 Even though Karairi is still seen by some analysts as a defender of the Hunde community, this 
vision of Karairi and APCLS is not shared by all Hunde leaders, nor even well known by Hunde 
peasants in Masisi. An informant who is a Hunde youth leader put it this way: 
I do not know what Karairi fights for. When he decided to create a militia, very 
few Hunde leaders were aware of it. It might be his own initiative, for his own 
ambition because he was promised by the government to recognize his rank as 
general of brigade. We, Hunde, at the beginning of his militia we did not 
understood his ideology. As a matter of fact, every time the Hunde populations 
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are killed by Hutu militias, Karairi did nothing to protect Hunde despite the fact 
that he is armed (Interview Goma, V.03.14) 
However, although it is difficult to say that APCLS is the protector of Hunde interests, currently 
Karairi remains the only Hunde military leader who continues to fight in the name of protecting 
the ancestral land and taking it back from the Hutu and Tutsi, seen by many Hunde leaders as 
foreigners. At the political level, APCLS is not structured and influential members are not 
sufficiently known. Nonetheless, it remains an important network for the Hunde community 
although many Hunde leaders with whom I discussed APCLS were very careful and sometimes 
vague in their answers about Karairi and APCLS. While Karairi is the military leader, important 
others are Bakungu Mitondeke and Feller Rutayitshirwa. In 2004, Mitondeke was the Vice-
Governor of North Kivu, in charge of political and administrative questions, when Serufuli (a very 
important Hutu figure) was Governor. In February 2012, Mitondeke was arrested at his residence 
in Goma Town by public security forces, accused of trafficking weapons to supply APCLS in 
Masisi. Erneste Kyaviro, a spokesman of the provincial government, had this to say on radio 
Okapi: ‘We could see with our own eyes eight types of assault rifles AK 47 assault rifles and two 
Belgian manufacturing of the Fal brand, and there were plenty of Mai-Mai elements in his 
residency…’. Mitondeke was transferred to Kinshasa where he was judged and jailed for one year. 
Later on, he was released, and today he lives in Kinshasa. Although Mitondeke prefers to stay in 
Kinshasa, his influence in Masisi is still important within the Hunde community. 
Another leader is the current Vice-Governor of North Kivu, Feller Rutayitshirwa. In 2011 
Rutayitshirwa was cited by the media as the sender of a truck (car) that was arrested by the 
Congolese intelligence service (ANR and T2) around Bihambwe, which is a village in Masisi. 
Apart from Mitondeke and Rutayitshirwa, there is a Hunde business elite based in Goma, but with 
less political influence. It is not even clear whether or not this elite group plays any significant role 
in Masisi. Likewise, the Mwami Bashali and Mwami Nicolas (of Bahunde Chieftaincy) only hold 
a moral and ideological authority, and not political influence compared to the three Big Men. 
Compared to Nyatura, APCLS operates on a lower scale. Although its headquarters used to be 
Lukweti, Karairi and his troops often move across villages at the border with Walikale Territoire. 
At the provincial and national level, APCLS does not have a significant network. Even though 
Vice-Governor Rutayitshirwa in Goma or Mitondeke in Kinshasa are said to be supporting Karairi, 
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it is still not clear whether they do it only for Karairi and APCLS or the whole Hunde community 
interests in general. The lines of dependency between different Hunde leaders I met and the Hunde 
peasants I spoke to in Masisi and Goma remain unclear and, if there are connections, the degree 
of informality does not allow them to be grasped.  
6.3 The rise of ‘string pullers’: From ‘Tous Pour la Paix’ (TPD) to date 
During the RCD administration (1998-2003), two local associations emerged in Goma City, 
motivated by the need for rapprochement between Hutu and Tutsi communities of both Rutshuru 
and Masisi Districts. Damien Bivegete, a Tutsi from Rutshuru, managed the first association 
(without a specific name). The aim was to promote dialogue and solidarity amongst Hutu and 
Tutsi. The second one, the ‘Association des Intellectuels’ was also a reconciliation initiative 
between Hutu and Tutsi intellectuals and it targeted mainly politicians and businessmen. Eugene 
Serufuli, Bertin Kirivika (both Hutu), Alexis Makabuza and Albert Semana (both Tutsi) were 
among the founders, together with about 15 other members. After consultation between Hutu and 
Tutsi involved in this initiative, the idea of merging efforts and working together pushed Serufuli 
to convince Bivegete to create one single organization. This took the name ‘Tous pour la Paix et 
le Développement’ (TPD) (interview Goma V.03.16) 
What is new in this dynamic is that the influential Hutu founders of TPD were not among the group 
of Hutu I mentioned earlier, who fought against RCD, and they were not even members of 
PARECO. I use the example of TPD as the trajectory through which current Hutu elites emerged 
and who to date constitute a strong network at many scales. It was on October 10th, 1998 that TPD 
was founded in Goma. Alexis Makabuza became chairman, Eugène Serufuli, deputy chairman, 
Célestin Nvunabandi secretary, and Damien Bivegete became an adviser.  
During the first assembly of TPD, one of the priority projects decided by the coordination body of 
TPD was the mobilization and repatriation of Rwandan refugees, especially FDLR combatants. 
Serufuli played a significant role in this project under the label of TPD. Hundreds of FDLR 
combatants were repatriated and Rwandan authorities seemed to see in Serufuli a potential 
collaborator in the near future (see Tull 2005: 179-184). One of the TPD founder members in 
Goma revealed:  
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at the time Serufuli was the president of TPD, he was very committed in the DDR 
program that was targeting FDLR combatants. He was very much trusted by 
FDLR to the point that he convinced many of them to demobilize and return to 
Rwanda. Rwanda authorities appreciated his courage and collaboration. When 
the Governor Kanyamuhanga died, Serufuli was appointed by Rwandan 
authorities as the new Governor of North Kivu. (interview Goma V.03.16)  
However, the official mission of TPD was not to be taken for granted. Some observers suspected 
its hidden agenda: “year after year, the TPD revealed itself to be the last card for Kigali in this part 
of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Indeed, it is Kigali which, in what the UN panel 
calls the ‘Rwanda-linked network’, dictates the policies and actions of the top leaders of the TPD. 
These leaders work as Kigali’s mere tools whose margin of manoeuvres is too limited” (Mararo, 
2004: 136). 
Moreover, the creation of TPD did not only coincide with the period of diplomatic tensions 
between Rwanda and the DRC, but also followed closely on the creation of RCD just two months 
earlier. It is important to remember here that the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement between RCD and 
the Government in Kinshasa in 1999 was supposed to be followed by the final agreement of Sun 
City in 2002. This new national and regional dynamic changed the configuration of the political 
and military landscape in the eastern DR Congo and increased Rwandan concerns in Kivu, 
especially about the presence of FDLR. With the expected formation of a government of transition 
resulting from the post-Sun City agreement, it was not clear whether the new Congolese 
Government would cooperate with Rwanda after the RCD no longer controlled the Kivu provinces. 
As such the preparation of a plan ‘B’ was somehow on the Rwandan agenda, with Serufuli being 
the central actor. 
When the former governor of North Kivu, Gafundi Kanyamuhanga, died in August 2000, a 
Rwandan delegation led by the Foreign Affairs Minister, Charles Murigande went to Goma. At 
the funeral ceremonies, Murigande said in his speech in the presence of media ‘… do not worry, 
we will give you another good Governor…’. A few days later, applications for the Governor 
position were decided in favor of Serufuli, who simultaneously became the President of TPD. The 
Tutsi elite was sure to gain the post as they hoped to be supported by Rwandan Tutsi authorities, 
as was the case with Kanyamuhanga . One of the interviewees, who was amongst the applicants, 
revealed that ‘there was no consensus amongst Tutsi to propose one candidate’. Another reason 
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could be the continuation of TPD’s work that Serufuli started in 1998. By choosing Serufuli, 
Murigande’s promise in Goma was fulfilled. Although Serufuli has become a ‘strongman’ of North 
Kivu, numerous Tutsi quit TPD, accusing it of being exclusively a Hutu network. With the creation 
of a CNPC in 2004 and CNDP in 2005, many Tutsi and some Hutu decided to join Nkunda. This 
seriously weakened TPD and noticeably reduced its local influence.  
Another factor that weakened TPD was the United Nations Security Council update in July 2011 
of a list of individuals and entities subject to a travel ban and assets freeze, imposed by 
paragraphs 13 and 15 of resolution 1596 (2005), as renewed by paragraph 3 of resolution 
1896 (2009) and paragraph 3 of resolution 1952 (2010). The TPD was mentioned for having 
distributed weapons and munitions to local militias. Serufuli was on the list, followed by Robert 
Seninga and Bertin Kirivita, today the supposed top leaders of Nyatura armed group. Nevertheless, 
the provincial elections of 2006 were a new political opportunity to be seized by these leaders 
whose mandates remain valid until now. The political influence of these leaders also profoundly 
changed the local landscape of administrative power, especially in Masisi. 
When he was Governor of North Kivu (2000-2007), Serufuli accelerated the strategy of appointing 
new agents in the local administration. When RCD started the war in 1998, many local traditional 
and administrative chiefs left Masisi for security reasons. To ensure continuity in local 
administration, Serufuli decided to replace those chiefs. For example, in Bashali-Mokoto, people 
designated by the RCD administration replaced 13 of the 15 customary leaders. Where Hunde 
customary leaders were not replaced, the RCD often appointed a Hutu to be an assistant, but later 
on most of them became the de facto authorities. This strategy was followed by the creation of 
‘Poste d’Encadrement Administratif’ (CPA). In 27 Postes, 19 local chiefs are Hutu. Hunde 
traditional leaders have been complaining in vain since then. Although the circular by the Minister 
of Internal Affairs issued in February 2015 suspended all ‘chefs de postes’, nothing has changed 
on the ground so far.  
Besides administrative and political power, customary power was also targeted by Hutu local 
leaders. An example is Bashali Chieftaincy where both Erasto and Nzabirinda have been claiming 
to be traditional chiefs. During the period of RCD control of Masisi, Erasto proclaimed himself as 
a traditional Hutu leader in Masisi and received considerable support from RCD and CNDP and 
even M23. With this support, Erasto has been pressuring the Mwami Bashali (the traditional chief 
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of the Hunde community). Attempts by top RCD and CNDP leaders to resolve this conflict of 
leadership between Erasto and chief Bashali have failed. Nzabirinda went to court against Mwami 
Bashali, and claimed that, since colonial times, the Chieftaincy of Bashali was and must remain 
an entity under the authority of Hutu and not Hunde (see chapter two).  
During an interview (V.12.15) in early 2015 with a former active member of RCD and CNDP, it 
was revealed that Nzabirinda won the court case against Mwami Bashali, but Mwami Bashali 
denied Nzabirinda's victory, which he regarded as a political conspiracy against the Hunde 
chieftaincy. Nzabirinda went to Kinshasa to meet Bizima Karaha, the former Minister of Internal 
Affairs between 1996-1998. Unfortunately, Karaha refused to sign the document that recognized 
Nzabirinda as the Chief of Bashali Chieftaincy, for two reasons: firstly, by signing the official 
recognition, tensions would have occurred between Hunde and Hutu as in 1993. Secondly, Karaha 
wanted to avoid the pressure from his own ethnic community, the ‘Banyamulenge’ (Tutsi 
community of South Kivu) that was also claiming, and is still claiming, official recognition of 
Mulenge as an autonomous district (Territoire). Despite that, Nzabirinda proclaimed himself 
Mwami of Bashali Kayembe whereas Erasto became Mwami of Bashali Mokoto. During the 
period when Masisi was under the control of CNDP and M23, Erasto and Nzabirinda were very 
close to the Tutsi leaders, which was the reason that they lost the support of the Hutu leaders of 
Masisi, notably Seninga, Kirivita and Serufuli. Since the failure of CNDP in 2009 and M23 in 
2013, Erasto and Nzabirinda live as refugees in the city of Gisenyi in Rwanda, although they still 
have strong social connections with many Hutu families in Masisi. This is regardless of the fact 
that their political influence in current dynamics on other levels (provincial and national) is weak. 
During the interview (Goma- I.01.15) with Mwami Bashali, it came out that these claims to Bashali 
as a Banyarwanda chieftaincy raised by Erasto and Nzabirinda did not receive the support of either 
CNDP or RCD authorities because these authorities were more interested in the control of a large 
part of Masisi, not only Bashali. Indeed, as I stated above, the strategy of extending influence 
beyond Bashali was evident in the nomination of Hutu chef de postes by Governor Serufuli. On 
the other side, when I met Erasto and Nzabirinda in Gisenyi (Rwanda) both were still convinced 
that they will continue to fight for their rights in Bashali. Today one can say that since Erasto and 
Nzabirinda are living abroad without any political activity in DR Congo and without any 
significant connection with Nyatura, it may take longer to see them emerging in Masisi.   
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For the Hutu elite that has political and economic control in Masisi, it does not suggest that it is 
ideologically united and economically equal. Obviously, even though the trio Seninga-Kirivita-
Serufuli is the most powerful, Hutu leaders in general, beyond Masisi, are divided into two major 
political forces. The first is the Parti National pour le Développement Intégral (PANADI), which 
is a Hutu intellectual elite group that emerged with relatively strong local support in the 1990s. In 
the 2011 general elections, PANADI won only two seats in the national parliament, while none of 
their candidates was elected to the provincial parliament. This is probably because most of the 
members live in Kinshasa, and have lost contact with the base, especially during the rebellions. 
That said, the political challenger to PANADI remains Union des Congolais pour le Progrès 
(UCP), a political party that Serufuli created with Seninga and Kirivita, which has succeeded in 
weakening PANADI. Not only is UCP strong in Masisi and Rutshuru Districts, more importantly, 
it is also a major ally of the presidential political coalition around Kabila (Majorité Présidentielle) 
in both Territories and continues to work closely with him. 
In order to maintain the alliance between the above leaders and President Kabila, the elections in 
2011 (see table 6 below) became an occasion for Hutu leaders to win seats in the national 
parliament, besides others who were already members of the provincial parliament since 2006. 
Their presence in provincial and national parliaments in addition to others who were appointed in 
different ministries and other governmental companies was a political asset to reinforce their 
constituencies at the local level while acting at provincial and national level.  
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Table 6 Political parties in Masisi during provincial elections (2006) and national elections 
(2011) 
Year Name Political affiliation 
2006 Seninga Robert (Hutu) Union des Congolais pour le Progrès (UCP) 
 Kirivita Bertin (Hutu)  Union des Congolais pour le Progrès (UCP) 
Sebishimbo (Hutu)  Parti National pour le Développement Intégral 
(PANADI) 
Banda (Hutu)   Mouvement de libération du Congo (MLC) 
Pilipili Mulemeli (Hunde) Convention des démocrates chrétiens (CDC) 
2011 Mwangacucu Hizi (Tutsi) Congrès Nationale pour la Défense du Peuple 
(CNDP) 
 Shomwa Mongera (Tembo) Démocratie Chrétienne Fédéraliste-Convention des 
fédéralistes pour la démocratie chrétienne 
DCF/COFEDEC 
 Ayobangira Sanvura (Hutu) Union des Congolais pour le Progrès (UCP) 
 Mukingi Oswald (Hutu) Union des Congolais pour le Progrès (UCP) 
 Gacuruzi Pandi (Hutu) Parti National pour le Développement Intégral 
(PANADI) 
 Safari Nganizi (Hutu) Coalition de Résistants Patriotes Congolais 
(PARECO) 
 Mugiraneza Jules (Hutu) Parti National pour le Développement Intégral 
(PANADI) 
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The aim of the above sections was to review the key episodes of different wars from which 
powerful individuals emerged, became ‘string puller’ and continue to operate across different 
levels. This was shown through the analysis of context and conditions of emergence of armed 
groups, organizations and political parties. Since 2011, Serufuli and Seninga succeeded in 
establishing the Union des Congolais pour le Progrès (UCP) in both Masisi and Rutshuru as a 
strategic political party that the majority ruling parties around President Kabila can rely on. 
Seninga, apart from being an elected member of the provincial parliament (North Kivu), is a 
founder (with Serufuli and other influential Hutu) of COOPERAMMA (the artisanal mining 
cooperative I described in chapter five) based in Rubaya (Masisi). The ‘unofficial’ control they 
have on Nyatura armed group is a key asset to both secure their economic activities such as mining 
exploitation, but also to make sure APCLS and other Mai-Mai groups do not expand their control 
to where the Big Men’s interests are located. It is with this complex picture of actors and networks 
in Masisi that I intend to analyze how peacebuilding interventions have dealt with conflict at the 
local level.   
The next section discusses an example of a conflict transformation program that was implemented 
in Bashali (Masisi) to scrutinize how big men, peacebuilding interventions and the issue of scale 
interact in order to understand the failure of peacebuilding. 
 6.4 Conflict Transformation in Bashali and the ‘local trap’ 
As discussed in chapter four, when state-building and peacebuilding organisations intervened in 
DR Congo, the first concern was primarily to deal with state institutions’ reinforcement, notably 
through elections and reforms in several sectors. At the beginning of the political transition in 
2003, a delegation of human rights and peacekeeping experts from American NGOs had visited 
the DR Congo to analyse the political situation in order to find ways the US and UN agencies 
could help the DR Congo to manage the transition and the post-electoral state-building process. 
One can read in this report that  
the DRC is now struggling to find its way out of war, and to make the transition 
to a stable, democratic and more prosperous future. Against a backdrop of many 
other urgent foreign policy crises, this report argues for greater American efforts 
to support this transition. The United States, its friends and allies need to increase 
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their diplomatic, security and economic support for the region and the UN’s 
peacekeeping operations in the DRC. (Shattuck et al, 2003:4).  
This international focus on the macro level viewed the armed conflicts in eastern DR Congo as 
direct consequences of the state’s weakness, whereas the local dynamics of these conflicts have 
become the focus of some peacebuilding NGOs. While chapter four focused on the process of 
constructing the ‘local’ by peacebuilding NGOs, I demonstrated in chapter five that the ‘local’ 
issues (land, power and identity) are multi-scalar, connected to other levels and involve multiple 
actors and networks who are still ignored by peacebuilding interventions. This section uses an 
example of a conflict transformation in Bashali implemented by Life & Peace Institute (LPI, an 
international peacebuilding organization based in Sweden) in partnership with a Congolese 
organization, ‘Action Solidaire pour la Paix’ (ASP), to highlight the extent to which the ‘local’ is 
more complex than it seems. First, I will introduce LPI and ASP as well as the background of the 
project.  
6.4.1 Presentation of Life & Peace Institute (LPI) and Action Solidaire pour la Paix (ASP) 
6.4.1.1 Presentation of Life & Peace Institute (LPI): Strategy and approach  
Life & Peace Institute is an international and ecumenical center based in Uppsala, Sweden, that 
has been working with peace and conflict issues since the 1980s. LPI was founded in 1985 as a 
result of a major international conference held in 1983 which was a response by the churches to 
the conflicts in the world, especially in light of the nuclear threat. Since then, LPI has carried out 
programs for conflict transformation in a variety of countries, conducted research, and produced 
numerous publications on nonviolent conflict transformation and the role of religion in conflict 
and peacebuilding. The main focus of LPI’s work has been on Africa, with the Horn of Africa 
Program being established and well-known in the early 1990s. The Institute has strengthened the 
capacity of a substantial number of civil society organizations to address the conflicts in their own 
context, in some of the most difficult and war-torn countries (information taken from LPI’s official 
webpage, www.life-peace.org). 
Community-based peacebuilding of civil society in peace processes forms a basis for LPI’s 
programs. Research also plays an essential role in the nonviolent conflict transformation approach, 
both as a precondition for understanding the context of engagement and as a means for conflict 
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transformation. While LPI’s partners include a large variety of civil society organizations, 
depending on the context of engagement in the different country programs, the Institute puts 
special emphasis on engaging in work or dialogue with faith-based organizations. LPI’s strategic 
priorities focus on three main points. One is civil society support and engagement. This is achieved 
through workshops, formal training and joint research initiatives. LPI supports its local partners in 
becoming effective agents for conflict transformation. Two, LPI is committed to policy work and 
awareness-raising by identifying key decision-makers and change agents, and three is the cross-
fertilization of conflict transformation theory and practice. Here, LPI engages in knowledge 
transfer and making knowledge available to its partners, peacebuilding practitioners and 
researchers.  
LPI’s nonviolent conflict transformation work is based on an understanding that conflict is a 
natural part of societies. There is a potential for both constructive and destructive change. It also 
builds on the premise that peace can only be achieved through the active involvement of the local 
communities themselves. LPI’s work, with a research focus, is carried out mainly through 
engagement with, and support to, civil society organizations. 
6.4.1.2 LPI and Participatory Action Research (PAR) in practice  
Participatory Action Research (PAR) is the privileged methodological approach applied to conflict 
transformation which LPI uses in most of its programs. In theory, LPI believes that the PAR 
process is participatory in that all actors concerned by a conflict are involved in learning how to 
address the problematic issues in a constructive manner. By applying the PAR, LPI assumes that 
the conflict transformation process is designed as research, because emphasis is placed upon 
empowering parties to a conflict to learn how to analyze complex problems and generate solutions 
that are viable in the long term. LPI sees the research process as an action-oriented in two important 
ways: First, the research process is a transformation of destructive conflict dynamics into 
constructive, co-operative inquiry. Second, the process includes a collaborative design of action 
plans to ameliorate issues identified by the community as problematic. 
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In order to address the conflict issues through the conflict transformation approach, LPI supports 
local partner organizations in different country programs becoming centers for conflict 
transformation. LPI helps build the capacity of its partners to become skilled at guiding their 
communities through PAR processes. In so doing, all parties involved in a destructive or 
intractable conflict are supposed to be engaged in a process of analyzing the multiplicity of 
interpretations of conflict causes and consequences, and the identification of constructive actions 
for the future. 
In the DR Congo, LPI’s program has its office in Bukavu in the province of South Kivu. Building 
upon 15 years of experience in the region, LPI supports and works with Congolese peacebuilding 
civil society partners in Bukavu (South Kivu) and Goma (North Kivu). LPI and its partners’ work 
in the DR Congo relies primarily, but not solely, on Participatory Action Research (PAR) 
methodologies in which the communities that are part of and affected by a given conflict engage 
in the identification of the underlying issues of a conflict and work together with others to resolve 
their differences non-violently and build constructive relationships. 
LPI launched its DR Congo programs in 2002 in response to an analysis of the situation which it 
conducted at the request of the Sweden International Development Agency (SIDA). The 
programmatic approach and theory emerged out of the realization that while conflicts in eastern 
DR Congo occur at different levels (from the local to the national, regional and international), 
peacebuilding responses focused on the national and sometimes regional aspects of the situation 
in DR Congo, while neglecting the local nature of the conflicts. LPI and its partners therefore work 
to transform local conflicts that are often centered around land, identity and power at the 
community level. LPI and its partners promote interethnic community dialogues, support existing 
platforms or help communities to establish new formal and informal structures that allow for non-
violent transformation of conflicts among communities. It is in this strategy of supporting civil 
society organizations that ‘Action Solidaire pour la Paix’ (ASP) was chosen by LPI as a partner to 
implement a conflict transformation using PAR in Bashali (Masisi). 
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6.4.1.3 ASP and the Conflict Transformation (CT) project in Bashali 
Before I introduce ASP, the context of its creation is important for this study. To better explain 
this, I begin by giving the background of the Community Action for Rural Integrated Development 
(ACODRI). ACODRI is a Congolese development NGO. It was created in 1989 by 12 peasant 
cooperatives that wanted to come together to promote agricultural activities in Masisi. Thus, 
ACODRI was created as a platform for the co-ordination of these cooperatives and its headquarters 
were established in Kitchanga in Bashali. Subsequently, tensions between the ethnic communities 
of Masisi in the early 1990s and later on the two Congolese wars of 1996-1997 and 1998-2003 had 
a negative impact on the social and economic life conditions of the population of North Kivu and 
Masisi in particular. 
As I explained in chapter four, the end of the second Congolese war and the beginning of the 
government of transition provided an opportunity for international actors to intervene in the DR 
Congo. Peacebuilding NGOs are some of these actors and specifically they wanted to deal with 
conflict at the community level. I argued in chapter four that the process of constructing the ‘local’ 
led these NGOs to rely on Congolese organizations in order to reach communities at the local level. 
It is in this process that ACODRI created ASP as an independent organization that could be taken 
by an international NGOs as partner. Hence ASP was created in 2008 in Goma (North Kivu) after 
the promise of support by LPI. Simply put, ASP was created in a hurry without any strategic plan. 
It was meant to become (as well as other local organizations in South Kivu) a professional center 
for conflict transformation. The first deal after signing the partnership was to conduct a 
participatory action research in Bashali as part of the LPI’s conflict transformation project.  
Between 2008 and 2009, Action Solidaire pour la Paix (ASP) launched a context analysis to 
identify the dynamics of conflicts in Bashali and to understand the ways local communities are 
affected and how these conflicts can be positively transformed. Based on the report of this context 
analysis, LPI and ASP agreed to design a research project to be implemented in Bashali.  
In 2010, a Participatory-Action Research (PAR) was launched to identify the main factors that 
drive violence in Bashali. The research’s report explains the conditions under which conflicts in 
Bashali emerged by focusing on the immigration of Banyarwanda in Masisi and ways in which 
this arrival has changed the relations of power and economic rights between immigrants and the 
‘autochthonous’ communities. The second aspect of the report is the land scarcity due to the 
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population density which sets pastoralists and farmers against each other around contested limits; 
and third, the overlapping land tenure systems in which state institutions are opposed to the 
customary authorities. This PAR’s report also identified categories of actors involved in the 
Bashali conflict. The first category is the cattle owners (pastoralists) against farmers, the second is 
the local militias, which function as self-defence forces confronting each other on the issues of 
identity, land access and political power.  
Emphasizing the participatory dimension of the PAR during the research process, ASP collected 
data from 900 participants, located in several places in Bashali: Mwesso, Kitshanga and Nyamitaba 
and in the cities of Goma, Kinshasa, Gisenyi and Kigali. These participants were actively involved 
in the process on behalf of their respective ethnic communities (Hunde, Hutu, and Tutsi). Other 
participants came from different civil society organizations from Goma and Bashali, as well as the 
political and administrative authorities. With the help of these participants ASP organized a series 
of intracommunity dialogues to discuss the progressive results of the PAR in each of the above 
three ethnic communities. ASP’s strategy was to organize a wider intercommunity meeting in a 
form of round-table in which these communities would agree on the key findings of the PAR 
process. At the beginning of 2013, ASP convinced the above participants to nominate a few groups 
of delegates who will represent their communities at the round table.  
From 5th to 8th August 2013, ASP organized a round-table in Goma, gathering 45 delegates from 
Hutu, Hunde and Tutsi communities and 5 customary chiefs to discuss and comment on the PAR 
findings collected since 2009. This round-table aimed at sharing the key findings of the PAR 
research and enabling the delegates to set up mechanisms for positive transformation of conflicts. 
In organizing this round-table ASP had expected, specifically, to bring delegates together to have 
a common understanding of land conflicts that have divided ‘local communities’ for many 
decades. The main themes or issues for discussion were (a) ‘the unequal distribution of land 
between farmers and large land owners, and how the gap can be addressed’, (b) small-scale 
pastoralists and landless farmers, (c) ‘local power (customary authority versus state institutions) 
and land management’. One of the outcomes of the round-table agreements was the 
implementation of local committees ‘Comités Inter-communautaires de transformation des 
conflits-CITC’ composed of ethnic community members in different villages in Bashali (Masisi). 
The CITC were designed and expected to be a space for dialogue and conflict resolution around 
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the above three themes. Another outcome was to write an action plan containing different phases 
and activities around 23 points and 7 resolutions as an ‘Act of Engagement’ to be implemented by 
the CITC.  
ASP was convinced that community delegates and CITC would not alone successfully implement 
the action plan without the contribution and the participation of ‘string pullers’ who have direct 
interests in Bashali (and in Masisi in general). Some of the ‘string pullers’ attended the round-table 
(for example Serufuli and Seninga) but were invited in their official positions, some as 
Parliamentarians and others as Ministers. Surprisingly, none of the 23 points of the action plan 
specifically tells how these committees are going to engage with the ‘string pullers’ of Masisi, 
despite their presence in the dialogue. Even the 7 points of the ‘acte d’engagement’ signed at the 
end of the round-table do not mention any engagement from these ‘string pullers’ in terms of 
concrete actions to be taken to address the conflicts. Moreover, not only were the Big Men not 
involved in different phases of the PAR process from the beginning until the Round-table took 
place, basically, they were there only as guests and not necessarily as stakeholders. The assumption 
of LPI from the beginning was that ASP would succeed in identifying key actors among local 
communities and these actors would be willing to make the project successful. What happened 
was that ASP selected different representatives of ethnic groups in Bashali and asked them to 
choose themselves delegates, including ‘string pullers’ living outside Bashali. Both ASP and 
delegates failed in convincing ‘string pullers’ (some of whom attended the round-table) to take 
concrete decisions towards conflict resolution. At the last day of the round-table LPI and ASP 
came up with the idea of a follow-up mechanism that could bring Big Men on board.  
To follow this assumption, LPI and ASP created in the aftermath of the Round-Table, a mechanism 
called ‘Groupe de Plaidoyer pour la Paix à Masisi-GPPM). Again, the hope of LPI and ASP was 
that ‘string pullers’ would voluntarily take responsibility for the GPPM leadership and would make 
it operational, using their relationships and connections with local community representatives. A 
few months later, the GPPM was established in Kinshasa. Not only it did not include key Big Men, 
it had not been established either in Goma or in Masisi where CITC are located. Technically, the 
local community representatives (through CITC) initially supposed to work closely with GPPM 
found themselves more than 2000km away in Kinshasa without any communication or meeting, 
even occasionally. It seemed that LPI and ASP had overestimated the capacity of the CITC to deal 
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with the complexity of the whole process, not only in terms of conflict management, but also and 
especially the ability to engage with Big Men. Clearly, the assumed influence of local communities 
on ‘string pullers’ was proven very weak and limited. This was confirmed within a group 
discussion held with ASP staff members in Goma, who declared that: 
in reality, we have convinced local community representatives to engage with 
more influential individuals (tireurs des ficelles- ‘string pullers’) who have 
political and economic interests in Masisi. But we have realized later that 
although ‘string pullers’ are very important in the process, they are also part of 
the problem. Most of them are big landowners and hold high political positions 
in the government and have strong connections with armed groups. It was naïve 
to think that they would collaborate with people (local communities) whose 
demands are articulated around land, identity and power questions. For sure, these 
Big Men cannot work against their own interests’ (Group interview Goma, 
VI.03.16-) 
As well as the challenge of involving ‘string pullers’ in the process, LPI is no longer able to fund 
ASP in order to facilitate a follow-up of CITC and GPPM activities. Not only is the GPPM not 
operational (members do not meet), ASP seems to be at the end of the PAR process, and will be 
abandoned by LPI because of the lack of funds to continue the project. However, according to ASP 
and LPI, CITC are supposed to continue - assuming that CITC are community-based initiatives - 
even when there is no external financial support. During fieldwork in October 2014, I visited a 
CITC in Bashali to discuss the issues of dealing with conflict transformation. Two major problems 
emerged from the visit and discussion in Bashali. The first problem is that, although the whole 
process of PAR involved ‘local communities’ and raised collective expectations in terms of 
solutions to the causes of violent conflicts, in the present situation neither ASP nor CITC are 
carrying out a concrete and effective program that can change ‘string pullers’ strategies. Given 
that these ‘string pullers’ are seen as the ‘stakeholders’ in the issues (land, political power, armed 
groups, natural resources) which have been put at the centre of the conflict by the PAR report, they 
would hardly, for example, agree to share the land they legally own with the population that feels 
dispossessed by some of these ‘string pullers’.  
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The second problem, linked to the first one, is that Big Men are highly placed politically in public 
institutions. With this position, they would prefer not to be portrayed as conflict-associated actors 
while representing the state. This is what happened during the round-table in Goma. Some of the 
Big Men who participated were invited as state representatives, and clearly not as the real ‘string 
pullers, which provided them a comfortable reason to participate without signing any engagement 
suggested by ASP and LPI. This multi-faced character of ‘string pullers’ (being both string pullers 
and state representatives) is what has mainly been challenging this conflict transformation process 
and will continue to do so unless there is an effective strategy to deal with them. Subsequently, 
some of the ‘string pullers’ I met informally during the research fieldwork showed an apparent 
mistrust of several projects implemented by international peacebuilding organisations on the 
community level. According to ‘string puller’,  
these organisations contribute to fuel tension when they confront us with the 
peasants, without even understanding the whole complexity of conflict. They 
constantly see us as the threat to conflict resolution and as manipulators of 
community members’ (interview Goma, III.02.15).  
Although there is a connection between ‘string pullers’ and some members of CITC, this 
connection does not have to do with the PAR action-plan or any other engagement resulted from 
the PAR process. Even the committee members of CITC do not believe much in the PAR outcome. 
This view was clearly shared by the Chairperson of the CITC whom I met in (Kilolirwe) Bashali:  
they (LPI and ASP) asked us to create a committee to solve our conflicts. Afterwards, 
they abandoned us. We do not have an office, no paper, no communication and 
transportation means! How can we affectively deal with such complex issues without 
money? Also, those ‘watu wa juu’ [people at higher level, in Swahili] who are 
politicians and owners of big plots of land do not live here with us. They are in Goma 
and Kinshasa and elsewhere and we do not know how to deal with them’ (group 
discussion, Kilolirwe, VI.11.14) 
The counter-productive effect in setting up CITC based on the assumption that community 
members ought to solve ‘their own’ conflicts, is that the creation of CITC based on members’ 
ethnic group has not only reinforced the existing collective consciousness of the ethnic boundaries 
among communities and all the political implications associated with ethnic identity, it has also 
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simplified the entire conflict system to ethnic rivalries. Although the PAR’s report provides a 
relatively nuanced conflict analysis to avoid the ‘ethnicization’ of the conflict and actors, ASP and 
LPI have fallen into the ethnicization trap by setting up CITC based on the ethnic group of the 
committee members. However, this is not an isolated or a new misconception related to ASP and 
LPI; this view of community as ethnic representation has been - and still is - shared by other 
international peacebuilding organisations, influenced largely by imported development 
approaches driven by donors’ agendas.  
6.5 Essentialising the ‘local’ as a counter-productive approach  
As discussed in chapter four, local violent conflicts in the aftermath of 1990s in the eastern DR 
Congo have largely been portrayed as intercommunity conflicts. Congolese and international 
NGOs have since then been using the concept of ‘local communities’ to refer to ethnic groups, but 
also as the most appropriate target of peacebuilding programs.  
In many places in eastern DR Congo, both peacebuilding and humanitarian organisations have set 
up local committees whose members are chosen within ethnic communities as a guarantee for 
success of the project. In the case of Masisi, the assumption was that once the projects were 
successfully established, these ‘local communities’ (example of CITC) would be able to address 
the causes of violence among themselves. During the past decade, the common label in many 
international organisations’ discourse emphasizing the involvement of the ‘local communities’ 
has, at the same time, increased the idea that the causes of conflict are ethnically driven.  
Now, the problem here is that ‘local communities’ continue to be seen by peacebuilding 
organizations as homogeneous ethnic groups fighting each other over land and power. At least in 
Masisi, I have noticed that using the label ‘local community’ has impeded the separation between 
the ‘real’ actors and the stakes around which violence is organised. Thus, ethnicizing both 
‘communities’ and the conflict is simply missing the target. Furthermore, individuals who control 
land, for example, or mining in Rubaya are not necessarily mono-ethnically organized as such. As 
I show in this chapter, while some ‘string pullers’ in Masisi are landowners, one cannot say that 
they are solely Hutu, Hunde or Tutsi. Furthermore, some landowners are not even native or living 
in Masisi. This is the case of Serufuli, who is a native of Nyanzale village located in Rutshuru 
Territory, but politically and economically Masisi has become his stronghold. Again, ASP and LPI 
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have fallen into this trap of constructing ‘local communities’ as the target of the conflict 
transformation project instead of considering the specific categories or groups involved in the 
conflict (such as pastoralists and farmers, traditional chiefs, etc.) which are also, like ‘string 
pullers’, not homogeneous groups in terms of interest.  
When I visited the CITC set up by ASP in Kilolirwe (in Bashali) in October 2014, I realized that 
the members of this committee are the representatives of ethnic groups, at ASP’s request. But 
when I engaged in discussion about CITC work with the committee members, in form of a group 
discussion, there was no clear correlation between the so-called local communities and the ‘real 
actors’ I mentioned above. This example shows that in the creation of CITC and many other similar 
local structures implemented by peacebuilding organizations in Masisi, there is a risk going on of 
‘de-politicizing’ the key drivers of conflict (such as land and power) by presenting these issues as 
locally rooted and controlled by the so-called ‘local communities’. As I previously discussed in 
chapter four, the construction of the ‘local community’ as a scale for conflict resolution projects 
relies on the assumption that communities can easily accommodate international programs that 
promise to deliver peace and development, but not necessarily at a scale which other levels/scales 
could systematically get connected to. This choice of the ‘local community’ had not only led NGO 
programs to construct and to categorize the ‘beneficiaries’ groups (which are ethnic groups in this 
case); also, NGOs deliberately pushed Congolese local associations to be partners through which 
they can legitimize their strategy of the ‘local’ construction. An expert who owns a development 
and conflict management cooperative I met in Goma and discussed the issue of ‘local 
communities’ as beneficiaries, said: 
contrary to what international NGOs do, we have rather gathered peasants in 
several villages to create cooperatives in different socioeconomic sectors 
(agriculture, small-scale livestock activities, etc.) based on their need. However, 
we have noticed on the ground that international NGOs are failing because they 
do not care about what the peasants need. Even Congolese organizations which 
use money from international programs do it for financial purpose, not for whom 
they call beneficiaries. (Interview Goma II.02.16)  
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In Masisi the ethnic character of local committees set up by NGOs had somehow become an asset 
for international organisations, seen as a reliable bridge to reach local communities (beneficiaries) 
and ensure the sustainability of the projects’ outcomes. Through the case study of Bashali, I found 
out that the design of the ‘local’ as a scale of intervention seems to provide a strong justification 
of international NGOs’ work, especially in the context of ‘absent or weak’ state security 
institutions, as a strategy for building their legitimacy on the local level. Not only have 
international NGOs been providing emergency basic social services to the population at highly 
visible locations in many places in Masisi, they have also often behaved like State Substitutes 
because of the direct link they have with donors and diplomatic corps in Kinshasa, often avoiding 
Congolese officials controlling their budget and projects on the ground, as this informant put it: 
 donors prefer to cooperate directly with international NGOs rather than with the state institutions, which 
reinforces the image that NGOs replace the state in the areas where they intervene. This has increased the 
expectations of the beneficiaries in the intervention zones, often beyond the responses of the implanted 
projects. The problem is that NGOs very rarely communicate the limits of their mandates or of the projects 
implemented. Even when they leave the project area, no one knows why’ (Interview- Goma II.02.16) 
    
Example of International NGOs visibility 
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 Example of Government visibility 
This sort of hegemonic image printed in the mind of peasants by the presence of international 
programs was strongly expressed by the Association of Masisi Youth (Coordination Territoriale 
de la Jeunesse Inter-communautaire de Masisi-JICOM) in its letter of 15th February 2016 to the 
national and provincial authorities to express discontent about the presence of NGOs in Masisi. 
One can read in the letter the following: ‘some organizations, by staying for a long period in 
Masisi, have become like state institutions. They think they have a monopoly of intervention in 
whatever they want but, in reality, they are doing nothing so far’. This letter signed by more than 
450 persons clearly expressed their anger at external intervention, which, in the eyes of the 
population of Masisi, does not produce any change in people’s life. In the same letter one can read 
that ‘these NGOs profit from the situation of turbulence in Masisi to abuse millions of us dollars 
in behalf of local communities, but in reality, this money exacerbates the misery of the population’. 
Prior to this letter, in 2009, the same movement organized a demonstration in Masisi which 
resulted in the suspension of international NGOs’ activities in Masisi.  
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Image 6: Youth of Masisi contesting International interventions   
 
                                                                                                          (Photo Reuters, August 2016)  
To address these tensions between the Masisi youth association and NGOs, the Governor of the 
province of North Kivu created the ‘Cellule Provincial d’Appui a la Pacification’ (CPAP), a body 
in charge of coordinating international organizations’ work on the provincial level. Alongside the 
creation of CPAP, Edits n° 001/2010 of 18th May 2010 and n° 01/037/CAB/GP-NK/2010 were 
issued by the Governor as general guidelines applying to NGO coordination, and a ministerial 
Arrêté n°002/CAB/MIN/MPPBCP/NK2014 of 27th January 2014 providing the guidelines for 
implementation of the above Edit n° 001/2010. It seems that these guidelines have not been 
implemented yet because a recent letter of 5th April 2017 was addressed to the national and 
provincial authorities by the same youth association, calling for a round-table during which all 
NGOs working in Masisi should report on their projects and the impact achieved in the presence 
of state authorities and customary chiefs of Masisi. Moreover, this discontent is not only expressed 
by the youth. This form of ‘hegemonic’ behaviour by NGOs has also hampered the role and the 
visibility of the state authorities in Masisi who believe that international NGOs compete with the 
state. One of the local government officials met in Sake claimed that: 
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NGOs neglect us as state authorities…they only come to talk to us when they are 
looking for some administrative documents to launch their projects. Afterwards, 
they never come back, often we do not even know who benefited from their 
projects and what were the results’ (Interview Masisi, IV.10.14-) 
It remains unclear whether there is any political manipulation by state authorities behind the youth 
(JICOM) demonstrations against NGOs. However, both sides seem to complain of the same fact. 
On the one hand, NGOs’ ineffectiveness in dealing with local problems in spite of a large amount 
of funds, and their insubordination to the state authority on the other. This lack of coordination 
and of a common understanding on the priorities NGO programs should focus on can be explained 
at two levels.  
The first is the fact that international NGOs have a strong capacity to lobby, both with different 
embassies in Kinshasa (which sometimes provide financial support to NGOs) and with 
institutional donors. These two levels of connection put international NGOs in a convenient and 
privileged position over state authorities. However, on the provincial level, this conflict of 
authority preoccupies the provincial government of North Kivu. As example, on 29th November 
2015, the provincial Minister of Planning (under whom international NGOs are supposed to be 
coordinated) gave an interview to Radio Okapi stating that ‘in North Kivu, 20% (22 out of 102) of 
NGOs function legally’ and was calling for all NGOs to submit their projects and activities in 
detail. According to the Minister, ‘this strategy will allow the provincial ministry to keep control 
of the activities implemented by NGOs whose projects rarely address the needs of the population’. 
This warning by the Minister about NGOs was at the request of the provincial parliamentarians 
who, a few weeks back, reported that international NGOs impose their programs on the population 
without involving state authorities to discuss the priorities.   
In addition to this conflict of roles and lack of coordination between the government institutions 
and international NGOs, so far neither side has shown an effective strategy to address the causes 
of violent conflict. In this competition, ‘string pullers’ remain the only category of actor that 
challenge both the state authorities and peacebuilding organisations in Masisi, by controlling 
scales, beyond the constructed ‘local’. If addressing the violence around the triangle land, identity 
and power necessitates the participation or the involvement of ‘string pullers’, the case of Masisi 
has shown that a more elaborated and new approach is needed and would require a long-term 
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approach instead of a short and temporary action that depend on the unpredictable donors’ funding. 
The above example of local opposition to international NGOs by both the youth of Masisi and 
government authorities provides a way to problematize the approach of essentializing the ‘local’ 
as a given scale where ‘communities’ are perceived as passive consumers of projects.  
6.6 The politics of scale beyond the ‘local’ 
While the local scale is recognized by both scholars and practitioners as the starting point to 
address the root causes of violent conflicts, the case study of Bashali in Masisi (North Kivu 
Province) allows us to argue that peacebuilding organizations have taken the community level for 
granted in addressing the complex settings of conflict dynamics. ASP and LPI assumed that the 
population at the local scale would be willing to work for peace and would even be able to convince 
‘string pullers’ to adhere to peace processes. Even though current literature suggests that the nature 
of conflict is essentially local, the example of Bashali shows that interests at stake (power, 
citizenship, land and other natural resources) remain under the control of ‘string pullers’ whose 
networks operate across scales (local, provincial, national and regional). I have demonstrated that 
land, identity and power are multi-scale issues; although the manifestations of violence can be 
observed on a local scale, they remain embedded in provincial and national institutions and rooted 
in a historical and political struggle of different groups. 
Whereas Kalyvas’s model insinuates the existence of distinct groups of actors that cooperate either 
through ‘cleavage’ or ‘alliance’ at different levels - while each group maintains a sort of autonomy 
- we have not seen either a clear line of ‘equal’ cooperation between ‘string pullers’and local 
communities when it comes to land or power issues, or any autonomy of local community 
representatives vis-à-vis ‘string pullers’. What we have witnessed, however, is that some of the 
‘string pullers’ navigate easily across scales, decide how and when to collaborate informally with 
influential individuals across scales but still for their own interests. This absence of linearity with 
scales and lack of interdependence between powerful individuals (‘string pullers’) and local 
community members constitute the limit to Kalyvas’ model of actors and scales. This observation 
falls to some extent into what Marston et al. (2005) call ‘horizontality’ in politics of scale. 
According to these authors, horizontality does not consider a scale as a concrete entity in the sense 
of verticality. Rather it seeks to study humans and objects in their interactions across a multiplicity 
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of social sites without any reference to levels or scales.  
The example of Bashali shows that top-down approaches to peace-building cannot be replaced by 
bottom-up ones, much as there is a clear boundary between the two approaches when it comes to 
addressing the causes of conflicts that transcend a single scale and where the role of ‘string pullers’ 
and their networks challenges international interventions. Through the analysis of the emergence 
of some powerful individuals and their strategies in this chapter, it appeared that the relations 
individuals have established, over many decades, with their constituencies are rather fluid; there 
is no clear boundary within which to locate these relations and they can hardly be seen through 
horizontal or vertical observation alone. Some of these individuals who became ‘string pullers’ at 
one time have lost their influence and changed their roles of ‘string pullers’, depending on the 
political situation. An example is the Hutu elites (today gathered around the political party 
PANADI) established in Kinshasa who were very influential at the local, provincial and national 
levels at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. Their influence has been weakened by 
the 1996 and 1998 wars which created conditions for the emergence of another network of ‘string 
pullers’ currently controlling interests across scales.  
Reflecting on the local controversy described above, Funk and Said (2010) observed in their case 
studies that the peace that local populations genuinely hope for may fail to take root without what 
they term ‘localizing peace’ in peacebuilding interventions. By ‘localizing peace’, they mean 
willingness to learn and to be enriched by what ‘the local’ has to offer. They argue that by failing 
to learn what the local can offer, peace-building organizations are likely to fall into what they had 
always criticized, that is, the top-down approach. The example of Bashali shows that while ASP 
and LPI, and even many other international NGOs in Masisi, promised to apply Participatory 
Action-Research as a bottom-up approach in dealing with local conflicts, this turned into another 
form of top-down model of intervention, the difference being that it is a direct intervention by 
NGOs in ‘local communities’, rather than higher state institutions intervening in the local scale or 
international donors in the state. The scepticism of local committee (CITC) members in Bashali 
and the resistance of ‘string pullers’ to collaborating with either NGOs or local structures 
implemented by these NGOs are eloquent indicators that peace-building interventions should 
invent another model to deal with such complex contexts like Bashali, taking into consideration 
the premise that the politics of scale might be useful for future peace-building interventions.  
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I join Cidell (2005) when he advises that, in peace processes, compromise may be harder or easier 
and political strategies may succeed or fail depending on whether individuals are taken seriously 
as members of multiple scales, and whether or not scales are understood as being composed of 
individuals. In many cases, in the view of Martin (1999:38), actors in land-use conflicts, for 
example, are not bound by, but rather transcend, scales in an attempt to articulate, defend, and 
secure their interests and identities. The struggle of the Hutu and Tutsi to gain strategic political 
positions in different institutions, as discussed in the previous chapter, not only allowed them to 
gain their nationality rights, but simultaneously allowed them to access and secure land. The 
trajectory of individuals (currently ‘string pullers’) through political struggle and different 
rebellions and protracted armed groups discussed in this chapter agrees to some extent with the 
conclusion of Brown and Purcell (2004), when they argue that scale is socially produced rather 
than ontologically given. However, the findings in this study suggest that this social production of 
scales does not obey the same processes and dynamics and even the same type of actors. The 
examination of a specific historical, social and political context in which actors emerged and 
networks formed and how dynamics are shaped, should be further discussed by scholars to inspire 
peace-building interventions. Drawing on the Bashali case, it is arguably correct to say that 
peacebuilding attempts have not yet met their promise of conflict resolution on the ‘local’ scale 
because Big Men and their connections to land, power and identity issues transcend the local scale. 
Expecting these relationships to be translated into peacebuilding programs requires a profound 
change in paradigms and approaches other than the ones we currently know.   
6.7 Concluding remarks  
This chapter started by discussing the emergence of armed groups and powerful individuals 
(‘string pullers’). I demonstrated how the first and second Congolese wars contributed to the 
emergence of powerful local actors who managed to consolidate their influence across scales. The 
examples of CNDP, PARECO, APCLS and Nyatura show that land, power and identity questions 
generate serious claims on the local level while providing avenues for key actors to negotiate 
higher positions in the army and in the movement. This negotiation was also made possible through 
the creation of networks. For instance, TPD offered an analytical window to see how actors can 
create connections based on their ethnic belonging while including members of other ethnicities 
for strategic purposes. Although TPD is Hutu dominated, Tutsi were also members and were 
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offered strategic posts at the provincial level when Serufuli was appointed by Rwandan authorities 
as governor of North Kivu.  
Moreover, the 2006 and 2011 elections became a political opportunity for the Hutu who not only 
controlled local administrative and political positions, but also occupied strategic positions in 
provincial and national institutions, which allowed them to use their positions to access and protect 
land in Masisi. This process of gaining political power through peace negotiations and elections at 
different levels of institutions by local actors is what I term in this chapter ‘navigating scales’ as a 
strategy to keep control of local stakes. One of the privileged strategies to control these stakes, as 
discussed in this chapter, is the link between armed groups and some of the Big Men.    
The importance of ethnicity, however, remains tricky in this study, one should admit. Although 
armed groups have ethnic connotations (Nyatura for Hutu, APCLS for Hunde etc.), members of 
these armed groups are not necessarily of the same ethnic group; they are not homogeneous in 
terms of ethnic belonging. Another aspect that confirms the above statement is that Hutu people 
are not necessarily aware of what Nyatura really is, the same with Hunde about APCLS. The goals 
and claims of these armed groups are not often endorsed by the ‘affiliated’ population. This to say 
that the loyalty of the population towards armed groups’ leaders on the one hand and the legitimacy 
of armed groups toward the population they claim to be ‘protecting’ remain questionable. I argue 
that it is this configuration of claims and actors which make armed groups the networks with direct 
links to land, power and identity questions.  
The second part of this chapter analysed a conflict transformation project in Bashali in order to 
show how these networks and actors affect peacebuilding interventions. I demonstrated that the 
ASP and LPI attempt at conflict transformation in Bashali not only fell into the trap of 
depoliticizing ‘local communities’, but also failed to recognize and to include ‘string pullers’ in 
the entire conflict transformation process. I argue that engaging only local actors (community 
representatives, traditional chiefs, local state authorities) in conflict resolution initiatives without 
involving the ‘string pullers’ is an expression of ignorance of the informal connections and the 
control that latter have on the former. This ignorance did not only lead ‘string pullers’ to distrust 
the process; even the local committee of conflict transformation (CITC) recognized its limited 
ability to bring them to the table for talks. 
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Furthermore, this attempt by peacebuilding organisations to essentialize the ‘local community’ as 
typically associated with the local scale has overlooked the fluid character of the ‘local 
communities’ by ethnicizing them as if they were homogeneous social groups, also by presenting 
the nature of conflict dynamics as ethnically set. This fluidity and the unconstructed character of 
local communities are illustrated in this chapter through the example of the local protests against 
international intervention in Masisi by groups of actors (the youth and state authorities), 
demanding NGOs to be accountable for what they do. This chapter examines the critiques made 
of state-building and peacebuilding intervention in eastern DR Congo by many scholars, which 
led to the discourse of the ‘forgotten local’ as the reason why peacebuilding failed. This discourse 
claims that local issues (land, identity and power) have been neglected by the Congolese 
Government, UN agencies and international NGOs, and that is why violence became protracted in 
eastern Congo. While this statement may have an empirical foundation, the general understanding 
of peacebuilding interventions has considered local factors for conflicts as exclusively local, 
without concurrently considering other levels in the intervention framework. Due to this ignorance 
of other levels, peacebuilding organizations have not been including other equally important issues 
like identity and power, which I have discussed in chapter four and five. Likewise, key actors and 
networks who played a significant role in different wars need to be considered in the current 
peacebuilding and state-building processes, for their potential capacity to mitigate violence.  
In the end, dominant explanations of Congolese wars seemed to have overlooked the strategies 
and capacity of local actors to navigate across scales to negotiate stakes, which is to a large extent 
the reason why conflict resolution initiatives do not succeed in including those powerful 
individuals in peace processes. This chapter intended to draw the attention of peacebuilding and 
policy makers to not only intervene on the local level as a specific scale of project implementation, 
but also to include other scales and to reconsider the ‘string pullers’ as multi-scalar actors, capable 
of playing a positive or negative role in current conflict transformation attempts. Because ‘string 
pullers’ remain informally connected to the ‘local’ while acting on other scales, peacebuilding 
should invent new approaches that are adapted to this complex context. So far, the liberal peace 
ideology continues to characterize several peacebuilding interventions by offering peace as a 
‘commodity’ that ‘local communities’ desperately need. One wonders why the presence of the 
largest UN peacekeeping mission and hundreds of international NGOs in the DR Congo have so 
far offered very little in terms of conflict resolution, despite all kind of resources mobilized? In the 
175 
 
context of a weak state (DR Congo) where ‘string pullers’ seem to be more powerful actors than 
state institutions, does the impact of these interventions really matter, or is what matters only the 
process of keeping trying regardless of the impact. At the same time, these interventions have 
opened up room for scholars to criticize different approaches used in them. Nevertheless, it remains 
to be seen whether both scholars and practitioners are capable of shaping the liberal peacebuilding 
‘machine’ to meet people’s expectations. I used the politics of scale as an analytical framework to 
bring out this complex picture. I intend to challenge the current academic debate on the violent 
conflicts in the eastern DR Congo which continues to fuel the top-down versus bottom-up 
dichotomy, by suggesting going beyond this dichotomy to provide a room for subalterns to express 
what kind of peace they aim for.      
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
[A former M23 officer and two Congolese army officers operating under 
Mudahunga’s orders told the Group that, on 24 February 2013, both Mudahunga and 
Muhire had distributed arms to Rwandophone (Hutu and Tutsi) young people and 
cattle herders in Kitchanga and in the nearby Kahe camp for internally displaced 
persons and incited them to attack ethnic Hundes.] UN report (2013), par 122, page 
27 
[… the coalition of the Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS) 
and Nyatura simultaneously attacked Friday 1 July in the morning several FARDC 
positions in Masisi …] Radio Okapi, July 2016 
[…the APCLS combatants are controlling villages around Kitchanga to protect as 
much as possible the members of their tribal community (Hunde) when they need to 
go for farming, because they were threatened and prevented from accessing their 
land by the Congolese Hutu fighters of the Nyatura militia, close to the FDLR, the 
Rwandan Hutu.] Forum des As, June 2017 
This study was inspired by a scholarly debate about the persistent violent conflicts in the eastern 
part of the Democratic Republic of Congo and how peacebuilding interventions have been dealing 
with conflicts over the years. During the past decade, there have been serious critiques by scholars 
emphasizing the failure of state-building attempts by international donors who could not provide 
a strategic plan for a long-term solution (Trefon 2011, 2013). In this debate, the failure is associated 
with the use of top-down approaches and, as result, there have been new arguments advocating for 
particular attention to the local dynamics of conflict (Autesserre 2008).  
While it is widely agreed that the nature of conflict in the eastern DR Congo is essentially local, 
pointing to the triangle of land, power and identity as the main drivers of violence, this study asked 
why peacebuilding interventions working at the local level for years continuously fail to address 
the causes of violent conflict in spite of the huge resources allocated. Why and how was the ‘local 
community’ constructed and how is it used to implement peace building programs? What are the 
limitations of focusing on the local community and how does this constitute the local trap? Finally, 
what were the processes of scale production by diverse actors and how can peacebuilding 
interventions relate to the politics of scale? The general objective of this study was to analyze the 
processes of the emergence of local actors as well as the conditions under which these actors 
contributed to the production of multiple scales. The aim was to understand why current 
peacebuilding interventions continue to fail in addressing the causes of violent conflict and to what 
extent the politics of scale could provide a thorough understanding of this failure.  After answering 
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the above questions through the empirical chapters (four, five and six), the main findings of this 
study can be formulated around the following points.  
By examining the context and strategies of peacebuilding interventions at the local level, the 
construction of the ‘local community’ level has been a way to legitimate a new form of intervention 
different from the top-down approach. By working at the local level (Masisi), I demonstrated in 
chapter four that other levels (especially provincial and national) have been ignored while 
overestimating the capacity of ‘local communities’ to deal with the causes of conflict. This is 
because the choice of so-called local communities as the focus for intervention has led to the 
reappearance of ethnic groups who hardly engage in dialogue with state institutions, as well as 
powerful individuals and even leaders of armed groups. Moreover, attempts by international 
peacebuilding NGOs to involve Congolese civil society organizations as partners to facilitate the 
implementation of projects in the communities has raised the question of the legitimacy of these 
organizations on the local level. Even with a long period of interventions, peacebuilding 
organizations have simplified the complexity of conflict dynamics (land, power and identity) to 
issues only of land. Furthermore, Congolese civil society organizations continue to play the role 
of ‘brokers’, only facilitating the implementation of projects, while having limited scope to 
participate in any other role due to a lack of their own strategy as intermediary bodies between 
international organizations and local populations. In addition to the lack of strategy, Congolese 
civil society organizations have become clients in the peacebuilding ‘market’ where money is 
promised to organizations which can prove their ability to make a project acceptable on the local 
level.  
Albeit peacebuilding interventions focus on the local level, I demonstrated in chapter five that 
land, power and identity are structural issues (imbedded in a set of laws and institutions sometimes 
with competing authorities) at multiple levels of institutions (local, provincial and national). The 
analysis of the legal and institutional framework of land, nationality and power questions allowed 
me to identify other levels where these questions are at play and to understand how scales are 
constructed and deconstructed by actors through diverse strategies and practices. Ignorance of this 
multi-scalar character of the conflict is what explains to a large extent the failure of peacebuilding 
interventions. Although there is empirical evidence regarding land-related violence at the local 
level, attempts to find local solutions to multi-level problems has proven to be counterproductive 
in the long term. One example is the land reform process. It was argued that land reform is a 
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political process that requires a strong political involvement, rather than just a technical matter of 
supporting civil society advocacy actions. Furthermore, the current ambiguity of the legal and 
institutional framework characterized by the conflict of competences at local, provincial and 
national levels continues to be an obstacle to any attempt towards peaceful access to land. In 
Masisi, land has been a powerful driving force of violence, by setting Banyarwanda against Hunde 
with regard to land rights. While for the Hunde in Bashali the use of autochthony was a weapon to 
exclude Banyarwanda from accessing land, the land law of 1973 (while remaining ambiguous 
about the role of customary chiefs in land management) opened up the possibilities for the 
Banyarwanda to access land, not through the local Hunde chiefs but by obtaining title deeds at the 
provincial and national levels.   
Worth saying is that this analysis of land, power and identity as multi-level issues has been a point 
of departure to grasp how actors construct and navigate across scales, using violent means such as 
wars and exactions through armed groups as a strategy to claim and to control land, power or any 
other political gain. The analysis of the formation of armed groups (chapter five) has shown how 
land, power and identity claims have been brought to the table in different political agreements 
between armed groups and the government and how armed groups contributed to the emergence 
of powerful individuals, becoming ‘string pullers’ while playing official roles in state institutions. 
The analysis of armed conflict in the context of Masisi and in many other places in the eastern DR 
Congo suggests that issues of power, land and identity are still at stake. While tensions among 
different groups in Masisi continue to occur at the local level, ‘string pullers’ behind armed groups 
have managed to create political and security strategies to operate at the local level, sometimes 
with connections to other levels depending on the profiles of these ‘string pullers’.  
It is in this set up of actors who navigate across levels that an example of a conflict transformation 
program implemented in Bashali was used to illustrate the difficulty of peacebuilding interventions 
to integrate a multi-level approach in their programs. Attempts to involve ‘string pullers’ in some 
peacebuilding projects at the local level continue to fail because of the informal character of 
political alliances, economic and security networks and the ‘string pullers’ behind them, while 
remaining fluid, unpredictable and embedded in the history of struggles that each of the groups 
experienced in the past.  
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7.1 Contribution to the theoretical debate 
7.1.1 Politics of scale beyond the top-down and bottom-up dichotomy 
In political geography, the call to consider how individuals through political or economic struggles 
contribute to the process of producing scales is made by several authors (Sayre and Vittorio 2009, 
Marston 2000). It is argued, for example, that individuals are situated at multiple scales at the same 
time, and that jurisdictions such as city governments or national legislatures are composed of 
members who constantly negotiate different interests depending on the level of jurisdictions these 
individuals are at (Cidell 2006). Because any governing body is comprised of individuals with 
conflicting interests, Cidell posits that the authority or power of a particular jurisdiction depends 
in part on the goals, abilities and even personalities of those individuals. As I discussed in chapter 
five, when the Banyarwanda nationality was denied after the independence of the DR Congo at 
the same time as Hunde traditional chiefs contested Banyarwanda access to land, the Banyarwanda 
elites developed new strategies. One of the strategies was to abandon struggles on the local scale 
(Masisi) and focus on other scales where they could gain the right to nationality. The appointment 
of Barthélémy Bisengimana as head of President Mobutu’s cabinet resulted in the grant of 
nationality to Banyarwanda in 1972, with implications for land access. This example shows that 
actors with an interest at the local scale can move to other scales to negotiate their interest. In this 
sense, struggles for personal goals and/or collective interests can lead to their production of more 
than one scale, which suggests that scales are not ontologically given. In the same way, Martin 
(1999) advocates for transcending the fixity of jurisdictional scale. She insists that while 
jurisdictions and institutions are fixed by scale (local, provincial, …), actors (individuals) are not 
bound by, but rather, transcend scales in an attempt to articulate, defend, and secure their interests.  
The debate on whether scales are constructed in the epistemological moment (as observational 
measurement) or whether scales are produced in the ontological moment, in a process that occurs 
independently of any act of observation continues to divide scholars in political geography (Sayre 
and Vittorio 2009). Even when Moore (2008) is concerned by the consequence of failing to make 
a clear distinction between scale as a category of practice and category of analysis, he at least 
suggests that scales are rather produced in the ontological moment, through practices formally and 
informally, which makes scales problematic as a category of analysis. However, the analysis of 
the emergence through political struggles (nationality, elections, rebellions) of powerful 
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individuals who have become ‘string pullers’ does not fall solely into one of the two categories 
(epistemological or ontological). I found that both categories are complementary in the sense that 
one can observe practices across different scales and at the same time identify diverse actors who 
plan and generate those practices and even the interests behind them. In the case of Masisi, one 
cannot assume the armed groups operate without the support and often the leadership of well-
known powerful individuals who at the same time occupy high political positions in the state 
institutions. The analysis of land, power and identity to explain different moments of struggles 
helps to identify different scales where these issues have brought several actors into confrontation. 
Although it is difficult to say whether these scales were vertically or horizontally negotiated and 
produced (see Howitt 1998), the result of the Banyarwanda struggles, nonetheless, have produce 
visible scales, namely local, provincial, national and regional. How can one distinguish scale from 
level? In this study, I named ‘levels’ the political and administrative divisions in terms of a 
hierarchy from the local to the international (see figure 2 in chapter three), whereas a scale is the 
representation of a level where different actors are in confrontation but the scale in question is not 
bounded to any visible or fixed level.  
For example, during the RCD rebellion, Goma at the provincial level, became a strategic scale for 
local, national, regional and international stakes. Goma became therefore a scale produced by 
multiple and diverse actors who came from different places (eastern DR Congo, Kinshasa, 
Rwanda, Uganda, …) whereas the issues at stake went beyond the provincial level per se. During 
the government of transition (2003-2006), Kinshasa became an important scale where actors from 
different levels were at play. With the difficulties of this transition and the rise of the CNDP 
rebellion against the government in 2005, the local level (Masisi) became a scale for a new political 
deal. Later on, the Goma peace agreement between the government and armed groups in March 
2009 made Goma, again, an important scale. While actors occasionally produce scales in a given 
geographical area at a particular moment of negotiation or tensions, levels are politically and 
administratively fixed. However, there is a trend to see scale production processes across state 
institutions at different levels. This has been shown through the analysis of land, power and identity 
as legal and institutional issues. One can argue that the analysis of scale making processes needs 
existing structures and institutions to better account for how scales are produced and how they 
shift, as well as the strategies of different actors. Nevertheless, while it is possible to observe 
powerful actors at the levels and their ‘official’ role in state institutions, some strategies used by 
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these actors to control some interests at other levels can make the analysis of scales tricky. For 
example, the role of Eugène Serufuli as a national Minister and Robert Seninga as a member of 
the provincial assembly and how they are linked to armed groups in Masisi can challenge the way 
scales and levels are related.   
The tendency by international aid agencies and NGOs to adopt the view of fixed and bounded 
scales when they differentiate the local from other scales (to frame peacebuilding intervention) 
was discussed in this study. State- and peacebuilding interventions continue to reference the 
‘levels’ of conflict as the ‘territorial location’ of stakeholders, which has contributed, so far, to 
what Martin (1999) calls ‘fixity’ of scales as a means of drawing concrete lines of demarcation 
between those scales. Even though Kalyvas (2003) provides an insightful entry point into how 
actors operate across different scales by opposing the ‘local’ to the ‘supra-local’, he posits that 
actors are located at fixed levels (for example local, provincial and national) and are only linked 
to each other by the mechanisms of cleavage and alliance.  
Although Kalyvas recognizes that actors connect even when their ideological agenda is opposed, 
still, he does not say anything about the possibility for these actors to transcend scales beyond the 
vertical or horizontal viewpoint. The analysis of the land, power and identity triangle provides a 
new understanding of how Banyarwanda elites have struggled to control land or to obtain the 
nationality right through different means and without clear boundaries in terms of hierarchy 
between levels. The existence of armed groups in Masisi and the ‘string pullers’ behind them is a 
demonstration of how focusing on one level may turn counterproductive. Peacebuilding 
interventions have still not invented an approach that can deal with scales through which the stakes 
of conflict are profoundly imbedded.  
I posit that scales are not given, they are produced by a set of diverse actors, not only to protect 
their existing interests, depending on the prevailing political, economic or judiciary situation. A 
scale can be formal or informal. As I discussed in chapter six, scales can be produced by an alliance 
between political parties for electoral purposes and disappear afterwards, and, informally, the same 
political party members control armed groups to protect land from the state formal apparatus. 
Expecting peacebuilding interventions to be successful in dealing with land, power and identity 
questions or any other conflict-related issue would require a deep revision of current strategies. As 
long as any of the above issues constitute a stake for diverse actors with opposing interests (which 
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is the case of Masisi), chances are slim to meet the promised peace.  
To sum up, the theoretical contribution of this thesis is to draw particular attention to the way 
applying the politics of scale perspective to analyze conflict dynamics in Masisi defies the 
hierarchical view of scale production by showing that scale-making processes themselves are 
meaningless without concrete institutions and levels where interests are at stake. Scale, taken as a 
spatial representation of spheres where social, political and economic struggles set different actors 
against each other, implies that scale can be observable if it corresponds to a level, but also can be 
invisible when processes of negotiating or competing are made through informal networks. In the 
case of Masisi, struggles over land, power or nationality questions claimed by different groups 
have become empirical objects in the sense that by analyzing them one could see the processes of 
the emergence of powerful individuals (string pullers) across scales (see chapter six). So far, the 
current debate in peace and conflict studies has not sufficiently acknowledged the relevance of the 
politics of scale in the approaches we currently know. In this respect, a new lens for paradigm 
shifts in peacebuilding interventions is needed.  
7.1.2 Rethinking peacebuilding interventions through the politics of scale 
Scholarly debate in peace and conflict studies about effective approaches to address the causes of 
violence continues (Paffenholz 2016, Schneckener 2016). Since peacebuilding has become a new 
feature of international interventions to deal with violence in post-conflict societies, bottom-up 
versus top-down have become the dominant views throughout the literature (Zaum 2012).  
The idea that societies can be stabilized through the reinforcement of state institutions (Mac Ginty 
2013:2), nourished by the Weberian conception of the state, has been embraced by many 
international organizations and donors as a way to promote peace and prevent conflict. Whilst this 
conception emphasizes the importance of central state institutions, critiques about the effectiveness 
of the state institutions to address the causes of violent conflicts and to guarantee a sustainable 
peace in post-conflict societies continue to advocate in favor of the inclusion of non-state actors in 
peacebuilding interventions (Richmond 2014). These interventions have since then been qualified 
as liberal peace interventions (Mac Ginty 2013, see chapter two). While they promote state-
building by strengthening the capacity of state institutions, there is still a strong critique that the 
vast majority of these initiatives are implemented in the Global South but are designed, directed 
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and funded from the Global North. It is argued that in countries where these interventions take 
place, peacebuilding is seen as something that comes from ‘outside’ of their context, hence the 
terminology of ‘top-down’ peacebuilding.  
A range of controversies related to the prevailing liberal peacebuilding model have led to the call 
for a clearer focus to deal with the underlying causes of conflicts. This has been labeled the bottom-
up approach. In accordance with this approach, several strategies have been debated by scholars 
and adopted by policy-makers and even translated into programs. One of these strategies is the 
‘local turn’, which is translated into the categories of ‘local community’ or ‘grassroots level’ 
intervention. Notwithstanding this emphasis on interventions on the local level, there are still some 
critiques of the attempts to apply a local lens to peacebuilding, arguing that the complexity of the 
local continues to defy interventions and that conflicts are as complex at the local level as at other 
levels (Donais 2009). The central critique here is that the local, community level or bottom-up 
approaches are romanticized while hardly providing a blueprint for higher quality peacebuilding 
(Öjendal and Ou 2015).  Worth noting is that this dichotomy within academic debate between 
liberal peacebuilding versus bottom-up or local turn or local ownership discourse is, in many 
regards, a counterproductive way of explaining why peacebuilding has produced very little of what 
it promises. This debate has been raised in the context of the DR Congo, in discussing whether the 
failure of international peacebuilding is related to either top-down or bottom-up approaches 
(Autessere 2010, Stearns 2013) and has influenced some organizations in their interventions. In 
the case of Masisi, when Life &Peace Institute (LPI) and its partner Action Solidaire pour la Paix 
(ASP) intervened in Bashali, the use of participatory-action research methodology relied on the 
belief that local communities are able to understand the dynamics of violent conflict and therefore 
could themselves find solutions to address the roots causes of the violence. This strategy of 
focusing on the local level, as I discussed in chapter four and six, was a way to escape critiques 
formulated against the top-down interventions used in the DR Congo by international donors.  
By analyzing how LPI and ASP implemented their project in Bashali, focusing on the role of 
several actors, I argue that neither one nor the other approach can work separately. For example, 
one cannot resolve land-related tensions at the local level without considering all the problems 
caused by the legal and institutional framework. In the same way, applying policies and laws to 
tackle land issues at the local level cannot be effective without taking into consideration the 
specificities of different cultures, values and perceptions that local populations have about land 
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and which fuel tensions among different groups. Land, power or identity are not exclusively either 
local or national, they are at all levels, with serious policy implications that peacebuilding actors 
should consider.    
By opposing top-down to bottom-up, scholars with a deep interest in the topic of peacebuilding 
have so far only succeeded in criticizing, while failing to formulate a coherent alternative that is 
also of practical utility. By drawing a dichotomy between liberal peacebuilding and the local turn, 
external and local actors, analysts fall into the trap of essentializing these dichotomies and 
therefore ignoring the intertwinement between actors and levels, not necessarily with clear 
boundaries between them. 
7.2 Empirical and methodological reflections   
The entry point of this study was to question the current approach used by peacebuilding 
interventions (that have been) dealing with the violent conflict in Masisi: The study put the focus 
on the role of diverse actors at different levels and the impact they can have on the failure of 
peacebuilding initiatives. In taking a micro lens to conduct this study, I also considered other levels 
beyond Masisi; including the provincial, regional, national and international levels. The main 
justification for peace- and state-building interventions in the DR Congo has been constructed on 
the idea that the DR Congo is a ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ or ‘weak’ state and that the state has lost the 
monopoly of the use of violence, which has resulted in protracted violent conflicts (Trefon, 2011). 
Armed groups in Masisi and its surroundings are seen as a consequence of the absence of the state 
authority, and therefore the international community can help reconstruct the state authority.  
Evidence on the ground shows that peacebuilding organizations have deliberately decided to 
construct the ‘local’ not as a paradigm shift from top-down approaches per se, but as a strategy to 
attract funds. International actors share the belief that the problem is state failure and that only the 
state can eradicate violence, whether they intervene at the local or other levels. This study shows 
that this ‘traditional’ view of the role of the state as an ultimate guarantee for a peaceful society 
results in two major problems. One is the refusal to acknowledge the presence of multiple actors 
and informal networks within the existing formal institutions, and how both have coexisted for 
long. The second is that international actors remain reluctant to consider the potential of some 
powerful individuals (‘string pullers’) to cooperate in making conflict transformation projects 
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somehow successful. Rather, these organizations continue to maintain a divide between local 
communities portrayed as victims and ‘string pullers’ as the ‘problem’, ignoring or 
underestimating the historical, social and political factors behind the dynamics of violence, as well 
as the dependency links that exist between them.  
This study suggests going beyond the conventional approaches to peace and conflict that see the 
state as an ‘absolute provider’ and to embrace the possibilities offered by the field of interventions.  
This applies to academic researchers as well. Albeit the entry point for research is often framed by 
‘ready-to-use’ theoretical and conceptual models, this study calls for a cautious mindset when it 
comes to the production of knowledge in a volatile political and security context such as Masisi 
and elsewhere. While using a multi-sited ethnography approach allowed me to identify various 
actors and to analyze their strategies through a succession of wars and political crises, it has also 
proven its limitations in this study, in terms of advantages and disadvantages.  
Major advantages of using this approach refer to how different groups involved in this study could 
be identified at different sites while simultaneously the methods used allowed to collect and 
analyze data in accordance with the conceptual framework, namely the Politics of scale. Following 
the predominant arguments throughout the debate about scale and how it is suggested to be 
analyzed, it would have not been possible to discuss the processes through which actors produce 
scales, without using a multi-sited methodological outlook. However, although the combination of 
the methodological approach and the conceptual and theoretical framework is at the core of the 
academic contribution of this study, it looked a bit ambitious to reach out all relevant actors, 
especially those called ‘string pullers’. This is because of the informal character of their ambiguous 
political role in the current overall governance landscape in the DR Congo, thus the disadvantages 
of the methodological approach used. 
Some of these ‘string pullers’, although well known, were not reachable because of the distance 
from my research sites. Some of the questions raised in this study were also sometimes sensitive 
when it came to analysis of armed groups and their leadership. I did not try to reach the leaders of 
some armed groups for my own safety and also due to the inaccessibility of their locations. Some 
powerful individuals refused to discuss some topics because they probably felt they were 
concerned and preferred to avoid giving their opinion. Instead, I identified another category of 
informants (I did not expect before the fieldwork) to gather information about armed groups. These 
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informants are political leaders who are linked to armed groups and who have played a political 
role during different rebel administrations. What was missing in the methodological approach was 
the integration of informal actors such as armed group leaders, or how to deal with ‘string pullers’ 
because of their official role in state institutions. In dealing with data collection in such a context 
of informal roles of actors, the researcher is also affected. When sensitive data are collected, and 
the researcher’s security is at stake, using such information in a thesis requires some compromises.   
7.3 Policy implications and generalization of findings beyond Masisi  
The relationship between land, power and identity issues and violent conflicts in the literature on 
the conflict in eastern DR Congo and Masisi in particular has become arguably the key explanation 
to understand the current protracted conflict and continue, to an extent, to legitimize peacebuilding 
interventions. In the context of sub-Saharan Africa, the academic discussion about the relationship 
between land, power and identity and how violent conflict can result from it continues to attract 
scholars and practitioners in the field of peacebuilding (Lund 2011; Huggins 2010; Boone 2013, 
2014). This discussion has largely contributed to the understanding of this relationship in different 
contexts across African countries while simultaneously the debate has remained, in many cases, 
theoretical without providing further evidence on what are the specificities in each context.  
In Masisi, for example, there was a paradigm shift in the way of presenting the dynamics of conflict 
between the mid-1980s and the entire decade of the 1990s and the beginning of 2000. Until the 
end of the second Congolese war (1998-2003), the public discourse and the views of the Congolese 
civil society organizations were dominated by explanations such as tribalism or interethnic 
conflict, putting forward ethnic groups as the main opponents. Although this explanation may be 
true in many places in the eastern part of the DR Congo, specific factors behind the violence such 
as the denial of nationality to the Banyarwanda or contestation about land access, remain less 
pronounced. The literature that emerged from the beginning of 2000, however, has theorized 
conflict dynamics by constructing land, power and identity as the main drivers of violent conflicts. 
This construction had two implications. The first is that scholars have introduced a generalized 
knowledge about land, power and identity in the Congolese context without mentioning specifics 
which have to do with history and political changes at the local, national and regional levels. The 
second is that policy makers and donors in peacebuilding interventions have taken this construction 
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for granted and accordingly conceived programs without questioning it. This study suggests that 
although land, power and identity can be relevant theoretical categories to analyze a set of 
phenomenon in a large part of Africa, one cannot use these categories without questioning their 
salience in the process of addressing the causes of violent conflicts. Reflecting on the example of 
Masisi, access to land by Banyarwanda has been accompanied by contestations of their nationality 
by Hunde and the quest for nationality has pushed Banyarwanda elites to conquest political power 
through wars and other political strategies, which in return has facilitated access to land. In this 
situation, peacebuilding interventions are still not able to show how conflicts related to identity or 
power are articulated in their projects.  
Considerable attempts have been made to date to conceptualize the notions of land, power and 
identity (see chapter two) and there is strong agreement among scholars that there is not a single 
definition of any of the three notions. All depends on the context, the disciplinary perspective or 
school of thought. Taking land for example, its meaning in the contemporary academic debate in 
social sciences often relates to one or another phenomenon whether social, political or economic. 
In conflict studies, for instance, land is seen as one of the conflict drivers resulting from the 
dysfunction of the normative framework (whether customary or legal institutions) in post-conflict 
societies (see Jensen et al 2013, Sikor and Mueller 2009). This view of land has of course an 
empirical foundation, while it simultaneously neglects diverse perceptions around land and its 
relation to other social phenomena such as culture, religion, ethnicity or belonging.  
This study recognized this normative view of land related debate. The entire chapter five discussed 
the role of institutions and different normative systems that exist in land management in the DR 
Congo and North Kivu in particular. While it is clear that all the problems raised largely fuel the 
violence around access to land, I acknowledged that land-related conflicts have more than legal 
explanations. Land issues must be considered in a broader perspective that should include actors 
in competition, their claims and their strategies. The example of Banyarwanda has shown that, 
beyond Masisi, land is a disputed ‘good’ whose right is claimed by multiple actors and authorities. 
And any attempt to end violence resulting from it should require a serious approach to address its 
entanglement aspects.  
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Recognizing the existence of multiple actors in violent competition as well the overlapping 
institutions and authorities seems to be key to understand the meaning and the manifestation of 
power, not as a given category but as a dynamic notion under construction by a set of multiple 
actors.  I do agree with Guzzini (2005) when he suggests that one should detach the notion of 
power from states and institutions by taking a close look at ‘politics’ as something that is done by 
actors, beyond states. Masisi, in this regard, is an exemplary case, which provides empirical 
examples of how power is expressed through multiple layers. Power has been associated with 
authority when customary chiefs in Masisi claim the exclusive right to decide who can be granted 
a piece of land without any intervention by state institutions such as cadastral services. Power has 
also been expressed through the government claim to have a monopoly on the use of violence 
during the negotiations with armed groups in 2008 during Goma Conference. While these 
negotiations allowed Banyarwanda military elites to occupy high positions in the national army, 
the general elections in 2006 and 2011 allowed Banyarwanda to access political power at the 
different levels of institutions. Interviewees for example could mention ethnicity or autochthony 
to describe ways in which power is obtained by different actors in competition. A member of the 
provincial bureau of the national electoral commission, for example, underlined that during 
elections in Masisi all candidates used their ethnic identities to mobilize their constituencies in 
which ethnic ties remain strong.  
Although ethnicity is recognized as a tool commonly used in competition over power and resources 
(Lumuna 1998:52), its salience in scale-making processes by actors needs to be contextualized and 
nuanced. Struggles to access land and power are not the causes of violence per se. Rather, they are 
trajectories on which competition between diverse groups heavily involve ethnic identity built 
upon economic and military networks. The example of Masisi has shown that although ethnicity 
has played a role in political competition (as a category of identity), it has been used mainly as a 
means to create relations of kinship and clientelism between individuals and groups, even though 
these relations are not structured and institutionalized. This is not to endorse it as a supposedly 
predominant characteristic in Congolese politics; rather it is a political resource that diverse actors 
can effectively use when interests are at stake. The notion of ethnicity as a political resource in 
Contemporary African politics could provide a better understanding of whether or not ethnicity 
matters.  
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Beyond the primordialist, the instrumentalist and the situational explanations of ethnicity which 
still divide social scientists on the meaning and the role of ethnicity in economic and political 
competition (Becker 2015:12), there is a way to agree that in many societies in contemporary 
Africa ethnic mobilization continues to play diverse roles for multiple ends (Elischer 2013). 
Insofar as state-society relations in many African countries continue to be dominated by the 
dialectic between local and national citizenship in the competition to access power and resources, 
individuals and groups are likely to be identified through the artifices of ethnicity. Talking about 
‘scales of citizenship’ through which ethnicity can be used, Jones and Gaventa (2002:19) argue 
that in the contemporary context of globalization where the global is opposed to the local, there is 
increasing recognition of different groups within and beyond states, at the many different scales in 
which people’s lives are played out. Following Peter Ekeh’s claims three decades ago, that African 
elites move forth and back from the primordial and civic publics, he assumed that the link of 
loyalties between elites and their constituencies are tangible in an epistemological sense (Ekeh 
1975). One can admit that Ekeh’s theory may apply in some places. The example of Masisi, 
however, suggests that although ‘string pullers’ have produced multiple publics through ethnic 
solidarity in the primordial public, once they possess power at different levels, it is hard to confirm 
whether they return social and economic benefits to their constituencies. In chapter five, I 
described how some powerful individuals (string pullers) possess large amounts of farming land 
in Masisi while at the same time families of the same ethnic group strive to access even small plots 
of land to make a living. One can argue that the primordial public remains crucial, but only for 
political and military strategies and to maintain the historical claims as well as to gain support, 
whereas other publics serve as channels to reinforce networks many of which are informal. Being 
a Hunde, Hutu or Tutsi, for example, only allows one to identify the affiliation to an ethnic group 
and to claim a number of rights, but this affiliation may lose its significance in the processes of 
making networks across scales.  
Through this attempt to clarify what the triangle land, power and identity actually mean from the 
point of view of participants involved in this study, I provide a substantial meaning of each notion 
as diverse actors I described in this study experience it. The way in which Land, Power and Identity 
triangle can drive violence in several African countries is recognized by an important body of 
literature (see chapter two) and Masisi, to a large extent, does not make an exception.  It turns out 
that the existing literature on conflicts in the eastern DR Congo has often been descriptive, simply 
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mentioning land, power, and identity without thoroughly explaining what each component of this 
triangle stands for, nor why and in which context each of them has prevailed in a particular period 
of violent conflict. A relevant lesson drawn from Masisi is that deconstructing this triangle to find 
out key factors of violence does not only have theoretical shift but also have policy implications 
in other parts of Africa and beyond. As I stated in the research problem of this thesis, peacebuilding 
organizations gladly welcomed this ‘given’ triangle and tried to implement programs reflecting it. 
But so far, these organizations have struggled to translate this set of multiple layers around land, 
power and identity into concrete projects. A crucial point this thesis seeks to emphasize is that 
land, power and identity and what each of them means in the conflict dynamics cannot be 
successfully addressed only at the local level without other levels through specific actions and 
adapted approach. It is within this interconnection between different notions surrounding land, 
power and identity that peacebuilding interventions should find a way to involve actors who 
continuously navigate across scales. In Masisi, while conflict drivers are seen to be local, ‘string 
pullers’ continue to remotely control local dynamics of violence and this remains unnoticed or 
deliberately ignored by the different projects I analyzed throughout chapters. 
7.4 Future research  
As in any academic research, this study has some limitations. In the process of data analysis and 
its discussion, three main research proposals can be put forward. The analysis of the emergence of 
armed groups has focused on the key powerful individuals who have played a significant role in 
different wars and other political processes. It was noticed that the discourse production by armed 
group leaders seemed to put communities’ claims forward as a strategy for self-legitimization. This 
link could be stressed in future by questioning the extent to which armed groups are legitimated 
by local populations in the areas in which they operate. Future research could focus on the study 
of legitimacy of armed groups as one category of relevant actors in the politics of scale. Second, 
this study investigates the case of Banyarwanda in Masisi and how struggles over access to land 
and nationality and different struggles they experienced against other groups contributed to the 
production of scales. However, the Banyarwanda (i.e. Hutu and Tutsi groups) are not only found 
in Masisi. The same groups live in the Territoire of Rutshuru and Kalehe in South Kivu. Using the 
case of Masisi would eventually pose a problem of generalization of findings beyond Masisi. 
Future research could further explore how scales are produced by integrating informal ‘string 
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pullers’ in the analysis. Third, several key informants provided examples of how some ‘string 
pullers’ have initiatives to find temporary solutions to how peasants can access land, without 
involving international NGOs. Indications are emerging that some powerful individuals are not 
always hostile to peacebuilding. Investigating these initiatives would be a starting point to think 
how to integrate the multi-scalar dimension into the current approach used by peacebuilding.   
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